Switch to: References

Citations of:

Spinoza on negation, mind-dependence and the reality of the finite

In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making. pp. 221-37 (2015)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Not Wholly Finite: The Dual Aspect of Finite Modes in Spinoza.Noa Shein - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):433-451.
    Spinoza’s bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite things pose a deep challenge: How can Spinoza account for their finitude and their plurality? Taking finite bodies as a test case for finite modes in general I articulate the necessary conditions for the existence of finite things. The key to my argument is the recognition that Spinoza’s account of finite bodies reflects both Cartesian and Hobbesian influences. This recognition leads to the surprising realization there must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason.Róbert Mátyási - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.
    In this paper, I argue that Spinoza holds a perspectivalist view of mereological composition, a form of anti-realism. The paper has two parts: In the first half of the paper, I introduce interpretive puzzles for the standard realist reading of Spinoza’s mereology. In the second half of the paper, I discuss Spinoza’s positive view on mereological composition and present a perspectivalist reading that avoids the interpretive puzzles.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Spinning Strands Into Aspects: Realism, Idealism, and Finite Modes in Spinoza.Noa Shein - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):323-336.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics.Sanem Soyarslan - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):342-364.
    Abstract: In the "Ethics" Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self-understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self-understanding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations