Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking ‘What is X?’ questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with ‘What is X for?’ questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study (...) of Russell's metaphilosophy, which was just such a revisionary conception of conceptual analysis. (shrink)

In a previous paper, an elementary and thoroughly arithmetical proof of Fermat’s last theorem by induction has been demonstrated if the case for “n = 3” is granted as proved only arithmetically (which is a fact a long time ago), furthermore in a way accessible to Fermat himself though without being absolutely and precisely correct. The present paper elucidates the contemporary mathematical background, from which an inductive proof of FLT can be inferred since its proof for the case for “n (...) = 3” has been known for a long time. It needs “Hilbert mathematics”, which is inherently complete unlike the usual “Gödel mathematics”, and based on “Hilbert arithmetic” to generalize Peano arithmetic in a way to unify it with the qubit Hilbert space of quantum information. An “epoché to infinity” (similar to Husserl’s “epoché to reality”) is necessary to map Hilbert arithmetic into Peano arithmetic in order to be relevant to Fermat’s age. Furthermore, the two linked semigroups originating from addition and multiplication and from the Peano axioms in the final analysis can be postulated algebraically as independent of each other in a “Hamilton” modification of arithmetic supposedly equivalent to Peano arithmetic. The inductive proof of FLT can be deduced absolutely precisely in that Hamilton arithmetic and the pransfered as a corollary in the standard Peano arithmetic furthermore in a way accessible in Fermat’s epoch and thus, to himself in principle. A future, second part of the paper is outlined, getting directed to an eventual proof of the case “n=3” based on the qubit Hilbert space and the Kochen-Specker theorem inferable from it. (shrink)

This paper explores the main philosophical approaches of David Hilbert’s theory of proof. Specifically, it is focuses on his ideas regarding logic, the concept of proof, the axiomatic, the concept of truth, metamathematics, the a priori knowledge and the general nature of scientific knowledge. The aim is to show and characterize his epistemological approach on the foundation of knowledge, where logic appears as a guarantee of that foundation. Hilbert supposes that the propositional apriorism, proposed by him to support mathematics, sustains (...) — on its turn — a general method for the treatment of the problem in other areas such as natural sciences. This method is axiomatic. Broadly speaking, we intend to recover and update the Hilbert’s philosophical thinking about the role of logic for scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Hilbert’s choice operators τ and ε, when added to intuitionistic logic, strengthen it. In the presence of certain extensionality axioms they produce classical logic, while in the presence of weaker decidability conditions for terms they produce various superintuitionistic intermediate logics. In this thesis, I argue that there are important philosophical lessons to be learned from these results. To make the case, I begin with a historical discussion situating the development of Hilbert’s operators in relation to his evolving program in the (...) foundations of mathematics and in relation to philosophical motivations leading to the development of intuitionistic logic. This sets the stage for a brief description of the relevant part of Dummett’s program to recast debates in metaphysics, and in particular disputes about realism and anti-realism, as closely intertwined with issues in philosophical logic, with the acceptance of classical logic for a domain reflecting a commitment to realism for that domain. Then I review extant results about what is provable and what is not when one adds epsilon to intuitionistic logic, largely due to Bell and DeVidi, and I give several new proofs of intermediate logics from intuitionistic logic+ε without identity. With all this in hand, I turn to a discussion of the philosophical significance of choice operators. Among the conclusions I defend are that these results provide a finer-grained basis for Dummett’s contention that commitment to classically valid but intuitionistically invalid principles reflect metaphysical commitments by showing those principles to be derivable from certain existence assumptions; that Dummett’s framework is improved by these results as they show that questions of realism and anti-realism are not an “all or nothing” matter, but that there are plausibly metaphysical stances between the poles of anti-realism and realism, because different sorts of ontological assumptions yield intermediate rather than classical logic; and that these intermediate positions between classical and intuitionistic logic link up in interesting ways with our intuitions about issues of objectivity and reality, and do so usefully by linking to questions around intriguing everyday concepts such as “is smart,” which I suggest involve a number of distinct dimensions which might themselves be objective, but because of their multivalent structure are themselves intermediate between being objective and not. Finally, I discuss the implications of these results for ongoing debates about the status of arbitrary and ideal objects in the foundations of logic, showing among other things that much of the discussion is flawed because it does not recognize the degree to which the claims being made depend on the presumption that one is working with a very strong logic. (shrink)

This note relates to two recent papers in the journal. The main point was to highlight Kempe's theory of multisets (as we now call them), especially in the background to the start of Peirce's theory of existential graphs.

During the first half of the twentieth century, mainstream answers to the foundational crisis, mainly triggered by Russell and Gödel, remained largely perfectibilist in nature. Along with a general naturalist wave in the philosophy of science, during the second half of that century, this idealist picture was finally challenged and traded in for more realist ones. Next to the necessary preliminaries, the present paper proposes a structured view of various philosophical accounts of mathematics indebted to this general idea, laying the (...) ground for a desirable integration of their strenghts. (shrink)

The book begins with a reconstruction of Aristotle's syllogistic as viewed by some of the well-known logicians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, that is, as expanded to include singular p...

Symbolic logics tend to be too mathematical for the philosophers and too philosophical for the mathematicians; and their history is too historical for most mathematicians, philosophers and logicians. This paper reflects upon these professional demarcations as they have developed during the century.

The paper examines the roots of Husserlian phenomenology in Weierstrass's approach to analysis. After elaborating on Weierstrass's programme of arithmetization of analysis, the paper examines Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic as an attempt to provide foundations to analysis. The Philosophy of Arithmetic consists of two parts; the first discusses authentic arithmetic and the second symbolic arithmetic. Husserl's novelty is to use Brentanian descriptive analysis to clarify the fundamental concepts of arithmetic in the first part. In the second part, he founds the (...) symbolic extension of the authentically given arithmetic with stepwise symbolic operations. In the process of doing so, Husserl comes close to defining the modern concept of computability. The paper concludes with a brief comparison between Husserl and Frege. While Frege chose to subject arithmetic to logical analysis, Husserl wants to clarify arithmetic as it is given to us. Both engage in a kind of analysis, but while Frege analyses within Begriffsschrift, Husserl analyses our experiences. The difference in their methods of analysis is what ultimately grows into two separate schools in philosophy in the 20th century. (shrink)

We discuss the many aspects and qualities of the number one: the different ways it can be represented, the different things it may represent. We discuss the ordinal and cardinal natures of the one, its algebraic behaviour as a neutral element and finally its role as a truth-value in logic.

There are many wonderful puzzles concerning Principia Mathematica, but none are more striking than those arising from the crisis that befell Whitehead in November of 1910. Volume 1 appeared in December of 1910. Volume 2 on cardinal numbers and Russell's relation arithmetic might have appeared in 1911 but for Whitehead's having halted the printing. He discovered that inferences involving the typically ambiguous notation ‘Nc‘α’ for the cardinal number of α might generate fallacies. When the volume appeared in 1912, it was (...) extensively emended by Whitehead and accompanied by a Prefatory Statement of Symbolic Conventions. This paper endeavors to recover from Whitehead's bad emendations—including his bewildering thesis that since ‘‘α’ is ‘true whenever significant,’ ‘α is to be accepted. It is supposedly a fallacy to apply Modus Ponens and infer Nc‘α from ‘α and‘‘α. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was one of the most prominent figures in the formation and development of mathematical logic. It is widely acknowledged that his work in this field exerted tremendous influence in the West, especially in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The important role he played in inspiring Chinese interest in this subject, however, is virtually unknown. This paper describes Russell's contributions to the introduction of mathematical logic in China through a discussion of his lectures in Beijing in (...) March of 1921, and the subsequent Chinese translations of his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and Principia Mathematica. (shrink)

We extend the language of the classical syllogisms with the sentence-forms “At most 1 p is a q” and “More than 1 p is a q”. We show that the resulting logic does not admit a finite set of syllogism-like rules whose associated derivation relation is sound and complete, even when reductio ad absurdum is allowed.

After a brief flirtation with logicism around 1917, David Hilbertproposed his own program in the foundations of mathematics in 1920 and developed it, in concert with collaborators such as Paul Bernays andWilhelm Ackermann, throughout the 1920s. The two technical pillars of the project were the development of axiomatic systems for everstronger and more comprehensive areas of mathematics, and finitisticproofs of consistency of these systems. Early advances in these areaswere made by Hilbert (and Bernays) in a series of lecture courses atthe (...) University of Göttingen between 1917 and 1923, and notably in Ackermann's dissertation of 1924. The main innovation was theinvention of the -calculus, on which Hilbert's axiom systemswere based, and the development of the -substitution methodas a basis for consistency proofs. The paper traces the developmentof the ``simultaneous development of logic and mathematics'' throughthe -notation and provides an analysis of Ackermann'sconsistency proofs for primitive recursive arithmetic and for thefirst comprehensive mathematical system, the latter using thesubstitution method. It is striking that these proofs use transfiniteinduction not dissimilar to that used in Gentzen's later consistencyproof as well as non-primitive recursive definitions, and that thesemethods were accepted as finitistic at the time. (shrink)

We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ?sortal terms?, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ?momental sectors?: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules for (...) (in)valid deduction, inference or substitution. Third, we elaborate on two neglected features of logic: the various modes of negating some part(s) of a proposition R, not only its ?external? negation not-R; and the assertion of R in the pair of propositions ?it is (un)true that R? belonging to the neglected logic of asserted propositions, which is usually left unstated. We also address the overlooked task of testing the asserted truth-value of R. Fourth, we locate logic among other foundational studies: set theory and other theories of collections, metamathematics, axiomatisation, definitions, model theory, and abstract and operator algebras. Fifth, we test this characterisation in two important contexts: the formulation of some logical paradoxes, especially the propositional ones; and indirect proof-methods, especially that by contradiction. The outcomes differ for asserted propositions from those for unasserted ones. Finally, we reflect upon self-referring self-reference, and on the relationships between logical and mathematical knowledge. A subject index is appended. (shrink)

For logicians and metaphysicians curious about the evolution of Russell's logic from The Principles of Mathematics to Principia Mathematica, no volume of the Collected Papers of Bertr...