The Habermasian concept of ‘interest’ has had a profound effect on the characterization of scientific disciplines. Going beyond issues unrelated to the theory itself, intra‐theoretical interest characterizes the specific ways of approaching any science‐related discipline, defining research topics and methodologies. This approach was developed by Jürgen Habermas in relation to empirical–analytical sciences, historical–hermeneutics sciences, and critical sciences; however, he did not make any specific references to health sciences. This article aims to contribute to shaping a general epistemological framework for health (...) sciences, as well as its specific implications for the medical and nursing areas, via an analysis of the basic knowledge interests developed by Habermas. (shrink)

This article challenges E.P. Thompson's definition of ‘moral economy’ as a traditional consensus of crowd rights that were swept away by market forces. Instead, it suggests that the concept has the potential of improving the understanding of modern civil society. Moral economy was a term invented in the eighteenth century to describe many things. Thompson's approach reflects only a minor part of this conceptual history. His understanding of moral economy is conditioned by a dichotomous view of history and by the (...) acceptance of a model according to which modern economy is not subject to moral concerns. It is on principle problematic to confine a term conjoining two concepts as general as ‘moral’ and ‘economy’ to a specific historical and social setting. Recent approaches that frame moral economy as an emotively defined order of morals are also misleading since they do not address economic issues in the way they are commonly understood. The most promising current approaches appear to be those that consider t.. (shrink)

The twin theories of late 20th-century societal constellations, functionalist modernization theory and neo-Marxist theories of late capitalism, fell into crisis and disrepute during the 1970s and 1980s. Social theory responded to such double crisis of the theorizing of `capitalism' and of `modernization' by embracing the term `modernity', a term that, almost unknown in social thought before the end of the 1970s, appeared to provide a new common ground in terms of representing the present societal constellation. At the same time, however, (...) the move towards such a common reference term appeared to entail the loss of all possibility of critique. Traditionally, critique used to embrace modernity (even without using the term) and to denounce capitalism because of its inability to complete the project of modernity - or rather: because of the obstacles it posed to such completion. To use the term `modernity' for a contemporary reality that was without doubt capitalist as well, made such a conceptual strategy impossible. Instead of returning to standard theories of capitalism, however, it is argued here that both capitalism and critique need to be reconceptualized in the light of their relation to modernity if the both intellectual and sociopolitical transformations since the 1970s are to be taken seriously. (shrink)

L'interet de Habermas pour lamodernitédont traite son dernier livre, le tourne vers les travaux de Foucault. Celui-ci aurait mis en évidence, dès l'Histoire de la folie, ce qu'il y a de nouveau sous le ciel de la rationalité moderne. Dans plusieurs chapitres consacrés à Foucault, Habermas esquisse une critique qui s'inspire substantiellement des travaux de Fink-Eitel, Fraser, Honegger, Rippel et Münkler, Dreyfus et Rabinow et de Honneth. Cette critique est radicale et prend pour cible la présumée théorie du pouvoir de (...) Foucault, les impasses où conduisent les instructions méthodologiques qu'il entend observer pour reconstruire l'histoire recente des sciences humaines, ainsi que les thèses au sujet du rapport entre les pratiques discursives et les pratiques non discursives, plus exactement les dispositifs de pouvoir dans lesquels les sciences humaines se trouvent intégrées. Bien que Foucault n'ait jamais développé une telle théorie du pouvoir et qu'il dise n'avoir jamais voulu l'élaborer, on doit constater avec Habermas que le thème du pouvoir est pourtant omniprésent, et que le concept de pouvoir doit ëtre considéré comme une notion centrale dans son oeuvre. (shrink)

Modernity seems to bring a type of relationship with life whereby life appears to be distant. Individuals may mitigate this distance by attaining a meaningful life, but this requires time, decisions and a purpose. In the late modern context, these dimensions – time, decisions and vital purposes – appear to be shaped in a way that further increases this remoteness. This paper analyses how the narratives associated with these three dimensions foster a way of understanding them that restricts the relationship (...) which individuals build with their own lives. The late-modern remoteness from life may stem from experiencing a lifetime without significant time, decisions without real choice and particular forms of self-fulfilment that misappropriate the relationship with life. (shrink)

Machine behavior that is based on learning algorithms can be significantly influenced by the exposure to data of different qualities. Up to now, those qualities are solely measured in technical terms, but not in ethical ones, despite the significant role of training and annotation data in supervised machine learning. This is the first study to fill this gap by describing new dimensions of data quality for supervised machine learning applications. Based on the rationale that different social and psychological backgrounds of (...) individuals correlate in practice with different modes of human–computer-interaction, the paper describes from an ethical perspective how varying qualities of behavioral data that individuals leave behind while using digital technologies have socially relevant ramification for the development of machine learning applications. The specific objective of this study is to describe how training data can be selected according to ethical assessments of the behavior it originates from, establishing an innovative filter regime to transition from the big data rationale n = all to a more selective way of processing data for training sets in machine learning. The overarching aim of this research is to promote methods for achieving beneficial machine learning applications that could be widely useful for industry as well as academia. (shrink)

Methodological nationalism in sociological theory is unfit for the current globalized era, and should be discarded. In light of this contention, the present article discusses Max Weber’s view of language as a way to relativize the frame of the national society. While a “linguistic turn” in sociology since the 1960s has assumed that the sharing of language—linguistic community—stands as an intersubjective foundation for understanding of meaning, Weber saw linguistic community as constructed. From Weber’s rationalist, subjectivist, individualist viewpoint, linguistic community was (...) a result of social actions, not a prior entity as assumed by German metaphysical organicism (and historicist holism). Indeed, Central Europe in Weber’s era was a battlefield of linguistic nationalism(s); in contrast to the national societies of the Cold War period, national borders were unstable and ultimately the multiethnic empires of the region were dismantled after World War I into ethnolinguistic nation-states. Experience of this contemporary reality brought Weber to the core of the relationship between language and politics: A language community is an imaginary one demarcated not by language itself but by conscious opposition against outsiders, with monolingual contexts within borders created artificially by homogenizing policies like linguistic standardization and national education—the first modernity of language. In this way, Weber felt, language can be a means to domination. (shrink)

The more recent computer developments cause us to take a new look at human intelligence. The prevailing occidental view of human intelligence represents a very one-sided, logocentric approach, so that it is becoming more urgent to look for a more complete view. In this way, specific strengths of so-called human information processing are becoming particularly evident in a new way. To provide a general substantiation for this view, some elements of a phenomenological model for a dialectical coherence of human expressions (...) of life are briefly outlined. The starting point is the everyday experience of constantly being confronted with contradictory situations. A model of polar, or dualistic, dialectic is proposed, which attempts to systematically establish the contradictions and contingencies of human life in theoretical structures. It is assumed that formal logic fails to work — strictly speaking — when applied to real situations of human interaction. Instead, definite negations are supposed to be involved. In this way, four polarities, pairs of concepts which are mutually dependent on each other and negate each other definitely, are presented: process and structure, the individual and general (societal), acting and imagining, subject-subject-relation and subject-object-relation (love and work). The latter gives rise to the dialectic of emotion and cognition, which plays a decisive role in a comparison of human and computer-“intelligence”.To cope with the specific human strengths, which are expressed through these polarities, self-learning computers would have to be able to act and to love like human beings and to grow up in a society like people. Furthermore, the learning process would have to implement the process-structure-dialectic with its aspects of finality. In spite of the recent breath-taking achievements of computers, one can not imagine how computers would ever achieve this. Computers are, however, thought of, by virtue of their complexity, being qualitatively different from machines. But human abilities still represent a new level of complexity: the level of dialectic. (shrink)

Since the emergence of neo-evolutionism in the 1960s, various critiques of the theory of social or socio-cultural evolution have been forwarded, including notably those of Immanuel Wallerstein, Alain Touraine and Anthony Giddens who decisively reject the idea of evolution. Within this context, Jürgen Habermas's theory of socio-cultural evolution has also become a specific object of critique, the best known in the English-speaking world being, perhaps, Michael Schmid's critique. While the latter is ultimately based on neo-Darwinistic assumptions which allow a non-Marxist (...) alternative to be pitted against Habermas's position, a significant immanent critique has been taking shape during the late 1970s and 1980s the contours of which are at present starting to become visible, despite the fact that as yet it is nowhere developed and presented in a systematic manner. I have in mind here the work of younger authors belonging to the circle around Habermas, such as Johann Arnason, Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, Günter Frankenberg, Ulrich Rödel, and Klaus Eder, who have not only developed a critique of Habermas but are also engaged in developing an alternative to him within the framework of critical theory. (shrink)

The article presents the main provisions of S.D. Bodrunov’s theory of noonomics and synthesizes them with the leading theories of the leaders of the Frankfurt school: Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. Noonomics refers to a new stage in the development of society as a whole, in which people will be forced out of material production, which will allow everyone to freely develop their creative powers. However, on the way to noonomics, humanity must avoid falling into a state of “digital concentration (...) camp,” which is possible only by transforming human nature itself, moving “from zoo- to noo-state.” This implies a synthesis of science and culture and the highest value of moral self-improvement for each person. Therefore, it is the development of the human mind that will allow the transition to noonomics. It is the study of the content and possibilities of the mind that will allow us to creatively develop the theory of noonomics by using J. Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality and A. Honneth’s new theory of socialism. Communicative rationality is a special capability which makes possible to achieve mutual understanding between representatives of con-flicting social classes and develop universal norms of activity that allow for the sustainable development of society as a whole. This capability can be developed within a special institutional environment based on solidarity activities. Thus, each person will consider the successful implementation of the plans of others as a condition for the possibility of implementing their plans. This network of social institutions based on solidarity activity will be the realization of freedom in its social form. Within the framework of solidarity activities, new universal meanings of social development arise, which the communicative community will be able to formulate. Further, these meanings will replace the existing ones, which are focused on profit and unlimited economic growth, and thus transform the existing institutional system. (shrink)

For some time now a number of critics have argued that Juergen Habermas has misinterpreted Freud. The gist of this criticism is that Habermas' interpretation of psychoanalysis as `depth hermeneutics' must violate the intent of Freud's work, which is so deeply grounded in drive theory. In other words, Habermas confuses philosophical reflection with psychoanalysis. This paper takes a somewhat different focus. It examines the consequences of Habermas' interpretation of Freud for Habermas' view of the individual. It is shown that Habermas' (...) interpretation eventuates in an abstract and shadowy view of the individual. It is argued that an alternative view of psychoanalysis, object relations theory, can help locate the source of Habermas' pale view of the individual, and help correct it, without succumbing to `neo-Freudian revisionism'. Object relations theory also suggests that in order to overcome the diminution of the individual in real life it is necessary for political theory to examine seriously the role of the family. Finally, object relations theory generates an interesting criticism of so-called postmodern psychoanalysis—for example, the work of Jacques Lacan. This criticism can help us better understand the relationship between Habermas and modernism. (shrink)

In contrast to other approaches, `modernity' in this article is not dealt with as a historical concept but as a normative-aesthetic term and as a mythical narrative in the sense of Nietzsche's `eternal recurrence of the same'. Paradoxically, there still exists a semantic shift between different historical concepts of modernity beginning in late antiquity and the Middle Ages up to the present confusions about `postmodernity'. However, the aesthetical bias of the discourse of modernity prevents any serious interpretation which is able (...) to refer these semantic shifts directly to some clear and incontestable socio-structural facts and developments. In its contemporary sociological form this discourse overlaps on the contrary with some main trends in aesthetic theory and practice: the exchangeability between `old' and `new' and the permanent suspension of the boundaries between `art' and `life'. Consequently, aesthetics as well as sociology are describing modernity as a cultural system which is `playing' with its own fundamental differentiations between `in' and `out' or self-reference and other-reference. (shrink)