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  1. We ought to agree: A consequence of repairing Goldman's group scoring rule.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):101-114.
    In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman presents a framework to quantify the epistemic effects that various policies, procedures, and behaviors can have on a group of agents. In this essay, I show that the framework requires some modifications when applied to agents with credences. The required modifications carry with them an interesting consequence, namely, that any group whose members disagree can become more accurate by forming a consensus through averaging their credences. I sketch a way that this result (...)
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  • (1 other version)Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinction between (...)
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  • Information Versus Knowledge in Confirmation Theory.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2012 - Logique Et Analyse 226:137-149.
    I argue that so-called 'background knowledge' in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with 'knowledge' in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as 'background information', which need not be believed in, justified, or true.
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  • Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.
    In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of modality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered (...)
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  • On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash University
    This dissertation looks at a set of interconnected questions concerning the foundations of probability, and gives a series of interconnected answers. At its core is a piece of old-fashioned philosophical analysis, working out what probability is. Or equivalently, investigating the semantic question of what is the meaning of ‘probability’? Like Keynes and Carnap, I say that probability is degree of reasonable belief. This immediately raises an epistemological question, which degrees count as reasonable? To solve that in its full generality would (...)
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  • Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
    Bayesians standardly claim that there is rational pressure for agents’ credences to cohere across time because they face bad (epistemic or practical) consequences if they fail to diachronically cohere. But as David Christensen has pointed out, groups of individual agents also face bad consequences if they fail to interpersonally cohere, and there is no general rational pressure for one agent's credences to cohere with another’s. So it seems that standard Bayesian arguments may prove too much. Here, we agree with Christensen (...)
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  • The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.
    The epistemic probability of A given B is the degree to which B evidentially supports A, or makes A plausible. This paper is a first step in answering the question of what determines the values of epistemic probabilities. I break this question into two parts: the structural question and the substantive question. Just as an object’s weight is determined by its mass and gravitational acceleration, some probabilities are determined by other, more basic ones. The structural question asks what probabilities are (...)
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  • Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos.João Miguel Biscaia Branquinho, Desidério Murcho & Nelson Gonçalves Gomes (eds.) - 2006 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Martins Fontes.
    Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...)
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  • What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
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  • Raciocínio científico e probabilidade: uma comparação entre o bayesianismo e a estatística do erro.Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal & Breno Hermann - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (1):115.
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  • Bayesianism and language change.Jon Williamson - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):53-97.
    Bayesian probability is normally defined over a fixed language or eventspace. But in practice language is susceptible to change, and thequestion naturally arises as to how Bayesian degrees of belief shouldchange as language changes. I argue here that this question poses aserious challenge to Bayesianism. The Bayesian may be able to meet thischallenge however, and I outline a practical method for changing degreesof belief over changes in finite propositional languages.
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  • The Concept of Rationality for a City.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - Topoi 40 (2):409-421.
    The central aim of this paper is to argue that there is a meaningful sense in which a concept of rationality can apply to a city. The idea will be that a city is rational to the extent that the collective practices of its people enable diverse inhabitants to simultaneously live the kinds of life they are each trying to live. This has significant implications for the varieties of social practices that constitute being more or less rational. Some of these (...)
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  • Deliberation, Judgement and the Nature of Evidence.Jon Williamson - unknown
    A normative Bayesian theory of deliberation and judgement requires a procedure for merging the evidence of a collection of agents. In order to provide such a procedure, one needs to ask what the evidence is that grounds Bayesian probabilities. After finding fault with several views on the nature of evidence (the views that evidence is knowledge; that evidence is whatever is fully believed; that evidence is observationally set credence; that evidence is information), it is argued that evidence is whatever is (...)
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  • A New Group Dutch Book Argument.Matthew Kopec - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):122-136.
    In this essay, I repair the group Dutch Book argument presented by Donald Gillies. I then examine what additional assumptions would be needed for the argument to generate genuinely normative prescriptions for groups of inquirers. Although the resulting norms will apply to fewer groups than Gillies originally intended, they are still an important addition to the normative landscape in social epistemology.
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  • Norms of Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison
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  • Keynes after Ramsey: In defence of a treatise on probability.Jochen Runde - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.
    Ramsey's critique of Keynes's ‘logical’ approach to probability is widely regarded as decisive, and his own ‘subjective’ approach and SEU framework are now familiar tools in economics. This paper challenges the standard view of Ramsey's critique and assesses the SEU model from a Keynesian viewpoint on probability. It consists of a summary of the two theories and an evaluation of Ramsey's criticisms and alternative. The two main conclusions are that although Keynes yields to Ramsey on the question of the existence (...)
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  • Popper's Contribution to the Philosophy of Probability.Donald Gillies - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:103-120.
    Popper's writings cover a remarkably wide range of subjects. The spectrum runs from Plato's theory of politics to the foundations of quantum mechanics. Yet even amidst this variety the philosophy of probability occupies a prominent place. David Miller once pointed out to me that more than half of Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery is taken up with discussions of probability. I checked this claim using the 1972 6th revised impression of The Logic of Scientific Discovery , and found that (...)
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  • Intersubjective corroboration.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
    How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued. -/- If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t (...)
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  • Henri Poincaré and bruno de finetti: Conventions and scientific reasoning.B. S. Gower - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):657-679.
    In his account of probable reasoning, Poincaré used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincaré's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincaré's conventionalism as (...)
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  • Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument.C. Waidacher - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):293-312.
    Probabilistic theories of rationality claim that degrees of belief have to satisfy the probability axioms in order to be rational. A standard argument to support this claim is the Dutch Book argument. This paper tries to show that, in spite of its popularity, the Dutch Book argument does not provide a foundation for normative theories of rationality. After a presentation of the argument and some of its criticisms a problem is pointed out: the Dutch Book argument applies only to situations (...)
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