We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

This is the first part of a paper concerning intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property which cannot be properly extended into logics of the same kind, and are therefore called maximal. To deal with these logics, we use a method based on the search of suitable nonstandard logics, which has an heuristic content and has allowed us to discover a wide family of logics, as well as to get their maximality proofs in a uniform way. The present part illustrates (...) infinitely many maximal logics with the disjunction property extending the well-known logic of Scott, and aims to provide a first picture of the method, sufficient for the reader who wish to achieve an overall understanding of it without entering into the further aspects developed in the second part. From this point of view, the latter will not be self-standing, but will be seen as a prosecution and a complement of the former, with the aim that the material presented in the whole paper can be used as a starting point for a classification of the subject. (shrink)

In Iemhoff we gave a countable basis for the admissible rules of . Here, we show that there is no proper superintuitionistic logic with the disjunction property for which all rules in are admissible. This shows that, relative to the disjunction property, is maximal with respect to its set of admissible rules. This characterization of is optimal in the sense that no finite subset of suffices. In fact, it is shown that for any finite subset X of , for one (...) of the proper superintuitionistic logics Dn constructed by De Jongh and Gabbay ), all the rules in X are admissible. Moreover, the logic Dn in question is even characterized by X: it is the maximal superintuitionistic logic containing Dn with the disjunction property for which all rules in X are admissible. Finally, the characterization of is proved to be effective by showing that it is effectively reducible to an effective characterization of in terms of the Kleene slash by De Jongh. (shrink)

We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

Refutation systems are formal systems for inferring the falsity of formulae. These systems can, in particular, be used to syntactically characterise logics. In this paper, we explore the close connection between refutation systems and admissible rules. We develop technical machinery to construct refutation systems, employing techniques from the study of admissible rules. Concretely, we provide a refutation system for the intermediate logics of bounded branching, known as the Gabbay–de Jongh logics. We show that this gives a characterisation of these logics (...) in terms of their admissible rules. To illustrate the technique, we also provide a refutation system for Medvedev’s logic. (shrink)

In [Ono 1987] H. Ono put the question about axiomatizing the intermediate predicate logicLFin characterized by the class of all finite Kripke frames. It was established in [ Skvortsov 1988] thatLFin is not recursively axiomatizable. One can easily show that for any finite posetM, the predicate logic characterized byM is recursively axiomatizable, and its axiomatization can be constructed effectively fromM. Namely, the set of formulas belonging to this logic is recursively enumerable, since it is embeddable in the two-sorted classical predicate (...) calculusCPC 2. Thus the logicLFin is II 2 0 -arithmetical.Here we give a more explicit II 2 0 -description ofLFin: it is presented as the intersection of a denumerable sequence of finitely axiomatizable Kripke-complete logics. Namely, we give an axiomatization of the logicLB n P m + characterized by the class of all posets of the finite height m and the finite branching n. A finite axiomatization of the predicate logicLP m + characterized by the class of all posets of the height m is known from [Yokota 1989]. We prove thatLB n P m + =,B n being the propositional axiom of the branching n. (shrink)

In this paper we study the admissible rules of intermediate logics. We establish some general results on extensions of models and sets of formulas. These general results are then employed to provide a basis for the admissible rules of the Gabbay–de Jongh logics and to show that these logics have finitary unification type.

Our investigation is concerned with the finite model property with respect to admissible rules. We establish general sufficient conditions for absence of fmp w. r. t. admissibility which are applicable to modal logics containing K4: Theorem 3.1 says that no logic λ containing K4 with the co-cover property and of width > 2 has fmp w. r. t. admissibility. Surprisingly many, if not to say all, important modal logics of width > 2 are within the scope of this theorem–K4 itself, (...) S4, GL, K4.1, K4.2, S4.1, S4.2, GL.2, etc. Thus the situation is completely opposite to the case of the ordinary fmp–the absolute majority of important logics have fmp, but not with respect to admissibility. As regards logics of width ≤ 2, there exists a zone for fmp w. r. t. admissibility. It is shown that all modal logics A of width ≤ 2 extending S4 which are not sub-logics of three special tabular logics have fmp w.r.t. admissibility. (shrink)

Visser's rules form a basis for the admissible rules of . Here we show that this result can be generalized to arbitrary intermediate logics: Visser's rules form a basis for the admissible rules of any intermediate logic for which they are admissible. This implies that if Visser's rules are derivable for then has no nonderivable admissible rules. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the admissibility of Visser's rules. We apply these results to some specific intermediate logics and (...) obtain that Visser's rules form a basis for the admissible rules of, for example, De Morgan logic, and that Dummett's logic and the propositional Gödel logics do not have nonderivable admissible rules. (shrink)

If the Visser rules are admissible for an intermediate logic, they form a basis for the admissible rules of the logic. How to characterize the admissible rules of intermediate logics for which not all of the Visser rules are admissible is not known. In this paper we give a brief overview of results on admissible rules in the context of intermediate logics. We apply these results to some well-known intermediate logics. We provide natural examples of logics for which the Visser (...) rule are derivable, admissible but nonderivable, or not admissible. (shrink)

The Visser rules form a basis of admissibility for the intuitionistic propositional calculus. We show how one can characterize the existence of covers in certain models by means of formulae. Through this characterization, we provide a new proof of the admissibility of a weak form of the Visser rules. Finally, we use this observation, coupled with a description of a generalization of the disjunction property, to provide a basis of admissibility for the intermediate logics BD2 and GSc.

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: each modal logic extendingK4 having the branching property belowm and the effective m-drop point property is decidable with respect to admissibility. A similar result is obtained for intermediate intuitionistic logics with the branching property belowm and the strong effective m-drop point property. Thus, general algorithmic criteria which allow to recognize the admissibility of inference rules for modal and intermediate logics of the above kind are found. These criteria are applicable to (...) most modal logics for which decidability with respect to admissibility is known and to many others, for instance, to the modal logicsK4,K4.1,K4.2,K4.3,S4.1,S4.2,GL.2; to all smallest and greatest counterparts of intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD n; to all intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD n; to all finitely axiomatizable modal and intermediate logics of finite depth etc. Semantic criteria for recognizing admissibility for these logics are offered as well. (shrink)

Infinitely many intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property are defined, each logic being characterized both in terms of a finite axiomatization and in terms of a Kripke semantics with the finite model property. The completeness theorems are used to prove that any two logics are constructively incompatible. As a consequence, one deduces that there are infinitely many maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property.

With each superintuitionistic propositional logic L with a disjunction property we associate a set of modal logics the assertoric fragment of which is L . Each formula of these modal logics is interdeducible with a formula representing a set of rules admissible in L . The smallest of these logics contains only formulas representing derivable in L rules while the greatest one contains formulas corresponding to all admissible in L rules. The algebraic semantic for these logics is described.

This paper is a survey of results concerning the disjunction property, Halldén-completeness, and other related properties of intermediate prepositional logics and normal modal logics containing S4.

This is the second part of a paper devoted to the study of the maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property , whose first part has appeared in this journal with the title “A method to single out maximal propositional logics with the disjunction property I”. In the first part we have explained the general results upon which a method to single out maximal constructive logics is based and have illustrated such a method by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of (...) maximal constructive logics extending the logic ST of Scott, for which, in turn, a semantical characterization in terms of Kripke frames has been given. In the present part we complete the illustration of the method of the first part, having in mind some aspects which might be interesting for a classification of the maximal constructive logics, and an application of the heuristic content of the method to detect the nonmaximality of apparently maximal constructive logics. Thus, on the one hand we introduce the logic AST , which is compared with ST and is seen as a logic “alternative” to it, in a sense which will be precisely explained. We provide a Kripke semantics for AST and show that there are maximal constructive logics which neither are extensions of ST nor are extensions of AST. Finally, we give a further application of the results of the first part by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of a maximal constructive logic extending AST. On the other hand, we compare the maximal constructive logics presented in both parts of the paper with a constructive logic introduced by Maksimova , which has been conjectured to be maximal by Chagrov and Zacharyashchev ; from this comparison a disproof of the conjecture arises. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 03, December 2022. In this paper, we show that there exist (continuum many) varieties of bi-Heyting algebras that are not generated by their complete members. It follows that there exist (continuum many) extensions of the Heyting–Brouwer logic [math] that are topologically incomplete. This result provides further insight into the long-standing open problem of Kuznetsov by yielding a negative solution of the reformulation of the problem from extensions of [math] to extensions of [math].