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What Logics Mean: From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics

New York: Cambridge University Press (2013)

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  1. Truth and Proof without Models: A Development and Justification of the Truth-valuational Approach (2nd edition).Hanoch Ben-Yami - manuscript
    I explain why model theory is unsatisfactory as a semantic theory and has drawbacks as a tool for proofs on logic systems. I then motivate and develop an alternative, the truth-valuational substitutional approach (TVS), and prove with it the soundness and completeness of the first order Predicate Calculus with identity and of Modal Propositional Calculus. Modal logic is developed without recourse to possible worlds. Along the way I answer a variety of difficulties that have been raised against TVS and show (...)
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  • Categoricity by convention.Julien Murzi & Brett Topey - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3391-3420.
    On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories: though they typically enjoy categoricity results—for instance, Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for second-order and Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity theorem (...)
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  • Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This book revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. Shadows of Syntax is the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. It (...)
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  • Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1667-1680.
    I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be (...)
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  • Categorical Quantification.Constantin C. Brîncuş - 2024 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 30 (2):pp. 227-252.
    Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...)
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  • Inferential Quantification and the ω-rule.Constantin C. Brîncuş - 2024 - In Antonio Piccolomini D'Aragona (ed.), Perspectives on Deduction: Contemporary Studies in the Philosophy, History and Formal Theories of Deduction. Springer Verlag. pp. 345--372.
    Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...)
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  • Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):391-415.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  • Sentence connectives in formal logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Compositionality Solves Carnap’s Problem.Denis Bonnay & Dag Westerståhl - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):721-739.
    The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Partiality and Adjointness in Modal Logic.Wesley H. Holliday - unknown - In Rajeev Gore (ed.), Advances in modal logic, volume. pp. 313-332.
    Following a proposal of Humberstone, this paper studies a semantics for modal logic based on partial “possibilities” rather than total “worlds.” There are a number of reasons, philosophical and mathematical, to find this alternative semantics attractive. Here we focus on the construction of possibility models with a finitary flavor. Our main completeness result shows that for a number of standard modal logics, we can build a canonical possibility model, wherein every logically consistent formula is satisfied, by simply taking each individual (...)
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  • Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action.Thomas Müller (ed.) - 2014 - Wien, Austria: Springer.
    This volume seeks to further the use of formal methods in clarifying one of the central problems of philosophy: that of our free human agency and its place in our indeterministic world. It celebrates the important contributions made in this area by Nuel Belnap, American logician and philosopher. Philosophically, indeterminism and free action can seem far apart, but in Belnap’s work, they are intimately linked. This book explores their philosophical interconnectedness through a selection of original research papers that build forth (...)
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  • Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...)
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  • A New Semantics for Vagueness.Joshua D. K. Brown & James W. Garson - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):65-85.
    Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative (...)
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  • Explicating Logical Independence.Lloyd Humberstone - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (1):135-218.
    Accounts of logical independence which coincide when applied in the case of classical logic diverge elsewhere, raising the question of what a satisfactory all-purpose account of logical independence might look like. ‘All-purpose’ here means: working satisfactorily as applied across different logics, taken as consequence relations. Principal candidate characterizations of independence relative to a consequence relation are that there the consequence relation concerned is determined by only by classes of valuations providing for all possible truth-value combinations for the formulas whose independence (...)
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  • Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):152-163.
    The following books have been received and many of them are still available for review. Interested reviewers please contact the reviews editor: [email protected], M., The Figure of This World:...
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  • Logic Reduced To (Proof-Theoretical) Bare Bones.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (2):193-209.
    What is a minimal proof-theoretical foundation of logic? Two different ways to answer this question may appear to offer themselves: reduce the whole of logic either to the relation of inference, or else to the property of incompatibility. The first way would involve defining logical operators in terms of the algebraic properties of the relation of inference—with conjunction $$\hbox {A}\wedge \hbox {B}$$ A ∧ B as the infimum of A and B, negation $$\lnot \hbox {A}$$ ¬ A as the minimal (...)
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