Citations of:
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


According to some philosophers, the Liar paradox arises because of a mistaken theory of truth. Its lesson is that we must reject some instances of the naive propositional truthschema ⌜It is true that φ if and only if φ⌝. In this paper, I construct a novel semantic paradox in which no principle even analogous to the truthschema plays any role. I argue that this undermines the claim that we ought to respond to the Liar by revising our theory of truth. 

Most paradoxes of selfreference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the TruthTeller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not selfmembered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are selfmembered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s (...) 

There are two paradoxes of satisfaction, and they are of different kinds. The classic satisfaction paradox is a version of Grelling’s: does ‘does not satisfy itself’ satisfy itself? The Unsatisfied paradox finds a predicate, P, such that Px if and only if x does not satisfy that predicate: paradox results for any x. The two are intuitively different as their predicates have different paradoxical extensions. Analysis reduces each paradoxical argument to differing rule sets, wherein their respective pathologies lie. Having different (...) 

This article has one aim, to reject the claim that negation is semantically ambiguous. The first section presents the putative incompatibility between truthvalue gaps and the truthschema; the second section presents the motivation for the ambiguity thesis; the third section summarizes arguments against the claim that natural language negation is semantically ambiguous; and the fourth section indicates the problems of an introduction of two distinct negation operators in natural language. 

Festschrift in Honor of Barry Smith on the occasion of his 65th Birthday. Published as issue 4:4 of the journal Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization. Includes contributions by Wolfgang Grassl, Nicola Guarino, John T. Kearns, Rudolf Lüthe, Luc Schneider, Peter Simons, Wojciech Żełaniec, and Jan Woleński. 

Poincaré in a 1909 lecture in Göttingen proposed a solution to the apparent incompatibility of two results as viewed from a definitionist perspective: on the one hand, Richard’s proof that the definitions of real numbers form a countable set and, on the other, Cantor’s proof that the real numbers make up an uncountable class. Poincaré argues that, Richard’s result notwithstanding, there is no enumeration of all definable real numbers. We apply previous research by Luna and Taylor on Richard’s paradox, indefinite (...) 

The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...) 

Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truthvaluegaps and is consistent (nondialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language. 





I address the claim by Valor and Martínez that Goldstein's cassationist approach to Liarlike paradoxes generates paradoxes it cannot solve. I argue that these authors miss an essential point in Goldstein's cassationist approach, namely the thesis that paradoxical sentences are not able to make the statement they seem to make. 