- Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - 2024 - Philosophical Studies (10):2577-2604.details
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The shape of agency: Control, action, skill, knowledge.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Strategy (Part I): Conceptual Foundations.Kenneth Silver - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12717.details
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Qui peut sauver la morale? Essai de métaéthique.François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2019 - Paris: Ithaque. Edited by Hichem Naar.details
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Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and assumptions.Brett Sherman & Gilbert Harman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131-140.details
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The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
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The volitive and the executive function of intentions.Christoph Lumer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):511-527.details
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Side-effect actions, acting for a reason, and acting intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.details
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Minimally Creative Thought.Dustin Stokes - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.details
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Intentional action and the unintentional fallacy.Ryan Wasserman - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.details
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Omissions and causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.details
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A dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for intentions and information changes in strategic games.O. Roy - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):291 - 320.details
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Are intentions self-referential?Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):309-329.details
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Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Alfred Mele & Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):265 - 287.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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(1 other version)Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some problems for juror impartiality.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):203 – 219.details
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Self-reflexive thoughts.Gilbert Harman - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):334-345.details
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Pretence as individual and collective intentionality.Hannes Rakoczy - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.details
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What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
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The intentional and the intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.details
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(1 other version)The two senses of desire.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.details
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Basic causal deviance, action repertoires, and reliability.Jesús H. Aguilar - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.details
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Asymmetries in judgments of responsibility and intentional action.Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.details
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Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children.James Russell - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.details
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Intention and control.Michael H. Robins - 1986 - Theoria 52 (1-2):41-56.details
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Taking on intentions.Chrisoula Andreou - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):157-169.details
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Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.details
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On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.details
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Is there a place for intention in an analysis of intentional action?Alfred Mele - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):419-432.details
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Intentions, foreseen consequences and the doctrine of double effect.Alison Hills - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283.details
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Exciting intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312.details
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Folk conceptions of intentional action.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):281-297.details
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(1 other version)Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.details
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Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.details
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An occurrent theory of practical and theoretical reasoning.Arthur F. Walker - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (2):199 - 210.details
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Can virtue epistemology capitalize on jtb's appeal?E. J. Coffman - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):199-222.details
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On the irreducibility of the will.J. L. A. Garcia - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):349 - 360.details
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Intentions are mental states.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.details
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The folk strike back; or, why you didn’t do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it.Mark T. Phelan & Hagop Sarkissian - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):291 - 298.details
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Making a Start with the stit Logic Analysis of Intentional Action.Jan M. Broersen - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):499-530.details
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Intrinsic intentionality.Hugh J. McCann - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):247-273.details
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Folk concepts of intentional action in the contexts of amoral and immoral luck.Paulo Sousa & Colin Holbrook - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):351-370.details
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Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional Account.Carl Ginet - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):223-45.details
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She intends to try.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):101-106.details
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Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
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