- Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):93-115.details
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New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures.Vincenzo Crupi, Nick Chater & Katya Tentori - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):189-204.details
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(1 other version)Cost-Benefit versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.Alex C. Michalos - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970 (1):375-402.details
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)T. S. Kuhn, functionalism, and sociology of knowledge. [REVIEW]Homa Katouzian - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):166-173.details
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A pragmatic modification of explicativity for the acceptance of hypotheses.I. J. Good & Alan F. McMichael - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):120-127.details
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A reinstatement, in response to Gillies, of Redhead's argument in support of induction.I. J. Good - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (3):470-472.details
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(1 other version)Random Thoughts about Randomness.Irving John Good - 1972 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:117-135.details
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Information and Explanatory Goodness.David H. Glass - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.details
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On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations.Michael P. Cohen - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1077-1089.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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A simplification of the theory of simplicity.Samuel A. Richmond - 1996 - Synthese 107 (3):373 - 393.details
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Structural Properties of Qualitative and Quantitative Accounts to Coherence.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):579-598.details
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Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):813-829.details
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Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge. pp. 90--100.details
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Explicativity, corroboration, and the relative odds of hypotheses.Irving John Good - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):39 - 73.details
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Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.details
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A bayesian approach in the philosophy of inference. [REVIEW]I. J. Good - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):161-166.details
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On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.details
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Bayesianism and support by novel facts.Colin Howson - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):245-251.details
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A historical comment concerning novel confirmation.I. J. Good - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):184-185.details
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A correction concerning complexity.I. J. Good - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):289.details
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Theoretical simplicity and defeasibility.Evan Fales - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (2):273-288.details
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Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):139--159.details
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(1 other version)Cost-benefit versus expected utility acceptance rules.Alex C. Michalos - 1970 - Theory and Decision 1 (1):61-88.details
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A good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the event.I. J. Good - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (2):251-253.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 (C):81-90.details
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On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.details
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