Rom Harré criticizes critical realism for ascribing causal powers to social structures, arguing that it is human individuals, and not social structures, that possess causal powers, and that a false conception of structural causation undermines the emancipatory potential of critical realism. I argue that an interpretation of the category of process as the spatio-temporalization of the category of structure, which underpins much evolutionary theory, provides the conceptual tools to explain how the critical realist transformational model of social activity can escape (...) from Harré’s criticism, leading to a general conception of social development within which various types of evolutionary processes can be identified as particular cases. I then argue that Tony Lawson’s PVRS model provides an evolutionary perspective that enables the conceptualization of coercive power as selective pressure. (shrink)

In his article, “Saving Critical Realism,”Harre relates his revised philosophy of science to a social philosophy concerning the nature of society, and to a political philosophy regarding the nature of freedom and reform. I argue that his social philosophy and political philosophy rest upon an individualistic sense of society and freedom. I demonstrate that his individualism is factually and politically untenable. I counterpose an alternative social philosophy and political philosophy that are based on a structural model of society, freedom, and (...) social change.My critique demonstrates how social science can adjudicate claims of structuralist vs. individualist social and political philosophy. It also argues that social science must constitute the basis for formulating political ideals of freedom and social organization if these are to be viable. (shrink)