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Reasons, Competition, and Latitude

Justin Snedegar

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press (2021)

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Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.details There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
How Should We Understand the Balancing View of Ought?Alexander Arridge - forthcoming - Ethics.details Thomas Schmidt argues that a widely held combination of views about reasons and ought—the Balancing View of Ought and the claim that reasons against Q are reasons for not-Q—is extensionally adequate only if it is complemented by two principles of reasons transmission. In this paper I present three problems for Schmidt’s package of views and two problems for his transmission principles considered in isolation. I then defend a rival package of views—a version of the Balancing View and the claim that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought.Benjamin Kiesewetter - manuscriptdetails According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Defending The Importance of Being Rational: Replies to Bedke and Guindon, Hazlett, and Way.Errol Lord - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):168-183.details Defending The Importance of Being Rational: Replies to Bedke and Guindon, Hazlett, and Way By LordErrol. Download Export citation Bookmark
The weight of reasons: a framework for ethics.Chris Tucker - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.details The book develops, defends, and applies a "Dual Scale" model of weighing reasons to resolve various issues in ethics. It tells you everything you ever wanted to know about weighing reasons and probably a lot of stuff you didn't want to know too. It addresses, among other things, what the general issue of weighing reasons is; what it is to weigh reasons correctly; whether reasons have more than one weight value (e.g., justifying, requiring, and/or commending weight); whether weight values are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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