Order:
Disambiguations
Oliver Istvan Toth [3]Oliver Toth [1]
See also
Oliver Toth
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences
  1. Inherence of False Beliefs in Spinoza’s Ethics.Oliver Istvan Toth - 2016 - Society and Politics 10 (2):74-94.
    In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza's and Descartes‟s discussion of error, that beliefs are affirmations of the content of imagination that is not false in itself, only in relation to the object. This interpretation is an improvement both on the winning ideas reading and on the interpretation reading of beliefs. Contrary to the winning ideas reading it is able to explain belief revision concerning the same representation. Also, it does not need the assumption that I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2.  87
    Memory, Recollection and Consciousness in Spinoza's Ethics.Oliver Toth - 2018 - Society and Politics 12 (2):50-71.
    Spinoza’s account of memory has not received enough attention, even though it is relevant for his theory of consciousness. Recent literature has studied the “pancreas problem.” This paper argues that there is an analogous problem for memories: if memories are in the mind, why is the mind not conscious of them? I argue that Spinoza’s account of memory can be better reconstructed in the context of Descartes’s account to show that Spinoza responded to these views. Descartes accounted for the preservation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. A Fresh Look on the Role of the Second Kind of Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics.Oliver Istvan Toth - 2017 - Hungarian Philosophical Review (2):37-56.
    In this paper, through a close reading of Spinoza's use of common notions I argue for the role of experiential and experimental knowledge in Spinoza's epistemology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Is Spinoza’s Theory of Finite Mind Coherent? – Death, Affectivity and Epistemology in the Ethics.Oliver Istvan Toth - 2017 - The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.
    In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark