In this article we approach a case of intersemiotic translation as a paradigmatic example of Boden’s ‘transformational creativity’ category. To develop our argument, we consider Boden’s fundamental notion of ‘conceptual space’ as a regular pattern of semiotic action, or ‘habit’ (sensu Peirce). We exemplify with Gertrude Stein’s intersemiotic translation of Cézanne and Picasso’s proto-cubist and cubist paintings. The results of Stein’s IT transform the conceptual space of modern literature, constraining it towards new patterns of semiosis. Our association of Boden’s framework (...) to describe a cognitive creative phenomenon with a philosophically robust theory of meaning results in a cognitive semiotic account of IT. (shrink)

This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...) highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow. Conversely, since says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it (...) undermines the prescriptive scope of. Drawing on C. S. Peirce's distinction between genuine and contrived doubt, I maintain that critical revisions of beliefs should be triggered only by unwanted disruptions of habits, thereby restoring unity between McDowell's two theses. (shrink)

This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...) highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together. (shrink)

Creativity is the hallmark of human intelligence. Roli et al. (Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution 9:806283, 2022) state that algorithms cannot achieve human creativity. This paper analyzes cooperation between humans and intelligent algorithmic tools to compensate for algorithms’ limited creativity. The intelligent tools have functionality from the neocortex, the brain’s center for learning, reasoning, planning, and language. The analysis provides four key insights about human-tool cooperation to solve challenging problems. First, no neocortex-based tool without feelings can achieve human creativity. Second, (...) an interactive tool exploring users’ feeling-guided creativity enhances the ability to solve complex problems. Third, user-led abductive reasoning incorporating human creativity is essential to human-tool cooperative problem-solving. Fourth, although stakeholders must take moral responsibility for the adverse impact of tool answers, it is still essential to teach tools moral values to generate trustworthy answers. The analysis concludes that the scientific community should create neocortex-based tools to augment human creativity and enhance problem-solving rather than creating autonomous algorithmic entities with independent but less creative problem-solving. (shrink)

This paper attempts to establish a systems-semiotic framework explaining creativity in the design process, where the design process is considered to have as its basis the cognitive process. The design process is considered as the interaction between two or more cognitive systems resulting in a purposeful and ongoing transformation of their already complex representational structures and the production of newer ones, in order to fulfill an ill-defined goal. Creativity is considered as the result of an emergence of organizational complexity in (...) each cognitive system participating in the design process, while it is trying to purposefully incorporate new constraints in its meaning structures. The meanings generated in each system are identified as the contingent and anticipatory content of its representations, and where self-organization is the dominant process in which they are continuously involved. Furthermore, Peircean semiotic processes appear to provide the functionality needed by the emergent representational structures in order to complete the cycle of a creative design process. Creativity originates in the abductive stage of the semiotic process, the fallible nature of which is maintained in the proposed framework by the fact that the respective emergent representations can be misfits. The nodal points of the framework are identified and analyzed showing that a cognitive system needs the whole interactive anticipatory cycle in order to engage in a creative design process. (shrink)

El presente artículo presenta cuatro visiones sobre la función de la abducción en el pragmatismo de Peirce y el modo en que afronta el tema de la novedad en la ciencia. La primera visión reduce la abducción a una intuición. La segunda indica que la abducción no sirve sin un “instinto descubridor”, la tercera apunta a que la abducción es insuficiente para explicar la novedad en la ciencia. La cuarta visión, que es la que se sostiene en este artículo, afirma (...) que desde el pensamiento de Peirce se dan las herramientas suficientes para resolver el problema de la novedad en la ciencia desde el pragmatismo como lógica de la abducción. Estas herramientas son las tres tesis cotarias. (shrink)