The immediate occasion for this special issue was Christia Mercer’s influential paper “The Contextualist Revolution in Early Modern Philosophy”. In her paper, Mercer clearly demarcates two methodologies of the history of early modern philosophy. She argues that there has been a silent contextualist revolution in the past decades, and the reconstructivist methodology has been abandoned. One can easily get the impression that ‘reconstructivist’ has become a pejorative label that everyone outright rejects. Mercer’s examples of reconstructivist historians of philosophy are deceased (...) (P. F. Strawson, Margaret J. Osler, Richard Watson, and Bernard Williams), anonymous (the fans of philosopher* mentioned by Lisa Downing), or authors whose more recent work followed a contextualist methodology (Jonathan Bennett). The reconstructivist camp seems to have turned into a shadowy group, largely extinct by now, not unlike the Death Eaters in the fictional universe of Harry Potter. There are some figures who previously belonged to this group, but they have since reformed their ways – or so it seems. Sometimes it is rumoured that certain people may still have secret allegiance to it, but no one dares to fly its banner openly. We decided to create this special issue because we believe that reconstructivist methodology does not deserve this shadowy existence. (shrink)

Aristotle is a political scientist and a student of biology. Political science, in his view, is concerned with the human good and thus it includes the study of ethics. He approaches many subjects from the perspective of both political science and biology: the virtues, the function of humans, and the political nature of humans. In light of the overlap between the two disciplines, I look at whether or not Aristotle’s views in biology influence or explain some of his theses in (...) political science. I show that we should not seek a unified answer to this question, for the relationship between the two disciplines varies depending on the topic. In some cases, e.g. the nature of the human function, the biological background is likely to be endorsed as one of the presuppositions of the ethical enquiry. In other cases, e.g. the study of social hierarchies, even though the ethical works and the biological works come to similar conclusions, it is hard to establish that the biological approach is intended to provide support to the ethico-political approach. In conclusion, I show that Aristotle’s political science and his biology are in conflict at least in two important cases: his account of justice towards non-human animals and his exhortation to contemplate. (shrink)

This paper opens by reviewing Aristotle’s conception of the natural slave and then familiar treatments of the internal conflict between the ruling and subject parts of the soul in Aristotle and Plato; I highlight especially the figurative uses of slavery and servitude when discussing such problems pertaining to incontinence and vice—viz., being a ‘slave’ to the passions. Turning to Campanella, features of the City of the Sun pertaining to slavery are examined: in sketching his ideal city, Campanella both rejects Aristotle’s (...) natural slave and is critical of the European institutions of slavery. The fact that slavery has no place in the City of the Sun takes on added significance when complemented with Campanella’s remarks on dominion and servitude in his Quaestiones de politiciis: I show that Campanella’s conception of slavery is intimately bound to sin, and consider whether his employment of the trope of slavery within the context of vice diverges from familiar usage. (shrink)

The tripartite division of peoples described in chapter 7 of book VII of Aristotle’s Politics identifies natural-born Greeks as the only people capable of free and well-ordered living in the polis. Ought we to infer from this passage that the underlying asymmetry between Greeks and non-Greeks somehow corresponds to the distinction, found in book I, between those who are masters by nature and those who are slaves by nature? The aim of this paper is to show that this claim is (...) not only not self-evident, but that it runs counter to Aristotle’s non-providential finalism, which is incompatible with the notion that nature could favor one people to the detriment of all others. In other words, the Greek people is not the rightful heir of the order of the world to the extent that their natural superiority in the political realm is quite accidental. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that, inPolitics I, Aristotle uses the method of his biological investigations and nine principles regarding causation and the working of nature known from his physics, psychology, and biology to demonstrate that the barbarians are natural slaves. His procedure is in line with his general way of thinking.

Name der Zeitschrift: Rhizomata Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 2 Seiten: 177-209.

The perplexing nature of time has been more contemplated, speculated, written, and debated about over the ages than virtually any other subject, with the possible exception of religion. Yet time seems more elusive than the vast majority of other metaphysical concepts. Time remains mysterious, for we lack an understanding of time at a basic physical level. Concepts of time in theories of modern physics and time as found in contemporary western analytic philosophy are discussed.

In the Infamous Opening Sections from Part IX of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche celebrates a strident kind of elitism and countenances, in however attenuated a form, the institution of slavery. “Every enhancement of the type ‘man,’” he writes, “has so far been the work of an aristocratic society—and it will be so again and again—a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and difference in worth [Werthverschiedenheit] between man and man, and that needs slavery (...) [Sklaverei] in some sense or other” (257). In the section that follows, Nietzsche describes a “good and healthy aristocracy” as “accept[ing] with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, for its sake [um ihretwillen] .. (shrink)

Although the commentary on Aristotle’s problematic discussion of slavery is vast, his discussion of nobility receives little attention. The fragments of his dialogue On Noble Birth constitute his most extensive examination of nobility, and while their similarity to the παμβασιλεύς of the Politics has recently been recognized, their relevance to natural slavery has hitherto gone unnoticed. Yet by declaring that true nobles – particularly the god-like ἀρχηγός – preternaturally possess superhuman characteristics, Aristotle precludes their easy inclusion in the kind “human” (...) in a manner inversely mirroring the preternatural subhumanity of natural slaves. Building on recent scholarship which argues that Aristotle’s “defense” of natural slaves is better understood as an indictment, On Noble Birth becomes most coherent if read as a hypothetical investigation into what would be required for “nobility” to name something true rather than equivocal, with the conclusion that “true nobility” is an empty set. (shrink)

Ethics for Rational Animals brings to light a novel account of akrasia, practical wisdom, and character virtue through an original and comprehensive study of the moral psychology at the basis of Aristotle's ethics. It argues that practical wisdom is a persuasive rational excellence, that virtue is a listening excellence, and that the ignorance involved in akrasia is in fact a failure of persuasion. Aristotle's moral psychology emerges from this reconstruction as a qualified intellectualism. The view is intellectualistic because it describes (...) practical wisdom as the sort of knowledge that can govern desire and action and akrasia as involving a form of ignorance. However, Aristotle's intellectualism is qualified because practical wisdom goes beyond grasping the truth about the human good, for it must also be able to convey the truth persuasively to non-rational cognition and desires. (shrink)

El trabajo apunta a presentar los argumentos de Aristóteles y de Hobbes para justificar la esclavitud. Así, por un lado, se mostrará que Aristóteles intenta defender tal institución bajo argumentos de premisas naturalistas, aunque incongruentes con sus propios fundamentos filosóficos. Por el otro, se señalará que los argumentos de Hobbes apelan a la libertad y el consentimiento, llegando a establecer dos tipos de esclavitud, una de tipo voluntario y otra que no lo es. En consecuencia, con el contraste argumental de (...) ambos autores se podrá ver la vía moderna y la antigua para justificar el esclavismo. (shrink)

Frente a la esclavitud natural defendida por Aristóteles, algunos intentan salvaguardar la coherencia interna del discurso, mientras que otros la niegan. Sin pretender un juicio valorativo, se busca esclarecer la naturaleza del esclavo, de la mujer y de las relaciones entre señor, mujer y esclavo en el oikos.

Business ethicists draw extensively on Aristotle’s work in defining the purpose of the business corporation. Insights from ancient authors can be valuable in illuminating contemporary issues, but we should be wary of enlisting their authority for our views without paying careful attention to what they might have intended by what they said in their own social and economic context. Business ethicists have argued that the business corporation should be a community within which its members can live a good life; that (...) its purpose should not be to maximise profits; and that it should integrate itself into a range of wider communities beyond its own boundaries and serve their interests. Aristotle would have agreed that the business corporation should not seek to make as much profit as possible, although he might have accepted that – in the light of modern developments in economic management - it should make enough profit to fund projects that would be beneficial to society. Aristotle’s view that the polis provided the setting in which people could best live a good life does not justify the claim that the business corporation can or should serve a similar purpose. Aristotle believed that people should strive for enough and not too much in several contexts, not only in acquiring wealth, but also in defining the size and scope of the community of which they should be members. Some expansive, contemporary views on the communities into which the business corporation should integrate itself are alien to Aristotle’s thinking. (shrink)

This paper examines Aristotle’s view that there are natural slaves, able-bodied people who lack the capacity to deliberate about the good and bad in life, who are ideally suited to be ‘tools of action’ for practically intelligent masters. After reconstructing Aristotle’s reasoning for the view that there are natural slaves in Politics i, and proposing a philosophical motivation for his interest in natural slavery, the paper reflects on what this case suggests about scholarly engagement with the political views of ancient (...) philosophers when these are so contrary to our own. (shrink)

Frente a la esclavitud natural defendida por Aristóteles, algunos intentan salvaguardar la coherencia interna del discurso, mientras que otros la niegan. Sin pretender un juicio valorativo, se busca esclarecer la naturaleza del esclavo, de la mujer y de las relaciones entre señor, mujer y esclavo en el oikos. In face of the natural slavery defended by Aristotle, some commentators try to protect the internal coherence of his discourse, while others deny it. Trying not to give a value judgment, the article (...) seeks to clear up the nature of the slave, the woman and the relationships between master, woman, and slave within the oikos. (shrink)

Tom Beauchamp and James Childress‘s revolutionary textbook, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, shaped the field of bioethics in America and around the world. Midway through the Principle’s eight editions, however, the authors jettisoned their attempt to justify the four principles of bioethics —autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice—in terms of ethical theory, replacing it with the idea that these principles are part of a common morality shared by all rational persons committed to morality, at all times, and in all places. Other commentators contend (...) that their theory has never been empirically confirmed and is unfalsifiable, since counterexamples can be deemed irrational, or as held by those living lives not committed to morality. The thesis of this paper is that common morality theory is the artifact of a category mistake—conflating common areas regulated by moral norms with common norms regulating moral conduct—that accords mid-twentieth century American liberal morality the status of transcultural, transtemporal, eternal moral truths. Such a conception offers bioethicists no tools for analyzing moral change—moral progress, regress, reform, evolution, devolution, or revolution—no theoretical basis for deconstructing structural classicism, racism, and sexism, or for facilitating international cooperation on ethical issues in the context of culturally based moral differences. (shrink)

Šio straipsnio tikslas – aptarti geriausios santvarkos problemą Aristotelio politinėje teorijoje, atsižvelgiant į Nikomacho etikoje pateiktą žmogiško klestėjimo sampratą. Joje Aristotelis teigia, kad monarchija yra geriausia santvarka (1160a35–36). Šis teiginys pakartojamas ir Politikoje (1288a15–18). Straipsnyje aiškinama, kodėl šie Aristotelio teiginiai prieštarauja Politikoje aptartoms teleologinėms polio, piliečio ir gero piliečio vs. gero žmogaus dorybių sampratoms. Atsižvelgiant į Aristotelio filosofinį valstybės apibrėžimą, jog ji yra „lygių asmenų susivienijimas dėl geriausio įmanomo gyvenimo“, ir teiginį, kad „geriausia yra laimė, o tai susideda iš tobulumo, (...) tobulo jos aktualizavimo ir panaudojimo“, be to, jo argumentus apie gero žmogaus ir gero piliečio santykį, straipsnyje teigiama, kad geriausia politinė santvarka yra politėja, o ne monarchija. Tačiau tokios interpretacijos nepakanka, jei norime išgelbėti Aristotelį nuo jo nenuoseklumo ir filosofiškai abejotinų teiginių apie „prigimtinę nelygybę“. Siūloma radikalesnė Aristotelio interpretacija, atmetanti šio filosofo ontologinę skirtį tarp oikos ir polio. Teigiama, kad Aristotelio socialinių santykių šeimoje-ūkyje (oikos) vertikalumas yra filosofiškai nepagrįstas ir prieštarauja revoliuciniams šio filosofo normatyvinės teleologijos aspektams ir jos radikalioms implikacijoms. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo inicialmente de la teoría de la esclavitud de Aristóteles en el libro i de la Política, con el fin de mostrar la utilización de dos procedimientos: uno dialéctico, a partir de la discusión con Platón, y otro retórico, con la utilización de metáforas y testimonios con los que configura el marco epistemológico de su teoría. Luego, me concentraré en un asunto por esclarecer: la diferencia ente los endoxa, la tesis y el testimonio. Al describir el (...) método dialéctico en los Tópicos, Aristóteles precisa el significado de los términos endoxa y tesis. Por su parte, en los libros i y ii de la Retórica, Aristóteles se ocupa del testimonio. Por consiguiente, identificaré estos dos tipos de procedimientos, los tipos de pruebas y las conclusiones en el libro i de la Política de Aristóteles, a partir de las características elaboradas en los Tópicos y en la Retórica. (shrink)

This article analyzes the emergence of a political rationality of groundwater in contemporary California. It contrasts a new government of nature that we call a ‘political physics of vital processes’, operative in the case of the Orange County Water District, with juridical and biopolitical rationalities of groundwater governance. To do so, we propose a genealogical account grounded in a reading of a key concept in Aristotle’s first book of Politics. The case is analyzed along the axes of subjectivity, space, and (...) temporality, opening to a novel way of conceptualizing the relation between power and nature. (shrink)