The use of narrative – in this case a fictional dialogue – has been a time-honoured way of exploring ideas and most importantly indispensable for learning, at least since the time of the Sophists. Indeed, the dialogues of Plato exemplify this thesis because the qualities and characteristics of philosophy and philosophising are revealed through their lives. Extending on this premise, we would argue that we learn to understand both the unity and complexity of philosophy – particularly in education and educational (...) research – not by formal philosophical arguments, necessary as they are in some contexts, but by narratives that are relevant, narratives that make the actions of one or more characters intelligible and justifiable. As a result, this article uses a narrative approach for the dual purpose of exhibiting the relevance of philosophy intelligibly exhibited through the examples of the characters put forward, but at the same time characters we our... (shrink)

John N Andrews; General Thinking Skills: are there such things?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 71–79, https://doi.o.

Evolution is often seen as a site of contestation within the school curriculum. The topic of evolution is therefore often considered to be ‘controversial’. I first examine what is meant by ‘controversial’ and conclude that while, in an everyday sense, the topic of evolution can indeed be considered to be controversial, this term can mislead. A more fruitful way forward may be to regard the topic of evolution as ‘sensitive’. I examine reasons why evolution might be considered sensitive – noting (...) that for a not inconsiderable number of people it is so because of a perceived conflict with religious views and also because it may be existentially disturbing for some. Rather little attention has been paid in the philosophy of education literature as to how we might deal with sensitive issues. I therefore look at what we mean by describing an issue as sensitive and at how teachers might deal in the classroom with such issues, specifically evolution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article criticizes certain subjectivist and isolationist stances on controversial issues, and construes the teaching of controversial issues as an interpersonal task. On this view the teacher (1) encourages students to enter into the perspectives of others; (2) establishes points of contact which make reasoned discourse possible; and (3) inducts students into a wider domain where they are provided with knowledge about controversies as well as the skills for handling those controversies. All of this requires considerable intervention on the (...) part of the teacher. Current doubts about such intervention are unjustified. (shrink)

Charles Clark; Why Teachers Need Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 241–252, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

Moral imagination has been described by Murdoch as ‘a way of seeing’. The focus of concern here is the influence of belief upon moral imagination and those attitudes that are needed if moral imagination is to be developed. The perspective adopted endorses a Humean recognition of the potent influence of personal experience upon those beliefs that are held, and therefore upon how we see the world. Kantian commitment to the power of the will, and to the ability of individuals to (...) choose who they wish to be, allows room for optimism, a view which is supported by the findings of Liaschenko. (shrink)

What is the future of Philosophy of education? Or as many of scholars and thinkers in this final ‘future-focused’ collective piece from the philosophy of education in a new key Series put it, what are the futures—plural and multiple—of the intersections of ‘philosophy’ and ‘education?’ What is ‘Philosophy’; and what is ‘Education’, and what role may ‘enquiry’ play? Is the future of education and philosophy embracing—or at least taking seriously—and thinking with Indigenous ethicoontoepistemologies? And, perhaps most importantly, what is that (...) ‘Future’? These debates have been located in the work of diverse scholars: from the West, from Global South, from indigenous thinkers. In this collective piece, we purposefully juxtapose diverse takes on the future of these intersections. We have given up the urge to organise, place together, separate with subheadings or connect the paragraphs that follow. Instead, we let these philosophers of education and thinkers who use philosophical texts and ideas to sit together in one long read as potentially ‘strange and unusual bedfellows’. This text urges us to understand how these scholars and thinkers perceive our educational philosophical futures, and how the work and thinking they have done on thinking about what the future of that new key in philosophy of education may look like is embedded in a much deeper and richer literature, and personal experience. (shrink)

The role of critique in the Anglophone analytical tradition of philosophy of education is outlined and some of its shortcomings are noted, particularly its apparent claim to methodological objectivity in arriving at what are clearly contestable positions about the normative basis of education. Many of these issues can be seen to have a long history within European, and especially German, philosophy of education. In the light of this the discussion moves on to a consideration of similarities and contrasts between the (...) Anglophone and German-inspired deployment of the concept of critical rationality in philosophy of education. The claims to objectivity of the Anglophone tradition are contrasted with a more self-conscious concern for social justice and improvement in other European traditions, which has been followed more recently by a greater scepticism concerning the potential of critique for delivering social justice and improvement in education. This has parallels with the growing Anglophone disillusion with ‘classical’ analytic philosophy of education. This in turn has resulted in a greater awareness of the limitations of critique: its ideological character, its rootedness in specific contexts, its own potential dogmatism and its ambiguities. The various contributions to this volume are briefly described and related to each other. (shrink)

There are renewed claims that thinking, or important aspects of it, should be conceived in terms of certain general powers, skills or competencies which should be taught as such. Some possibilities for confusion within this view are identified and it is argued that its undoubted attractions must be weighed against certain severe dangers, particularly with regard to how it may predispose us to conceive of content and its role in thinking. Some implications for teaching of a view of thinking that (...) affirms the sanctity of content are sketched. (shrink)