- Epistemological contextualism: Its past, present, and prospects.Andrew P. Norman - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):383-418.details
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Analytical marxism: A form of critical theory. [REVIEW]Kai Nielsen - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):1 - 21.details
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The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.details
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Error in action and belief.Natika Newton - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):363-401.details
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The reliable route from nonmoral evidence to moral conclusions.Neil Sinhababu - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Clear and Distinct Perception in the Stoics, Augustine, and William of Ockham.Tamer Nawar - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):185-207.details
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Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification.Jeremy Koons - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):203-218.details
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Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):602-617.details
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Reliabilism and Demon World Victims.Jennifer Wilson Mulnix - 2013 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 44:35-82.details
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A new solution to the safety dilemma.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-17.details
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A new argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2333-2353.details
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Grades of explanation in cognitive science.Richard Montgomery - 1998 - Synthese 114 (3):463-495.details
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Explaining dubious assertions.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):825-830.details
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Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.details
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Scientific Ethics: A New Approach.Marcello Menapace - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics 25 (4):1193-1216.details
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‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know.Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):183-205.details
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The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.details
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On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4243-4260.details
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Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science. Tom Sorell. [REVIEW]James Maffie - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):677-679.details
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“Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive Africa”: some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments. [REVIEW]James Maffie - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):207-224.details
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Naturalism, scientism and the independence of epistemology.James Maffie - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (1):1 - 27.details
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Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux.B. J. C. Madison - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):741-755.details
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Conditional reasoning and conditional logic.William G. Lycan - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):223 - 245.details
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Do corporations have minds of their own?Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):265-297.details
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Perdurantism, fecklessness and the veil of ignorance.Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2565-2576.details
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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Reliabilism and induction.Michael Levin - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):297 - 334.details
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How to make the generality problem work for you.Christopher Lepock - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):275-286.details
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Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs.Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):115-132.details
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Thomas Reid on truth, evidence and first principles.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):156-166.details
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A pragmatic case against pragmatic theological realism.Wang-yen Lee - 2009 - Heythrop Journal 50 (3):479-494.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Arational belief convergence.Charles Lassiter - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6329-6350.details
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The normativity of naturalistic epistemology.Markus Lammenranta - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):337-358.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.details
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A minimal expression of non–reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):706–723.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Knowledge without Truth.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):29-51.details
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Conservatism and its virtues.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):143 - 163.details
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Knowledge, criticism, and coherence.Thieu Kuys - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):41 - 60.details
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Moral Intuitions: seeming or believing?Christopher B. Kulp - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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A logic for factive ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.details
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Elgin’s community-oriented steadfastness.Klaas J. Kraay - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4985-5008.details
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How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist.David Mark Kovacs - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2129-2152.details
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Should we replace knowledge by understanding? — A comment on Elgin and Goodman's reconception of epistemology.Dirk Koppelberg - 1993 - Synthese 95 (1):119 - 128.details
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A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
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Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.details
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Group knowledge: a real-world approach.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):813-839.details
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