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  1. Ways of Integrating HPS: Top-down, Bottom-up, and Iterations.Kye Palider - 2021 - In Hakob Barseghyan, Jamie Shaw, Paul Edward Patton & Gregory Rupik (eds.), Scientonomy: The Challenges of Constructing a Theory of Scientific Change. Wilmington: Vernon Press. pp. 21-40.
    Philosophy of science and history of science have been unable to integrate in a meaningful fashion. The major difficulty has been the question of how the history of science can inform the philosophy of science. By making several distinctions to characterize the type of philosophy of science relevant for integrated HPS, I show how traditional approaches to integration failed. These include a top-down and a bottom-up philosophical approach to integrated HPS. I then present a more fruitful way of integrating the (...)
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  • Larry Laudan’s Typology for Historical Methodology and the Historical and Experimental Turns in Philosophy of Science.Jutta Schickore - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (1):87-107.
    Today, Larry Laudan is known predominantly for his work on the pessimistic metainduction and for his discussion of science and values. This essay examines a less familiar part of Laudan’s work, his typology of historical methodologies from the late 1970s. My aim is to elucidate Laudan’s typology and to examine one of the types in more depth, namely, the “pragmatic, symbiotic” model of historical methodology. Laudan expounded the model in the essays that eventually became his 1981 book Science and Hypothesis. (...)
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  • Philosophy of Science and History of Science: A Productive Engagement.Eric Palmer - 1991 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Philosophy of science and history of science both have a significant relation to science itself; but what is their relation to each other? That question has been a focal point of philosophical and historical work throughout the second half of this century. An analysis and review of the progress made in dealing with this question, and especially that made in philosophy, is the focus of this thesis. Chapter one concerns logical positivist and empiricist approaches to philosophy of science, and the (...)
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  • Lakatos’ “Internal History” as Historiography.Eric Palmer - 1993 - Perspectives on Science 1 (4):603-626.
    Imre Lakatos' conception of the history of science is explicated with the purpose of replying to criticism leveled against it by Thomas Kuhn, Ian Hacking, and others. Kuhn's primary argument is that the historian's internal—external distinction is methodologically superior to Lakatos' because it is "independent" of an analysis of rationality. That distinction, however, appears to be a normative one, harboring an implicit and unarticulated appeal to rationality, despite Kuhn's claims to the contrary. Lakatos' history, by contrast, is clearly the history (...)
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  • Kuhn, Popper, and the Superconducting Supercollider.Andrew T. Domondon - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):301-314.
    The demise of the Superconducting Supercollider is often explained in terms of the strain that it placed on the federal budget of the United States, and change in national security interests with the end of the Cold War. Recent work by Steve Fuller provides a framework to re-examine this episode in epistemological terms using the work of Kuhn and Popper. Using this framework, it is tempting to explain the demise as resulting from the overly Kuhnian character of its proponents, who (...)
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  • Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism.Howard Sankey - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (4):437-445.
    The aim of this paper is to document Laudan's rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory (...)
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  • Toward a rational theory of progress.Menachem Fisch - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):277 - 304.
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  • Some problems facing intuitionist meta-methodologies.Larry Laudan - 1986 - Synthese 67 (1):115 - 129.
    Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for historical (as opposed to contemporary or imaginary) test cases. What all such (...)
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  • Comment on John Yolton's 'is there a history of philosophy? Some difficulties and suggestions'.W. H. Williams - 1986 - Synthese 67 (1):23 - 32.
    In this comment on John Yolton's Is There a History of Philosophy? (Yolton, 1985) I review his account of the development during the 17th to 19th centuries of a common sense of the range of philosophical problems and of the canon of philosophical works. I suggest that his account may be read in light of Rorty's four genres of historiography (Rorty, 1984). I criticize his view of the place of the history of philosophy in philosophy as too timid, though correct (...)
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  • How and Why I Write History of Science.Menachem Fisch - 2013 - Science in Context 26 (4):573-585.
    I have always been a philosopher at heart. I write history of science and history of its philosophy primarily as a philosopher wary of his abstractions and broad conceptualizations. But that has not always been the case. Lakatos famously portrayed history of science as the testing ground for theories of scientific rationality. But he did so along the crudest Hegelian lines that did injury both to Hegel and to the history and methodology of science. Since science is ultimately rational, he (...)
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  • Cognitive values, theory choice, and pluralism : on the grounds and implications of philosophical diversity.Guy Stanwood Axtell - unknown
    Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1991.
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