- Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.details
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Rationality, coordination, and convention.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Synthese 84 (1):1 - 21.details
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(1 other version)Co‐Ordination, Salience and Rationality.Seumas Miller - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):359-370.details
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(1 other version)Co-ordination, salience and rationality.Seumas Miller - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):359-370.details
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(1 other version)Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior.Robert Sugden - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):69-89.details
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Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.details
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What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 9-40.details
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Methodological rules as conventions.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (4):477-495.details
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Bridging psychology and game theory yields interdependence theory.Paul A. M. Van Lange & Marcello Gallucci - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):177-178.details
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On the principle of coordination.Maarten C. W. Janssen - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):221-234.details
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Correlated equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):347 - 364.details
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Rationality and salience.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):61-77.details
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Strategic behavior and counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.details
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The logic of team reasoning.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.details
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Coordination without meta-representation.Camilla Colombo & Francesco Guala - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (5):684-717.details
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Simplicity, Inference and Modelling: Keeping It Sophisticatedly Simple.Arnold Zellner, Hugo A. Keuzenkamp & Michael McAleer (eds.) - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation.Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):163-185.details
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We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory.Alessandra Smerilli - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):539-560.details
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Rationalizing Focal Points.Maarten C. W. Janssen - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (2):119-148.details
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On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation.Robert Sugden - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):713-737.details
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No Title available: Reviews.Bruno Verbeek - 1999 - Economics and Philosophy 15 (1):144-152.details
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When and why Conventions cannot Be Social Institutions.Vojtěch Zachník - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1235-1254.details
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Collective obligations, group plans and individual actions.Allard Tamminga & Hein Duijf - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):187-214.details
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Strategic interdependence, hypothetical bargaining, and mutual advantage in non-cooperative games.Mantas Radzvilas - unknowndetails
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Je peut-il raisonner avec les autres? Représentations et représentation de l’agent économique dans le raisonnement en équipe.Aude Lambert - 2018 - Revue de Philosophie Économique 19 (1):119-134.details
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Can we rationally learn to coordinate?Sanjeev Goyal & Maarten Janssen - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (1):29-49.details
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Payoff dominance and the stackelberg heuristic.Andrew M. Colman & Michael Bacharach - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):1-19.details
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30 Years After ‘ Morals by Agreement’.Mohamad Al-Hakim & Garrett Mac Sweeney - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):593-600.details
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