Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I argue (...) that on each of them the argument either begs the question or is unsound. (shrink)

Spinoza is most often seen as a stern advocate of mechanistic efficient causation, but examining his philosophy in relation to the Aristotelian tradition reveals this view to be misleading: some key passages of the Ethics resemble so much what Suárez writes about emanation that it is most natural to situate Spinoza's theory of causation not in the context of the mechanical sciences but in that of a late scholastic doctrine of the emanative causality of the formal cause; as taking a (...) look at the seventeenth-century philosophy of mathematics reveals, this is in consonance also with Spinoza's geometrical cast of mind. Against this background, I examine Spinoza's essentialist model of causation according to which each thing has a formal character determined by the thing's essence and what follows from that essence. In the case of real things this essential causal architecture results in efficacy, i.e. in bringing about real effects, the key idea being that without the essential, formally structured causal thrust there would be no efficacy in the first place. I also explain how this model accounts for efficient causation taking place between finite things. (shrink)

This paper examines Descartes's third primary notion and the distinction between different kinds of knowledge based on different and mutually irreducible primary notions. It discusses the application of the notions of clearness and distinctness to the domain of knowledge based on that of mind-body union. It argues that the consequences of the distinctions Descartes is making with regard to our knowledge of the human mind and nature are rather different from those that have been attributed to Descartes due to the (...) influential Rylean picture of Cartesian mind-body dualism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT E. M. Curley has said that Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum “is as obscure on examination as it is compelling at first glance.” Why should that be? Maybe because the cogito raises so many textual and interpretive questions. Is it an argument or an intuition? If it is an argument, does it require an additional premise? Is it best interpreted as a “performance?” Is it best seen as the discovery that any reason proposed for doubting its success entails the meditator’s (...) existence? And so on. But all these questions typically arise in the wake of worries about the cogency of the cogito when it is treated as an argument and worded in its canonical form, “I think, therefore I exist.” In this essay, I focus on what I take to be the most fundamental reason for questioning the cogito’s cogency when it is so treated—namely that the “I” in its premise is question-begging. I distinguish that reason from other reasons that are sometimes conflated with it, and I argue that it is not a good reason. I then comment on some of the questions mentioned above in light of my defense of the cogito seen in that traditional way. (shrink)

What is the relationship between persons, animals, and machines? The author first presents a form of argument against any attempt to reduce biology to mechanism. He then runs a parallel argument for psychology and biology. But although he tries to resist reduction, he insists that to bring into being a person or an animal requires no more than the construction of a certain sort of machine, or causal engine, such that certain normative standards can be applied to its behavior If (...) to call an entity a machine is to forego such commitments, then, trivially, no animal or person could be a machine. If the term "machine" implies no more than the presence of a causal engine, natural or artificial, then machines can be, and some are, animals or people. (shrink)

Special issue of the Journal for Early Modern Studies (4.1., Spring 2005) Guest Editor: Lucian Petrescu. -/- .

In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...) to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face with its own freedom. This feeling of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt (suspension). (shrink)

According to the Monist Interpretation of Descartes, there is really only one corporeal substance—the entire extended plenum. Evidence for this interpretation seems to be provided by Descartes in the Synopsis of the Meditations, where he claims that all substances are incorruptible. Finite bodies, being corruptible, would then fail to be substances. On the other hand, ‘body, taken in the general sense,’ being incorruptible, would be a corporeal substance. In this paper, I defend a Pluralist Interpretation of Descartes, according to which (...) there are many corporeal substances. In particular, I show that none of the claims in the Synopsis about incorruptibility and substance entail either that finite bodies are not substances, or that the only corporeal substance is the entire plenum. (shrink)

Znaczenie epistemiczne aktualnie jasnych i wyraźnych ujęć w epistemologii Kartezjusza W niniejszym artykule omawiam kwestię dotyczącą roli, jaką Kartezjusz wyznaczył w budowie gmachu wiedzy pewnej temu, co można określić mianem aktualnie jasnych i wyraźnych ujęć. Powyższa kwestia jest od dawna przedmiotem ożywionej dyskusji wśród komentatorów epistemologii Kartezjusza. W współczesnej literaturze historyczno-filozoficznej spotkać można dwie zasadnicze interpretacje na temat funkcji jaką pełnią w systemie Kartezjusza aktualnie jasne i wyraźne ujęcia. Pierwszą można nazwać interpretacją psychologiczną, drugą zaś normatywną. Ta ostatnia głosi, że (...) aktualnie jasne i wyraźne ujęcia są całkowicie odporne na wątpienie zanim jeszcze dowiedzie się istnienia Boga i ustali ogólną regułę prawdy. Z tego względu ich pewność nie ogranicza się u Kartezjusza jedynie do pewności psychologicznej, lecz ma charakter normatywny. Opowiadam się za interpretacją normatywną. Przemawiają za nią – moim zdaniem – liczne racje. Ale rodzi ona także pewne trudności. Dlatego po przedstawieniu argumentów przemawiających na jej rzecz i niewątpliwych zalet wynikających z jej przyjęcia, omawiam szczegółowo pewne trudności zarówno tekstowe, jak i merytoryczne, którym musi sprostać ta interpretacja, jeśli mamy ją utrzymać. (shrink)

First, I offer a solution to the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation, drawing on the fact of its distinctness in kind. Secondly, I demonstrate how, contrary to what is denied, Descartes’ metaphysical commitments allow for the intellect's clear and distinct conception of the mind–body union. Central to my two-fold defence is a novel account of the metaphysics of Descartes’ Causal Principle: its neutrality, and the unanalysable, fundamental nature of causality. Without the presupposition, and uniqueness of the mind-body union there (...) can be no mind-body interaction; this throws new light on current concerns in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Argues that Descartes's commitment to mind-body causation leads to a commitment to body-body causation.

In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation : the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes’ virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist (...) solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief. (shrink)

Positive thinking is one of the most valuable tools that postmodern man possesses for personal development and transforming community life. Positive thinking is based on the harmonious relation of the individual with himself, with the others, and with the surrounding reality. It comes at the end of a process of conscious change which the individual goes through in gradual steps, and becomes nuanced as thinking and personal practices develop. Our starting point is the role of thinking as laid out by (...) Descartes. Descartes’ conception of philosophy as a thought system points to the acquisition of virtue through knowledge of truth, by cultivating measure, and thus highlighting man as a thinking being. The entire effort of achieving knowledge, of acquiring wisdom, has a moral finality. Its fundament is the presence of God as the infinite instance that deems possible the free manifestation of the human person. As a thinking being, the human subject brings himself into existence. He certifies the reality of the world. Everything takes place on the horizon of the infinite self-existence represented by the philosophical idea of God. As a spiritual being, man can use thinking to shape his desires, to master his willpower, but most of all, to integrate himself in the process of conscious personal development. (shrink)

Este artículo examina cómo la separabilidad y unidad mente-cuerpo resultan clave para poner de manifiesto lo inapropiado del “teatro cartesiano”, metáfora creada por Daniel Dennett para criticar la experiencia consciente unificada en Descartes. La primera sección introduce al problema de la separabilidad cartesiana. La segunda examina cómo mente y cuerpo, separables mediante lo concebible según Descartes, resultan ser cosas metafísicamente distintas. La tercera enfatiza como separables no implica separados. La última sección enfatiza el argumento de la dis-analogía del piloto y (...) el navío, y cómo, según el filósofo francés, aunque separables, mente y cuerpo son substancias estrechamente unidas, formando un ens per se. En vista de este, criticamos la metáfora del “teatro cartesiano” de Dennett: es imposible que la mente sea un espectador, puesto que la experiencia consciente ya es unificada e incluso somatizada. Notamos, por último, que pese a Dennett, hay investigadores de la Ciencia Cognitiva que coinciden con Descartes en relación con la estrecha unión mente-cuerpo, i.e., quienes defienden que la mente es encarnada, incrustada o incluso extendida. (shrink)

Ocurre algo curioso con la manera cómo vemos la doctrina de Descartes. Sabemos, por un lado, que es un dualismo y, por el otro, que es un mecanicismo. Sinembargo, rara vez paramos mientes en el hecho de que esa combinación esinsólita desde el punto de vista de nuestras actuales mores filosóficas. El dualistacontemporáneo suele ser antimecanicista y el mecanicista contemporáneo suele ser antidualista. Este artículo ofrece una revisión de las obras principales deDescartes en un intento por hacer comprensible a los (...) lectores contemporáneosuna combinación doctrinal cuya naturaleza chocante no percibimos por el merohecho de que tendemos a mantener sus diversas partes en compartimentosestancos. La revisión que se propone nos muestra, de paso, que Descartes esun autor mucho más interesante y rico de lo que esconden los clichés ordinarios. Así por ejemplo, tomar en serio el intento de Descartes de construir unafísica y una fisiología nos llevaría a reconocer que sus preocupaciones metafísicas, contra la opinión común, están bastante lejos de ser el centro de su obra. (shrink)

This re-examination of the cogito is prompted by a substantive question which has not previously been identified: the distinguishability of the I or self. Consequently, its force has not been addre...