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  1. DIE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DES ORDO AMORIS IN DER PERSPEKTIVE MAX SCHELERS UND BIN KIMURAS.Guido Cusinato - 2019 - Thaumàzein 7:108-142.
    In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the world of persons with schizophrenia from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler’s indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker. In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the modus vivendi of schizophrenic patients (...)
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  • Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.
    A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...)
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  • Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
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  • What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation.Helene Stephensen & Josef Parnas - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):629-642.
    The purpose of this article is to show how schizophrenia, understood as a distortion of the most intimate structures of subjectivity, illustrates the nature of subjectivity as such, while at the same time how philosophical considerations may help to understand schizophrenia. More precisely, schizophrenic experiences of self-alienation seem to reflect a congealing or concretization of a form of differentiation or potential alterity implicit in the dynamic nature of subjectivity. In other words, we propose that the structure of subjectivity includes potential (...)
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  • Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...)
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  • Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
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  • Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership.Sanneke Haan & Leon Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual (...)
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  • Schizotypal personality traits and prediction of one’s own movements in motor control: What causes an abnormal sense of agency?Tomohisa Asai, Eriko Sugimori & Yoshihiko Tanno - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1131-1142.
    Background. Positive schizophrenic symptoms, especially passivity phenomena, including auditory hallucinations, may be caused by an abnormal sense of agency, which people with schizotypal personality traits also tend to exhibit. A sense of agency asserts that it is oneself who is causing or generating an action. It is possible that this abnormal sense of self-agency is attributable to the abnormal prediction of one’s own movements in motor control. Method. We conducted an experiment using the “disappeared cursor” paradigm in which non-clinical, healthy (...)
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  • Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
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  • Feedback control of one’s own action: Self-other sensory attribution in motor control.Tomohisa Asai - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 38:118-129.
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  • Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
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  • Accounting for the phenomenology and varieties of auditory verbal hallucination within a predictive processing framework.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:142-155.
    Two challenges that face popular self-monitoring theories (SMTs) of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) are that they cannot account for the auditory phenomenology of AVHs and that they cannot account for their variety. In this paper I show that both challenges can be met by adopting a predictive processing framework (PPF), and by viewing AVHs as arising from abnormalities in predictive processing. I show how, within the PPF, both the auditory phenomenology of AVHs, and three subtypes of AVH, can be accounted (...)
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  • Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...)
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  • On the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts: A Critique of Shaun Gallagher’s Neurophenomenological Account of Thought Insertion.Steve Schofield - 2006 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 6 (2):1-10.
    This paper explores the phenomenon of thought insertion, an experience reported by some schizophrenics where it is believed that other persons or forces are inserting thoughts into their minds. This relatively circumscribed symptom of schizophrenia raises difficult questions concerning our sense of agency for our thoughts. How is it possible that persons can think that their thoughts are not their own? Gallagher, drawing on Husserl’s early work on timeconsciousness, provides a subtle and sophisticated answer to this problem, suggesting that protention (...)
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  • The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
    Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...)
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  • The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory.Marc Slors - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):521-542.
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with (...)
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  • Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.
    Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive (...)
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  • Endogenous versus exogenous change: Change detection, self and agency.Bruno Berberian & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):198-214.
    The goal of this study is to characterize observers’ abilities to discriminate between endogenous and exogenous changes. To do so, we developed a new experimental paradigm. On each trial, participants were shown a dot pattern on the screen. Next, the pattern disappeared and participants were to reproduce it. Changes were surreptuously introduced in the stimulus, either by presenting participants anew with the dot pattern they had themselves produced on the previous trial or by presenting participants with a slightly different dot (...)
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  • The “minimal self” in psychopathology: Re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum☆.Michel Cermolacce, Jean Naudin & Josef Parnas - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.
    The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the ‘mineness’ of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, (...)
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  • Wegner on hallucinations, inconsistency, and the illusion of free will. Some critical remarks.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):359-372.
    Wegner’s argument on the illusory nature of conscious will, as developed in The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002) and other publications, has had major impact. Based on empirical data, he develops a theory of apparent mental causation in order to explain the occurrence of the illusion of conscious will. Part of the evidence for his argument is derived from a specific interpretation of the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations as they may occur in schizophrenia. The aim of this paper is (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  • The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience.Jonathan Cole - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):309-325.
    Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It (...)
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  • Corporealized and disembodied minds: A phenomenological view of the body in melancholia and schizophrenia.Thomas Fuchs - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):95-107.
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  • Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  • Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.
    Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst (...)
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  • Delusional beliefs and reason giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  • In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Psychological and philosophical studies have extended J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordances. Affordances are possibilities for bodily action presented to us by the objects of our perception. Recent work has argued that we should extend the actions afforded by perception to mental action. I argue that we can extend the notion of affordance itself. What I call ‘Introspective Affordances’ are possibilities for mental action presented to us by introspectively accessible states. While there are some prima facie worries concerning the non-perceptual (...)
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  • What is it like to lack mineness? Depersonalization as a probe for the scope, nature and role of mineness.Alexandre Billon - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 314-342.
    Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and (...)
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  • Agency and Anxiety: Delusions of Control and Loss of Control in Schizophrenia and Agoraphobia.Shaun Gallagher & Dylan Trigg - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10:181864.
    We review the distinction between sense of agency and sense of ownership, and then explore these concepts, and their reflective attributions, in schizophrenic symptoms and agoraphobia. We show how the underlying dynamics of these experiences are different across these disorders. We argue that these concepts are complex and cannot be reduced to neural mechanisms, but involve embodied and situated processes that include the physical and social environments. We conclude by arguing that the subjective and intersubjective dimensions of agency and ownership (...)
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  • Development of Embodied Sense of Self Scale (ESSS): Exploring Everyday Experiences Induced by Anomalous Self-Representation.Tomohisa Asai, Noriaki Kanayama, Shu Imaizumi, Shinichi Koyama & Seiji Kaganoi - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.Oliver Lukitsch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):955-975.
    Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy (...)
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  • Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2018 - The Psychiatry Quarterly 89 (4):957-968.
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  • All in My Head: Beckett, Schizophrenia and the Self.Elizabeth Barry - 2016 - Journal of Medical Humanities 37 (2):183-192.
    This article will explore the representation of certain mental and somatic phenomena in Beckett’s trilogy of novels Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable, exploring how his understanding of schizophrenia and psychosis informs his representation of the relationship between mind and body. It will also examine recent phenomenological and philosophical accounts of schizophrenia (Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, Shaun Gallagher) that see the condition as a disorder of selfhood and concentrate in it on the disruption to ipseity, a fundamental and pre-reflective awareness (...)
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  • From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind.Micah Allen & Karl J. Friston - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2459-2482.
    Predictive processing approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered (...)
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  • I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  • Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.
    Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...)
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  • Are we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):233-253.
    The target article sketched and explored a mechanism (action-oriented predictive processing) most plausibly associated with core forms of cortical processing. In assessing the attractions and pitfalls of the proposal we should keep that element distinct from larger, though interlocking, issues concerning the nature of adaptive organization in general.
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  • Commentary on Martin & Pacherie. Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.Max Seeger - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):261-263.
    In their article “Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration”, Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie criticize the standard approach to thought insertion. However, their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of what the standard approach actually claims. By clarifying the notions ‘sense of ownership’ and ‘sense of agency’, I show that Martin & Pacherie’s own approach can be construed as a refined version of the standard approach.
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  • A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  • Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74 (C):102770.
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  • Mind/Brain and Economic Behaviour: For a Naturalised Economics.Mario Graziano - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (3):237-264.
    Neuroeconomics is a science pledged to tracing the neurobiological correlates involved in decision-making, especially in the case of economic decisions. Despite representing a recent research field that is still identifying its research objects, tools and methods, its epistemological scope and scientific relevance have already been openly questioned by several authors. Among these critics, the most influential names in the debate have been those of Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, who claim that the data on neural activity cannot find place in (...)
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  • Psychopathy: Morally Incapacitated Persons.Heidi Maibom - 2017 - In Thomas Schramme & Steven Edwards (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer. pp. 1109-1129.
    After describing the disorder of psychopathy, I examine the theories and the evidence concerning the psychopaths’ deficient moral capacities. I first examine whether or not psychopaths can pass tests of moral knowledge. Most of the evidence suggests that they can. If there is a lack of moral understanding, then it has to be due to an incapacity that affects not their declarative knowledge of moral norms, but their deeper understanding of them. I then examine two suggestions: it is their deficient (...)
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  • Voices and Thoughts in Psychosis: An Introduction.Sam Wilkinson & Ben Alderson-Day - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):529-540.
    In this introduction we present the orthodox account of auditory verbal hallucinations, a number of worries for this account, and some potential responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, in particular the question of how different it is supposed to be from AVHs. We then mention two ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices and thoughts in psychosis, and then present the motivation (...)
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  • Biological Psychiatry and Normative Problems: From Nosology to Destigmatization Campaigns.Romain Schneckenburger - 2011 - Medicine Studies 3 (1):9-17.
    Psychiatry is becoming a cognitive neuroscience. This new paradigm not only aims to give new ways for explaining mental diseases by naturalizing them, but also to have an influence on different levels of psychiatric norms. We tried here to verify whether a biological paradigm is able to fulfill this normative goal. We analyzed three main normative assumptions that is to say the will of giving psychiatry a valid nosology, a rigorous definition of what is a mental disease, and new tools (...)
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  • Unraveling the mind.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):214-215.
    A radical interpretation of the predictive coding approach suggests that the mind is “seamless” – that is, that cancellation of error signals can propagate smoothly from highest to lowest levels of the control hierarchy, dissolving a distinction between belief and perception. Delusions of alien control provide a test case. Close examination suggests that while they are evidence of predictive coding within the cortex, they are not evidence for the seamless interpretation.
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  • Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...)
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  • Sense of agency over thought: External misattribution of thought in a memory task and proneness to auditory hallucination.Eriko Sugimori, Tomohisa Asai & Yoshihiko Tanno - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):688-695.
    Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased and that scores (...)
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  • Schizophrenia and the Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.Hanna Pickard - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):55 - 74.
    Extant philosophical accounts of schizophrenic alien thought neglect three clinically signifi cant features of the phenomenon. First, not only thoughts, but also impulses and feelings, are experienced as alien. Second, only a select array of thoughts, impulses, and feelings are experienced as alien. Th ird, empathy with experiences of alienation is possible. I provide an account of disownership that does justice to these features by drawing on recent work on delusions and selfknowledge. Th e key idea is that disownership occurs (...)
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  • Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
    There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able (...)
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  • Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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