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  1. Rethinking Synesthesia.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.
    Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as ?seeing? sounds as colors or ?smelling? colors as odors. It is commonly assumed these days that such synesthetic experiences must be instances of misperceptions. Against this widespread assumption, I will highlight that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations. On this view, which I will back up by conceptual arguments (...)
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  • Rethinking the Senses and Their Interactions: The Case for Sensory Pluralism.Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Synaesthesia and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Wager.Richard Gray - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):339-46.
    Wager has argued that synaesthesia provides material for a counterexample to representational theories of the phenomenal character of experience. He gives a series of three cases based on synaesthesia; he requires the second and third cases to bolster the doubtfulness of the first. Here I further endorse the problematic nature of the first case and then show why the other two cases do not save his argument. I claim that whenever synaesthesia is a credible possibility its phenomenal character can be (...)
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  • Synaesthesia Misrepresented.A. Wager - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):347-351.
    Gray argues that my three earlier counterexamples fail to refute representational theories of phenomenal character. I maintain that, despite Gray's arguments, each example does in fact work against the particular representational theory at which it is targeted. Further, I question whether my internalism regarding phenomenal character and Gray's externalism regarding modularity are in genuine conflict with one another.
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  • You Can See What 'I' Means.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70.
    This paper takes up the question of whether we can visually represent something as having semantic value. Something has semantic value if it represents some property, thing or concept. An argument is offered that we can represent semantic value based on a variety of number-color synesthesia. This argument is shown to withstand several objections that can be lodged against the popular arguments from phenomenal contrast and from the mundane example of reading.
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