Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Freedom and Indoctrination.Michael Garnett - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):93-108.
    It has been alleged that compatibilists are committed to the view that agents act freely and responsibly even when subject to certain forms of radical manipulation. In this paper I identify and elucidate a form of compatibilist freedom, social autonomy, that is essential to understanding what is wrong with ordinary indoctrination and argue that it also holds the key to understanding what goes wrong in more fanciful manipulation cases.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Coercion: The Wrong and the Bad.Michael Garnett - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):545-573.
    The idea of coercion is one that has played, and continues to play, at least two importantly distinct moral-theoretic roles in our thinking. One, which has been the focus of a number of recent influential treatments, is a primarily deontic role in which claims of coercion serve to indicate relatively weighty prima facie wrongs and excuses. The other, by contrast, is a primarily axiological or eudaimonic role in which claims of coercion serve to pick out instances of some distinctive kind (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Agency and Inner Freedom.Michael Garnett - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):3-23.
    This paper concerns the relationship between two questions. The first is a question about inner freedom: What is it to be rendered unfree, not by external obstacles, but by aspects of oneself? The second is a question about agency: What is it to fail at being a thing that genuinely acts, and instead to be a thing that is merely acted upon, passive in relation to its own behaviour? It is widely believed that answers to the first question must rest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy as Social Independence: Reply to Weimer.Michael Garnett - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):155-159.
    I defend my pure social account of global autonomy from Steven Weimer's recent criticisms. In particular, I argue that it does not implicitly rely upon the very kind of nonsocial conception of autonomy that it hopes to replace.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Freedom and Unpredictability.Michael Garnett - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):666-680.
    In A Metaphysics for Freedom, Helen Steward proposes and defends a novel version of the libertarian account of free action. Amongst several objections that she considers to her view, one that looms particularly large is the Challenge from Chance: ‘the most powerful, widely-promulgated and important line of anti-libertarian reasoning’. This paper begins by arguing that Steward’s response to the Challenge is not fully convincing. It then goes on to explore a further possible libertarian line of defence against the Challenge, arguing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Exploitation and International Clinical Research: The Disconnect Between Goals and Policy.Danielle M. Wenner - 2018 - In David Boonin (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy. Cham, Switzerland: pp. 563-574.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ageism and Autonomy in Health Care: Explorations Through a Relational Lens.Laura Pritchard-Jones - 2017 - Health Care Analysis 25 (1):72-89.
    Ageism within the context of care has attracted increasing attention in recent years. Similarly, autonomy has developed into a prominent concept within health care law and ethics. This paper explores the way that ageism, understood as a set of negative attitudes about old age or older people, may impact on an older person’s ability to make maximally autonomous decisions within health care. In particular, by appealing to feminist constructions of autonomy as relational, I will argue that the key to establishing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mental Illness, Natural Death, and Non-Voluntary Passive Euthanasia.Jukka Varelius - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):635-648.
    When it is considered to be in their best interests, withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment from non-competent physically ill or injured patients – non-voluntary passive euthanasia, as it has been called – is generally accepted. A central reason in support of the procedures relates to the perceived manner of death they involve: in non-voluntary passive euthanasia death is seen to come about naturally. When a non-competent psychiatric patient attempts to kill herself, the mental health care providers treating her are obligated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Self-Validating Neuroenhancement Be Autonomous?Jukka Varelius - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture.Chris Mills - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):495-509.
    Choice architecture is heralded as a policy approach that does not coercively reduce freedom of choice. Still we might worry that this approach fails to respect individual choice because it subversively manipulates individuals, thus contravening their personal autonomy. In this article I address two arguments to this effect. First, I deny that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous. I explain the reasons we have for avoiding heteronomous policy-making and offer a set of four conditions for non-heteronomy. I then provide examples of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations