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Do Animals Feel Pain?

Philosophy 66 (255):25-40 (1991)

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  1. How can we know whether fish feel pain? Epistemology of the scientific study of fish sentience.Victor Duran-Le Peuch - 2021 - Dissertation,
    I start by defining sentience and giving an analysis of the epistemological problems that plague its scientific study; this consists mainly in justifying that the attribution of sentience is underdetermined by the data. Second I show that as a result of this situation of underdetermination, most of the types of arguments used to infer sentience from the data are inconclusive and lead to a stalemate. Third, I argue that the stalemates arise from a foundationalist epistemology which needlessly leads to skeptical (...)
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  • Do Plants Feel Pain?Adam Hamilton & Justin McBrayer - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (56):71-98.
    Many people are attracted to the idea that plants experience phenomenal conscious states like pain, sensory awareness, or emotions like fear. If true, this would have wide-ranging moral implications for human behavior, including land development, farming, vegetarianism, and more. Determining whether plants have minds relies on the work of both empirical disciplines and philosophy. Epistemology should settle the standards for evidence of other minds, and science should inform our judgment about whether any plants meet those standards. We argue that evidence (...)
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  • Pain (Oxford Bibliographies Online).David Bain - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they seek a general account, and increasingly as a rich and fruitful topic in its own right. Pain raises specific questions: about mentality and consciousness certainly, but also about embodiment, affect, motivation, and value, to name but a few. The growth of philosophical interest in pain has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of pain science, which burgeoned in the 1960s. This is no accident: developments in (...)
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  • A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.
    Two important thought-experiments are associated with the work of Hilary Putnam, one designed to establish multiple realizability for mental kinds, the other designed to establish essentialism for natural kinds. Comparing the thought-experiments with each other reveals that the scenarios in both are structurally analogous to each other, though his intuitions in both are greatly at variance, intuitions that have been simultaneously well received. The intuition in the former implies a thesis that prioritizes pre-scientific over scientific indicators for identifying mental kinds (...)
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  • Corrupting the youth: a history of philosophy in Australia.James Franklin - 2003 - Sydney, Australia: Macleay Press.
    A polemical account of Australian philosophy up to 2003, emphasising its unique aspects (such as commitment to realism) and the connections between philosophers' views and their lives. Topics include early idealism, the dominance of John Anderson in Sydney, the Orr case, Catholic scholasticism, Melbourne Wittgensteinianism, philosophy of science, the Sydney disturbances of the 1970s, Francofeminism, environmental philosophy, the philosophy of law and Mabo, ethics and Peter Singer. Realist theories especially praised are David Armstrong's on universals, David Stove's on logical probability (...)
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  • What is speciesism?Oscar Horta - 2010 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
    In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...)
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  • Animal pain.Colin Allen - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):617-643.
    Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such as Aplysia, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reconsidering fetal pain.Stuart W. G. Derbyshire & John C. Bockmann - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics Recent Issues 46 (1):3-6.
    Fetal pain has long been a contentious issue, in large part because fetal pain is often cited as a reason to restrict access to termination of pregnancy or abortion. We have divergent views regarding the morality of abortion, but have come together to address the evidence for fetal pain. Most reports on the possibility of fetal pain have focused on developmental neuroscience. Reports often suggest that the cortex and intact thalamocortical tracts are necessary for pain experience. Given that the cortex (...)
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  • Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.
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  • Neo-Cartesianism and the expanded problem of animal suffering.Phil Halper, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf & Perry N. Fuchs - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2):177-198.
    Several well-known theodicies, whatever their merits, seem to make little sense of animal suffering. Here we argue that the problem of animal suffering has more layers than has generally been acknowledged in the literature and thus poses an even greater challenge to traditional Judeo-Christian Theism than is normally thought. However, the Neo-Cartesian (NC) defence would succeed in defanging this Expanded Problem of Animal Suffering. Several contemporary philosophers have suggested that recent evidence either supports the NC view or at least should (...)
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  • Harrison on Animal Pain.Ian House - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (257):376 - 379.
    In ‘Do Animals Feel Pain?’ Peter Harrison argues that there are no good reasons to think that animals feel pain, that there are good reasons to think they do not feel pain, and that they should be treated well in order to promote not animal, but human, welfare. This is a provocative, and implausible, thesis. It has succeeded in provoking me, to rage and to rejoinder, but it has failed to convince me that a monkey shrieking as it is mutilated (...)
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  • “We are Human Beings, and We Value Human Life”: Glock and Diamond on Mental Capacities and Animal Ethics.Mikel Burley - 2020 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 9.
    How should a philosophical inquiry into the moral status of (nonhuman) animals proceed? Many philosophers maintain that by examining the “morally relevant” psychological or physiological capacities possessed by the members of different species, and comparing them with similar capacities possessed by human beings, the moral status of the animals in question can be established. Others contend that such an approach runs into serious moral and conceptual problems, a crucial one being that of how to give a coherent account of the (...)
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  • Human beings and giant squids (on ascribing human sensations and emotions to non-human creatures).David Cockburn - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (268):135-50.
    A television nature programme a year or two ago contained a striking sequence in which a giant squid was under threat from some other creature . The squid responded in a way which struck me immediately and powerfully as one of fear. Part of what was striking in this sequence was the way in which it was possible to see in the behaviour of a creature physically so very different from human beings an emotion which was so unambiguously and specifically (...)
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  • The Emergence and Development of Animal Research Ethics: A Review with a Focus on Nonhuman Primates.Gardar Arnason - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2277-2293.
    The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term “animal research ethics”. Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview of the development of the field and a discussion (...)
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  • Articulating Animals: Animals and Implicit Inferences in Brandom's Work.Joel D. Musser - 2011 - Between the Species 14 (1):3.
    Brandom denies animals implicit reasoning by emphasizing their inability to make inferences explicit, and in so doing, denigrates animals by likening their behavior to that of machines and artifacts. With disturbing regularity and ease, Brandom equates pigeons and parrots to machines and thermostats in their inability to express implicit/explicit inferences: neither the pigeon nor the machine can “provid[e] reasons for making other moves in the language game.” I contest, however, that animals are paradigmatically more than any similarity or analogy to (...)
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  • Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism. [REVIEW]Kurt Gray & Chelsea Schein - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):405-423.
    Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of (...)
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  • El impenetrable silencio del corazón animal. A propósito de la concepción de los animales en la obra de Descartes.Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2022 - Pensamiento 78 (298 S. Esp):821-840.
    Tradicionalmente se le atribuye a Descartes la tesis del «animal-máquina». De acuerdo con ésta los animales carecen de capacidades cognitivas, emociones y, en general, de conciencia. Esta interpretación, que todavía sigue vigente, se apoya en los avances de la filosofía natural cartesiana, que rompió con la aristotélico-escolástica, de carácter cualitativo, proponiendo un modelo físico-matemático cuantitativo mucho más cercano al nuestro. Pero, la propuesta de Descartes en su vertiente fisiológica, que en el fondo supone una concepción del ser humano innovadora, dejaba (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reconsidering fetal pain.Stuart W. G. Derbyshire & John C. Bockmann - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (1):3-6.
    Fetal pain has long been a contentious issue, in large part because fetal pain is often cited as a reason to restrict access to termination of pregnancy or abortion. We have divergent views regarding the morality of abortion, but have come together to address the evidence for fetal pain. Most reports on the possibility of fetal pain have focused on developmental neuroscience. Reports often suggest that the cortex and intact thalamocortical tracts are necessary for pain experience. Given that the cortex (...)
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  • Anthropomorphism as a methodological problem of animal ethics (in the memory of Sir Patrick Bateson).Petr Jemelka & Martin Gluchman - 2017 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 7 (3-4):169-176.
    The paper aims to highlight the serious methodological issue of contemporary bioethics (especially topics on the subject of animal ethics). In the discourse on the issue of the pain and suffering of animals and in derived questions, a certain form of anthropomorphism is manifested. Ethical applications of empirical research results that are relevant to humans (or humans as an anatomically and physiologically analogous animal species) are preferred. Subsequently, these extrapolations serve as a criterion for judging the qualitative level of the (...)
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