In addition to opening a fertile field for inquiry in analytical social epistemology, Miranda Fricker’s work has provided powerful conceptual tools that merge descriptive capacity and political potency. For this reason, over the last fifteen years, the conceptual repertoire introduced by the author has been well received in both academic and political arenas. At times, the concepts of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice acquire excessive dimensions in the literature, and this undermines, on the one hand, their analytical precision and, on (...) the other, their usefulness. In this paper I argue against Fricker’s structural parallelism thesis and defend an independent treatment of each of these concepts. On this basis, to counteract the hyperinflation of the concept of hermeneutic injustice, I proceed with an exercise of conceptual precision. To this end, I identify the conditions that make hermeneutic injustice both unjust and hermeneutic. Finally, I present theoretical and practical reasons to encourage the rigorous use of these concepts. (shrink)

The paper applies the theoretical frameworks of epistemic injustice and narrativist philosophy of history to read the process of re-signification of an event that took place in a prison in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1978, called “Massacre in the Seventh Ward” or “Mutiny of the Mattresses”. By looking into this case, we explore the exercise of epistemic resistance through category expansion, drawing on the most recent developments on hermeneutical injustice as a deficiency in the application (and not (...) only in the content) of the available concepts. This allows us to identify the selected case as an example of hermeneutical injustice, and to highlight some characteristics of such injustice that remain under-analysed in the specialised literature, linked to agency, temporality, and the concrete forms adopted by resistance. Among the latter, we highlight the role that can be played by the exercise of what in philosophy of history has been called the “practical past”: an intervention in the dispute of meanings about the past, born out of an explicit commitment to the present. Finally, the conclusions present some caveats to be considered in the study of epistemic injustice in the context of institutions such as prisons. (shrink)

In the debate on epistemic injustice, it is generally assumed that testimonial injustice as one form of epistemic injustice cannot be committed (fully) deliberately or intentionally because it involves unconscious identity prejudices. Drawing on the case of sexual violence against refugees in European refugee camps, this paper argues that there is a form of testimonial injustice—willful testimonial injustice—that is deliberate. To do so, the paper argues (a) that the hearer intentionally utilizes negative identity prejudices for a particular purpose and (b) (...) that the hearer is aware of the fact that the intentionally used prejudices are in fact prejudices. Furthermore, the paper shows how testimonial injustice relates to recognition failures both in terms of a causal as well as a constitutive claim. In fact, introducing willful testimonial injustice can support the constitutive claim of such a relation that has so far received little attention. Besides arguing for a novel form of testimonial injustice and contributing to the recent debate on the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition failures, this paper is also motivated by the attempt to draw attention to the inhumane conditions for refugees at the border of Europe as well as elsewhere. (shrink)