Cet article porte sur les conditions méthodologiques de compréhension des croyances en sciences sociales. Selon une certaine tradition épistémologique, l’attribution de rationalité aux agents est une condition nécessaire à l’explication compréhensive de leurs attitudes et actions. Cet article évalue cette idée en interrogeant le rôle d’une telle attribution dans la manière dont certains historiens et politistes ont tenté de comprendre l’erreur d’appréciation stalinienne concernant l’imminence de l’attaque allemande. Après avoir explicité l’approche poppérienne du principe de rationalité, je définis son équivalent (...) doxastique : l’hypothèse de rationalité épistémique. J’examine ensuite la manière dont ces travaux mobilisent puis réfutent cette hypothèse. (shrink)

Ignorance can excuse otherwise blameworthy action, but only if the ignorance itself is blameless. One way to avoid culpable ignorance is to pay attention when epistemic peers disagree. Expressed disagreements place an obligation on the agent to pay attention when an interlocutor disagrees, or risk culpable ignorance for which they might later be found blameworthy. Silence, on the other hand, is typically taken as assent. But in cases of suppressed disagreement, the silenced interlocutor has information that could save the agent (...) from ignorance in scenarios where that ignorance might lead to harmful action, and silence does not actually indicate assent. The problem is further complicated because the agent might not be aware of the fact that a silenced interlocutor has information that could prevent ignorance, and consequent harmful action. In this paper, I provide a new account of excuses from ignorance in situations of suppressed disagreement. I do this in the context of two cases; Kelly’s hypothetical case of the Tyrannical Dictator, and the real-world case of former South African President Thabo Mbeki and his AIDS denialist policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. (shrink)

In a certain picture of cooperative conversation, ‘silence gives assent’. However, in adversarial contexts, structured by power dynamics, silence may be a powerful expression of dissent. To reconcile these opposite interpretations, I propose an analysis of silence as the expression of a default attitude. Given pragmatic cues, participants infer the cooperativeness of conversational settings. Depending on cooperativeness, they assign a default attitude (of assent, of suspension of judgment, of dissent) to other participants, that they take intentional silence to express. This (...) analysis takes the main effect of speech acts to be proposals to update the conversational Common Ground, and highlights the necessity of assent in conversational updates. (shrink)

One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in a Social and Digital World” is the epidemic of ‘fake news’ and a cluster of trust- relevant vices we commonly associate with those who share it, click on it, and believe it. Fake news consumers are, among other things, gullible and naïve. Many are also dogmatic: intellectually and/or emotionally tied to a view point, and as a result, too quick to uncritically (...) trust whatever aligns with it. Gullibility, naivety, and dogmatism are all examples of vices that lead to us trust when we shouldn’t. The effects of these kinds of vices can be dangerous. Our aim here, however, is to explore the other side of the coin: those character vices that lead us to refrain from trusting when we should trust. For ease of reference, call these vices of distrust. Vices of distrust are dangerous in their own right, and in ways that often harm others along with oneself. The three vices of distrust we want explore—with a particular focus on their manifestations online—are: closemindedness, emulousness, and arrogance. Each contributes to vicious distrust in its own distinctive way. (shrink)