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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Making room for options : moral reasons, imperfect duties, and choice
In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Moral obligation. Cambridge University Press (2010)
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Explores the basic forms of responsibility that we willingly assume and the collaborative fulfillment that we find in each. |
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If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as (...) |
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If conduct must be wrongful in order to be justifiably criminalised, how should its wrongfulness be established? I examine a conception of wrongfulness put forward by A. P. Simester, which makes wrongfulness turn on whether the reasons favouring the performance of an action are, all things considered, defeated by the reasons against its performance. I argue that such a view can only generate appropriate substantive constraints in the context of criminalisation if it can distinguish between the sorts of reasons that (...) |
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It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you (...) |
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BackgroundHealth data holds great potential for improved treatments. Big data research and machine learning models have been shown to hold great promise for improved diagnostics and treatment planning. The potential is tied, however, to the availability of personal health data. In recent years, it has been argued that data from health records should be available for health research, and that individuals have a duty to make the data available for such research. A central point of debate is whether such secondary (...) |
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It is often claimed both that forgiveness is elective and that forgiveness is something that we do for reasons. However, there is a tension between these two central claims about the nature of forgiveness. If forgiving is something one does for reasons, then, at least sometimes, those reasons may generate a requirement to forgive or withhold forgiveness. While not strictly inconsistent with electivity, the idea of required forgiveness strikes some as antithetical to the spirit of the concept. They argue that (...) |
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If conduct must be wrongful in order to be justifiably criminalised, how should its wrongfulness be established? I examine a conception of wrongfulness put forward by A. P. Simester, which makes wrongfulness turn on whether the reasons favouring the performance of an action are, all things considered, defeated by the reasons against its performance. I argue that such a view can only generate appropriate substantive constraints in the context of criminalisation if it can distinguish between the sorts of reasons that (...) |
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This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds. |
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