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Turing indistinguishability and the blind watchmaker

In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins. pp. 3-18 (2002)

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  1. Turing test: 50 years later.Ayse Pinar Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
    The Turing Test is one of the most disputed topics in artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper is a review of the past 50 years of the Turing Test. Philosophical debates, practical developments and repercussions in related disciplines are all covered. We discuss Turing's ideas in detail and present the important comments that have been made on them. Within this context, behaviorism, consciousness, the 'other minds' problem, and similar topics in philosophy of mind are discussed. We (...)
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  • (1 other version)Minds, machines and Turing: The indistinguishability of indistinguishables.Stevan Harnad - 2000 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.
    Turing's celebrated 1950 paper proposes a very general methodological criterion for modelling mental function: total functional equivalence and indistinguishability. His criterion gives rise to a hierarchy of Turing Tests, from subtotal ("toy") fragments of our functions (t1), to total symbolic (pen-pal) function (T2 -- the standard Turing Test), to total external sensorimotor (robotic) function (T3), to total internal microfunction (T4), to total indistinguishability in every empirically discernible respect (T5). This is a "reverse-engineering" hierarchy of (decreasing) empirical underdetermination of the theory (...)
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  • Why and how we are not zombies.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):164-67.
    A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind.
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  • (1 other version)Minimal mind.Alexei A. Sharov - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 343--360.
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  • Neuropragmatism on the origins of conscious minding.Tibor Solymosi - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 273--287.
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  • Harnessing psychoanalytical methods for a phenomenological neuroscience.Emma P. Cusumano & Amir Raz - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • (1 other version)Imitation, Skill Learning, and Conceptual Thought: an embodied, developmental approach.Ellen Fridland - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 203--224.
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  • Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 259--269.
    According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this (...)
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  • Concept combination and the origins of complex cognition.Liane Gabora & Kirsty Kitto - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 361--381.
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  • (1 other version)Evolving consciousness : the very idea!James H. Fetzer - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 225--242.
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  • Organic codes and the natural history of mind.Marcello Barbieri - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 21--52.
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  • Phenomenality, conscious states, and consciousness inessentialism.Mikio Akagi - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):803-819.
    I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also possible to fail (...)
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  • The mind of the noble ape in three simulations.Tom Barbalet - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 383--397.
    The Noble Ape Simulation offers an account of the mind as something that can be observed, measured, and ultimately simulated through external effects. This version of the applied mind is not created through a single method but through layering three simulations relating to information chemistry, social constraints, and evolving narrative. As examples, additional simulation elements in Noble Ape are presented to offer the simulation methodology of Noble Ape. This chapter, rather than being a theoretical critique, is intended as a project (...)
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  • The evolution of scenario visualization and the early hominin mind.Robert Arp - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 143--159.
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  • (1 other version)Cybersemiotics : a new foundation for a transdisciplinary theory of consciousness, cognition, meaning and communication.Soren Brier - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 97--126.
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  • Representation in biological systems : teleofunction, etiology, and structural preservation.Michael Nair-Collins - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 161--185.
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  • Towards implementing free-will.Bruce Edmonds - 2000
    Some practical criteria for free-will are suggested where free-will is a matter of degree. It is argued that these are more appropriate than some extremely idealised conceptions. Thus although the paper takes lessons from philosophy it avoids idealistic approaches as irrelevant. A mechanism for allowing an agent to meet these criteria is suggested: that of facilitating the gradual emergence of free-will in the brain via an internal evolutionary process. This meets the requirement that not only must the choice of action (...)
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  • From Non-minds to Minds: Biosemantics and the Tertium Quid.Crystal L'Hôte - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 85--95.
    I present and evaluate the prospects of the biosemantic program, understood as a philosophical attempt to explain the mind’s origins by appealing to something that non-minded organisms and minded organisms have in common: representational capacity. I develop an analogy with ancient attempts to account for the origins of change, clarify the biosemantic program’s aims and methods, and then distinguish two importantly different forms of objection, a priori and a posteriori. I defend the biosemantic program from a priori objections on the (...)
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  • From the natural brain to the artificial mind.Massimo Negrotti - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 399--409.
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  • Mental organs and the origins of mind.Thomas S. Ray - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 301--326.
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  • Mind or mechanism : which came first?Teed Rockwell - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 243--258.
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  • (1 other version)The emergence of empathy in the context of cross-species mind reading.John Sarnecki - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 129--142.
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  • Mnemo-psychography: The Origin of Mind and the Problem of Biological Memory Storage.Frank Scalambrino - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 327--339.
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  • (1 other version)Introduction : exploring the origins of mindedness in nature.Liz Swan - 2012 - In Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 1--17.
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  • Not so exceptional : away from Chomskian saltationism and towards a naturally gradual account of mindfulness.Andrew M. Winters & Alex Levine - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 289--299.
    It is argued that a chief obstacle to a naturalistic explanation of the origins of mind is human exceptionalism, as exempli fi ed in the seventeenth century by René Descartes and in the twentieth century by Noam Chomsky. As an antidote to human exceptionalism, we turn to the account of aesthetic judgment in Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man , according to which the mental capacities of humans differ from those of lower animals only in degree, and not in kind. Thoroughgoing (...)
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  • The annotation game: On Turing (1950) on computing, machinery, and intelligence.Stevan Harnad - 2009 - In Robert Epstein & G. Peters (eds.), Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer. Springer.
    This quote/commented critique of Turing's classical paper suggests that Turing meant -- or should have meant -- the robotic version of the Turing Test (and not just the email version). Moreover, any dynamic system (that we design and understand) can be a candidate, not just a computational one. Turing also dismisses the other-minds problem and the mind/body problem too quickly. They are at the heart of both the problem he is addressing and the solution he is proposing.
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  • On Fodor on Darwin on Evolution.Stevan Harnad - manuscript
    Jerry Fodor argues that Darwin was wrong about "natural selection" because (1) it is only a tautology rather than a scientific law that can support counterfactuals ("If X had happened, Y would have happened") and because (2) only minds can select. Hence Darwin's analogy with "artificial selection" by animal breeders was misleading and evolutionary explanation is nothing but post-hoc historical narrative. I argue that Darwin was right on all counts. Until Darwin's "tautology," it had been believed that either (a) God (...)
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