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Paraconsistent dynamics

Synthese 193 (1):1-14 (2016)

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  1. A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Yuri David Santos - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):451-489.
    Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information, which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available (...)
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  • Paraconsistent Logic.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change.Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Marcio M. Ribeiro - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):632-672.
    Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual (...)
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  • Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Francesco Berto & Christopher Badura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193.
    We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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  • Dialetheism.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and (...)
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  • Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
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