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  1. The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.
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  • Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  • Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.
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  • Can cognitive science create a cognitive economics?Nick Chater - 2015 - Cognition 135 (C):52-55.
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  • There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.
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  • An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):86-105.
    In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905–930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement-Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of the virtue of (...)
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  • The cognitive functions of language.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):657-674.
    This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is _de facto_ the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include (...)
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  • Mirroring cannot account for understanding action.Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):23-24.
    Susan Hurley's shared circuits model (SCM) rightly begins in action and progresses through a series of layers; but it fails to reach action understanding because it relies on mirroring as a driving force, draws on heavily criticized theories, and neglects the need for shared experience in our grasp of social understanding.
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  • How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121-138.
    Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental (...)
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  • Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.
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  • Frames, reasoning, and the emergence of conventions.Nicola Campigotto - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (3):383-400.
    This paper examines the perceptual and reasoning processes that underpin regularities in behaviour. A distinction is made between situations as they are, or as described by an omniscient external observer, and situations as agents see or frame them. Different frames can stem from differences in culture, experience and personality, as well as from other context-specific factors. Drawing upon David Lewis’s Convention, I show that consistency between reasoning and experience does not preclude individuals from understanding the same state of affairs differently, (...)
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  • Hierarchical levels of imitation.R. W. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):516-517.
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  • Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.
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  • Language and its role in understanding intentional relations: Research tool or mechanism of development?Nancy Budwig & Michael Bamberg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):125-126.
    In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.
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  • Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.
    According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May et al (2010), (...)
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  • Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading.Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  • Do we “acquire” culture or vice versa?Jerome Bruner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):515-516.
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  • Algunas reflexiones acerca de la simulación mental y la perspectiva de la primera persona.Patricia Brunsteins - 2008 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 20 (1):7-38.
    Suele considerarse a las teorías de la racionalidad, las teorías de la teoría y las teorías de la simulación mental como diversas estrategias de atribución mental, cada una de las cuales, desde una concepción tradicional, sería única y exhaustiva. En este trabajo examino algunas versiones de la teoría de la simulación mental y, particularmente, la perspectiva desde la cual estas describen la atribución mental. Finalmente, a partir de ciertas críticas, reformulo el sentido de la perspectiva de la primera persona que (...)
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  • Discussion of Bill Brewer's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”.Bill Brewer, David de Bruijn, Chris Hill, Adam Pautz, T. Raja Rosenhagen, Miloš Vuletić & Wayne Wu - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):19-32.
    What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject (...)
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  • Social-emotional and auto-operational roots of cultural (peer) learning.Stein Braten - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):515-515.
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  • We read minds to shape relationships.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
    Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...)
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  • Towards a new image of culture in wild chimpanzees?Christophe Boesch - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):514-515.
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  • Theory, observation, and drama.Simon Blackburn - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):187-203.
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  • Science as if situation mattered.Michel Bitbol - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):181-224.
    When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. (...)
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  • Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoning.Leda Berio - 2020 - Synthese (Special Issue: THE CULTURAL EVOL):1-30.
    I argue that both language acquisition and cultural and social factors contribute to the formation of schemata that facilitate false belief reasoning. While the proposal for an active role of language acquisition in this sense has been partially advanced by several voices in the mentalizing debate, I argue that other accounts addressing this issue present some shortcomings. Specifically, I analyze the existing proposals distinguishing between “structure-oriented” views :1858–1878, 2007; de Villiers in Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford University (...)
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  • Theory, the Final Frontier? A Corpus-Based Analysis of the Role of Theory in Psychological Articles.Sieghard Beller & Andrea Bender - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Uncertain reasoning about agents' beliefs and reasoning.John A. Barnden - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 9 (2-3):115-152.
    Reasoning about mental states and processes is important in various subareas of the legal domain. A trial lawyer might need to reason and the beliefs, reasoning and other mental states and processes of members of a jury; a police officer might need to reason about the conjectured beliefs and reasoning of perpetrators; a judge may need to consider a defendant's mental states and processes for the purposes of sentencing and so on. Further, the mental states in question may themselves be (...)
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  • Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  • The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.
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  • Simulation is not enough: A hybrid model of disgust attribution on the basis of visual stimuli.Luca Barlassina - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...)
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  • Sharing a perspective precedes the understanding of that perspective.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):513-514.
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  • Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third (...)
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  • Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychology.John A. Barker - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.
    Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory– the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP’s fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be (...)
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  • Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.
    Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
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  • Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.
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  • A developmental theory requires developmental data.Kim A. Bard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):511-512.
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  • Are children with autism acultural?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):512-513.
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  • Eliminativism and an Argument from Science.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.
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  • Empathy with vicious perspectives? A puzzle about the moral limits of empathetic imagination.Olivia Bailey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9621-9647.
    Are there limits to what it is morally okay to imagine? More particularly, is imaginatively inhabiting morally suspect perspectives something that is off-limits for truly virtuous people? In this paper, I investigate the surprisingly fraught relation between virtue and a familiar form of imaginative perspective taking I call empathy. I draw out a puzzle about the relation between empathy and virtuousness. First, I present an argument to the effect that empathy with vicious attitudes is not, in fact, something that the (...)
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  • Minimal theory of mind – a Millikanian Approach.Nimra Asif - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-26.
    Minimal theory of mind is presented in the theory of mind literature as a middle ground between full-blown ToM and mere behavior-reading. Minimal ToM seems to be a useful construct for studying and understanding the minds of nonhuman animals and infants. However, providing an account of minimal ToM on which minimal mindreading is significantly less demanding than full-blown mindreading yet more than just a behavior-reading process is a challenge. In this paper, I argue that to address this challenge, we need (...)
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  • A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory.Nobuhiko Asakura & Toshio Inui - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Experiential Explanation.Sara Aronowitz & Tania Lombrozo - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1321-1336.
    People often answer why-questions with what we call experiential explanations: narratives or stories with temporal structure and concrete details. In contrast, on most theories of the epistemic function of explanation, explanations should be abstractive: structured by general relationships and lacking extraneous details. We suggest that abstractive and experiential explanations differ not only in level of abstraction, but also in structure, and that each form of explanation contributes to the epistemic goals of individual learners and of science. In particular, experiential explanations (...)
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  • Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.
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  • The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation.Angela Arkway - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.
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  • Folk psychology, consciousness, and context effects.Adam Arico - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
    Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires . Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental states that are not paradigmatically considered intentional. (...)
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  • Beyond Simulation–Theory and Theory–Theory: Why social cognitive neuroscience should use its own concepts to study “theory of mind”.Ian A. Apperly - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):266-283.
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  • Choice or No Choice: Is the Langer Effect Evidence Against Simulation?Anton Kühberger, Josef Perner, Michael Schulte & Robert Leingruber - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):423-436.
    The discussion of whether people understand themselves and others by using theories of behaviour (theory theory) or by simulating mental states (simulation theory) lacks conclusive empirical evidence. Nichols et al. (1996) have proposed the Langer effect (Langer, 1975) as a critical test. From people's inability accurately to predict the difference in the subjective value of lottery tickets in choice and no‐choice conditions, they argued that people do not simulate behaviour in such situations. In a series of four experiments, we consistently (...)
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  • The roots of self-awareness.Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.
    In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account.
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  • How to learn from our mistakes: Explanation and moral justification.Kristin Andrews - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):247 – 263.
    A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally heinous actions. Human folk psychology in this area is prone to a specific error of conflating an explanation for behaviour with a justification of it. An analysis of the error leads me to conclude that simulation is used to generate both explanations and justifications of heinous acts. (...)
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  • Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.
    Barresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
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