Consider a variant of the usual story about the iterative conception of sets. As usual, at every stage, you find all the (bland) sets of objects which you found earlier. But you also find the result of tapping any earlier-found object with any magic wand (from a given stock of magic wands). -/- By varying the number and behaviour of the wands, we can flesh out this idea in many different ways. This paper's main Theorem is that any loosely constructive (...) way of fleshing out this idea is synonymous with a ZF-like theory. -/- This Theorem has rich applications; it realizes John Conway's (1976) Mathematicians' Liberation Movement; and it connects with a lovely idea due to Alonzo Church (1974). (shrink)

In this talk I present the main results from Anta (2021), namely, that the theoretical division between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood as a separation in the epistemic capabilities of this physical discipline. In particular, while from the Boltzmannian framework one can generate powerful explanations of thermal processes by appealing to their microdynamics, from the Gibbsian framework one can predict observable values in a computationally effective way. Finally, I argue that this statistical mechanical schism contradicts the Hempelian (...) (1958) thesis that the predictive power of a scientific theory is directly proportional to its explanatory potential, and vice versa. (shrink)

In this paper we view the first order set theory ZFC under the canonical frst order semantics and the second order set theory ZFC_2 under the Henkin semantics. Main results are: (i) Let M_st^ZFC be a standard model of ZFC, then ¬Con(ZFC + ∃M_st^ZFC ). (ii) Let M_stZFC_2 be a standard model of ZFC2 with Henkin semantics, then ¬Con(ZFC_2 +∃M_stZFC_2). (iii) Let k be inaccessible cardinal then ¬Con(ZFC + ∃κ). In order to obtain the statements (i) and (ii) examples of (...) the inconsistent countable set in a set theory ZFC + ∃M_stZFC and in a set theory ZFC2 + ∃M_st^ZFC_2 were derived. It is widely believed that ZFC + ∃M_stZFC and ZFC_2 + ∃M_st^ZFC_2 are consistent, i.e. ZFC and ZFC_2 have a standard models. Unfortunately this belief is wrong. Book. Advances in Mathematics and Computer Science Vol. 1 Chapter 3 There is No Standard Model of ZFC and ZFC2 ISBN-13 (15) 978-81-934224-1-0 See Part II of this paper DOI: 10.4236/apm.2019.99034 . (shrink)

Main results are:(i) Let M_st be standard model of ZFC. Then ~Con(ZFC+∃M_st), (ii) let k be an inaccessible cardinal then ~Con(ZFC+∃k),[10],11].

We show how to interpret Heyting's arithmetic in an intuitionistic version of TT, Russell's Simple Theory of Types. We also exhibit properties of finite sets in this theory and compare them with the corresponding properties in classical TT. Finally, we prove that arithmetic can be interpreted in intuitionistic TT, the subsystem of intuitionistic TT involving only three types. The definitions of intuitionistic TT and its finite sets and natural numbers are obtained in a straightforward way from the classical definitions. This (...) is very natural and seems to make intuitionistic TT an interesting intuitionistic set theory to study, beside intuitionistic ZF. (shrink)

In his recent book, Quine, New Foundations, and the Philosophy of Set Theory, Sean Morris attempts to rehabilitate Quine’s NF as a possible foundation for mathematics. I explain why he does not succeed.

In general little thought is given to the general question of how to implement mathematical objects in set theory. It is clear that—at various times in the past—people have gone to considerable lengths to devise implementations with nice properties. There is a litera- ture on the evolution of the Wiener-Kuratowski ordered pair, and a discussion by Quine of the merits of an ordered-pair implemen- tation that makes every set an ordered pair. The implementation of ordinals as Von Neumann ordinals is (...) so attractive that it is uni- versally used in all set theories which have enough replacement to prove Mostowski’s collapse lemma. I have frequently complained in the past about the widespread habit of referring to implementations of pairs (ordinals etc) as definitions of pairs (etc). My point here is a different one: generally little attention has been paid to the question of what makes an implementation a good implementation. In most cases of interest the merits of the candidates are uncontroversial. What I want to examine here is an example where there are com- peting implementations for ordered pairs, and—although it is clear to the cognoscenti and also (with a bit of arm-waving) plausible to the logician in the street that some of the impossible candidates are impossible, nobody has ever given a satisfactory explanation of why this is so. (shrink)

A common objection to Quine's set theory "New Foundations" is that it is inadequately motivated because the restriction on comprehension which appears to avert paradox is a syntactical trick. We present a semantic criterion for determining whether a class is a set which motivates NF.

A paper by Beneš, published in 1954, was an attempt to prove the consistency of $\mathsf{NF}$ via a partial model of Hailperin’s finite axiomatization of $\mathsf{NF}$. Here, I offer an analysis of Beneš’s proof in a De Giorgi-style setting for set theory. This approach leads to an abstract version of Beneš’s theorem that emphasizes the monotone and invariant content of the axioms proved to be consistent, in a sense of monotony and invariance that this paper intends to state rigorously and (...) to help clarify. Moreover, some tentative speculation will be made about possible developments of the topic in the following two directions: which set theories can be proved to be consistent via Beneš-like constructions, and how can we elaborate on Beneš’s model to get a consistency proof for full $\mathsf{NF}$? (shrink)

The iterative conception of set commonly is regarded as supporting the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). This paper presents a modified version of the iterative conception of set and explores the consequences of that modified version for set theory. The modified conception maintains most of the features of the iterative conception of set, but allows for some non-wellfounded sets. It is suggested that this modified iterative conception of set supports the axioms of Quine's set theory NF.

The usual construction of models of NFU (New Foundations with urelements, introduced by Jensen) is due to Maurice Boffa. A Boffa model is obtained from a model of (a fragment of) Zermelo–Fraenkel with Choice (ZFC) with an automorphism which moves a rank: the domain of the Boffa model is a rank that is moved. “Most” elements of the domain of the Boffa model are urelements in terms of the interpreted NFU. The main result of this paper is that the restriction (...) of the membership relation of the original model of set theory with automorphism to the domain of the Boffa model is first-order definable in the language of NFU. In particular, all information about the extensions in the original model of the urelements of the model of NFU is definable in terms of NFU. A corollary (answering a question of Thomas Forster) is that the urelements in a Boffa model are not homogeneous. (shrink)

Familiar proof theoretical and especially automated deduction methods sometimes accept infinity where, in fact, it can be omitted. Our first example deals with the infinite supply of individual variables admitted in 1-order deductions, the second one deals with infinite-branching rules in sequent calculi with number-theoretical induction. The contents of Section 1 summarize and extend basic ideas and results published elsewhere, whereas basic ideas and results of Section 2 are exposed for the first time in the present paper. We consider classical (...) formalisms only, to which constructive formalisms can be reduced by Shanin-style interpretations. (shrink)