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Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics

Sanem Soyarslan

Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):342-364 (2018)

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Spinoza's Account of Blessedness Explored through an Aristotelian Lens.Sanem Soyarslan - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (3):499-524.details RÉSUMÉDans cet article, j'examine si la description spinozienne de la béatitude peut être identifiée à un idéal contemplatif dans la tradition aristotélicienne. Je présente d'abord les caractéristiques principales de la vie contemplative telle que définie par Aristote ainsi que sa différence avec la vie des vertus orientées vers la pratique — une différence fondée sur la distinction d'Aristote entrepraxisettheoria. En mettant en évidence les points communs entre les deux types de connaissance adéquate de Spinoza — c'est-à-dire la connaissance intuitive et (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Spinoza’s Re-Evaluation of Humility.Josefine Klingspor - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.details Spinoza’s philosophy develops in striking ways over the course of his philosophical career. In his first work on metaphysics, the Short Treatise, Spinoza insists that humility is one of the highest virtues and that human beings have no power of their own. But in his final work on metaphysics, the Ethics, Spinoza bluntly declares that humility is not a virtue and argues that our essence simply consists in power. This essay demonstrates the interconnectedness and significance of these apparently distinct shifts. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Superbia, existimatio, and despectus: an aspect of Spinoza’s theory of esteem.Francesco Toto - 2022 - Intellectual History Review 32 (1):113-133.details This article focuses on three of the affects discussed in Spinoza’s Ethics: pride, esteem, and scorn. At first, it focuses mainly on the delusional aspect Spinoza attributes to these passions as a matter of definition, emphasizing the monological and self-referential dimension in which they seem to imprison the subject. It then analyzes the reference to a notion of justice contained in their definitions, and how this triggers a struggle for recognition. In a third moment, it highlights the political efficacy of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
How to Understand the Ineliminable Weakness of Finite Modes in Spinoza.Sanem Soyarslan - 2024 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 41 (1):23-44.details According to Spinoza, “... if we suppose that a person perceives his own lack of power because he recognizes that something is more powerful than himself... then we conceive that the person is simply understanding himself distinctly... ” (Ethics IV, Demonstration to Proposition 53, my italics). What does Spinoza mean by ‘something’ here? Given that there are two kinds of adequate cognition for Spinoza, which one is at stake when we understand that something is more powerful than ourselves? This paper (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
From humility to envy: Q uestioning the usefulness of sad passions as a means towards virtue in Spinoza's Ethics.Sanem Soyarslan - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):33-47.details In the Ethics Spinoza defines certain traditional virtues such as humility and repentance as species of sadness and denies that they are virtues. He nonetheless holds that they can turn out to be useful as a means towards virtue—in fact, the greatest virtue of blessedness—in the life of someone who is not guided by reason. In this paper, I examine Spinoza’s relatively overlooked claim regarding the usefulness of sad passions as a means towards blessedness. In taking up Spinoza’s treatment of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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