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Consider the following 'principles':2(Norm of Belief Schema) Necessarily, a belief of is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if p (at that scenario) — where 'p' has the aforementioned content .(Generalized Norm of Belief) Necessarily, for all propositions , a belief of is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if is true (at that scenario).Both 'principles' appear to capture the aim(s) of belief. (NBS) particularizes the aims to beliefs of distinct contenttypes. (GNB) generalizes these aims of (...) 

In this paper we examine various requirements on the formalisation choices under which selfreference can be adequately formalised in arithmetic. In particular, we study selfreferential numberings, which immediately provide a strong notion of selfreference even for expressively weak languages. The results of this paper suggest that the question whether truly selfreferential reasoning can be formalised in arithmetic is more sensitive to the underlying coding apparatus than usually believed. As a case study, we show how this sensitivity affects the formal study (...) 

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 105114, February 2012. 

Davidson conjectured that suitably formulated Tarskistyle theories of truth can “do duty” as theories of meaning for the spoken languages that humans naturally acquire. But this conjecture faces a pair of old objections that are, in my view, fatal when combined. Foster noted that given any theory of the sort Davidson envisioned, for a language L, there will be many equally true theories whose theorems pair endlessly many sentences of L with very different specifications of whether or not those sentences (...) 

Che cos'è la verità? A questa domanda le teorie deflazioniste rispondono in modo sorprendente: niente, o quasi. Secondo il deflazionismo la verità, come proprietà, semplicemente non esiste o è priva di qualsiasi sostanza. In questo contributo presenterò tale posizione offrendo un breve resoconto critico dell'evoluzione della proposta e una disamina delle sue tesi centrali. 

Widespread deflationistic readings of Quine misrepresent his view of disquotation’s significance and the truth predicate’s utility. I demonstrate this by answering a question that philosophers have not directly addressed: how does Quine understand the philosophical problem of truth? A primary thesis of this paper is that we can answer this question only by working from within Quine’s naturalistic framework. Drawing on neglected texts from Quine's corpus, I defend the view that, for Quine, the problem of truth emerges from the development (...) 

In “ProofTheoretic Justiﬁcation of Logic”, building on work by Dummett and Prawitz, I show how to construct usebased meaningtheories for the logical constants. The assertabilityconditional meaningtheory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their introduction rules; the consequenceconditional meaningtheory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their elimination rules. I then consider the question: given a set of introduction rules \, what are the strongest elimination rules that are validated by an assertability (...) 

It is argued that a certain form of the view that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are "inconsistent" provides the best response to the semantic paradoxes. After extended discussions of the views of Kirk Ludwig and Matti Eklund, it is argued that in its strongest formulation the view maintains that understanding a natural language is sharing cognition of an inconsistent semantic theory for that language with other speakers. A number of aspects of this approach are discussed and a (...) 

Truththeoretic deflationism holds that truth is simple, and yet that it can fulfil many useful logicolinguistic roles. Deflationism focuses on axioms for truth: there is no reduction of the notion of truth to more fundamental ones such as sets or higherorder quantifiers. In this paper I argue that the fundamental properties of reasonable, primitive truth predicates are at odds with the core tenets of classical truththeoretic deflationism that I call fix, express, and quantify. Truth may be regarded as a broadly (...) 

The infinitary function of the truth predicate consists in its ability to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. A transparency principle for truth states the equivalence between a sentence and its truth predication; it requires an introduction principlewhich allows the inference from "snow is white" to "the sentence 'snow is white' is true"and an elimination principlewhich allows the inference from "the sentence 'snow is white' is true" to "snow is white". It is commonly assumed that a theory of truth needs to (...) 

§§34 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenthcentury semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the preFregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...) 

What is the cognitive value of the concept of truth? What epistemic difference does the concept of truth make to those who grasp it? This paper employs a new perspective for thinking about the concept of truth and recent debates concerning it, organized around the question of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. The paper aims to defend a substantively correct and dialectically optimal account of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. This perspective is employed in (...) 

Deflationists claim that the truth predicate was introduced into our language merely to full a certain logicolinguistic function. Oddly enough, the question what this function exactly consists in has received little attention. We argue that the best way of understanding the function of the truth predicate is as enabling us to mimic higherorder quantification in a firstorder framework. Indeed, one can show that the full simple theory of types is reducible to disquotational principles of truth. Our analysis has important consequences (...) 

The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasideflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against nonnaive and nontransparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasideflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions (...) 

What BarOn and Simmons call 'Conceptual Deflationism' is the thesis that truth is a 'thin' concept in the sense that it is not suited to play any explanatory role in our scientific theorizing. One obvious place it might play such a role is in semantics, so disquotationalists have been widely concerned to argued that 'compositional principles', such as / (C) A conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true / are ultimately quite trivial and, more generally, that semantic theorists have (...) 

It has been known for some time that contextdependence poses a problem for disquotationalism, but the problem has largely been regarded as one of detail: one that will be solved by the right sort of cleverness. I argue here that the problem is one of principle and that extant solutions, which are based upon the notion of translation, cannot succeed. 

This paper investigates a set of issues connected with the socalled conservativeness argument against deflationism. Although I do not defend that argument, I think the discussion of it has raised some interesting questions about whether what I call “compositional principles,” such as “a conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true,” have substantial content or are in some sense logically trivial. The paper presents a series of results that purport to show that the compositional principles for a firstorder language, taken (...) 

This paper explores the relationship between Hume's Prinicple and Basic Law V, investigating the question whether we really do need to suppose that, already in Die Grundlagen, Frege intended that HP should be justified by its derivation from Law V. 

A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox". 

Disquotationalism is the view that the only notion of truth we really need is one that can be wholly explained in terms of such trivialities as: “Snow is white” is true iff snow is white. The 'Classical Disquotational Strategy' attempts to establish this view case by case, by showing that each extant appeal to truth, in philosophical or scientific explanations, can be unmasked as an appeal only to disquotational truth. I argue here that the Classical Strategy fails in at least (...) 

John McDowell has often emphasized the fact that the use of langauge is a rational enterprise. In this paper, I explore the sense in which this is so, arguing that our use of language depends upon our consciously knowing what our words mean. I call this a 'cognitive conception of semantic competence'. The paper also contains a close analysis of the phenomenon of implicature and some suggestions about how it should and should not be understood. 

The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) the inference: From ¬(p (...) 

Can one combine Davidsonian semantics with a deflationary conception of truth? Williams argues, contra a common worry, that Davidsonian semantics does not require truthtalk to play an explanatory role. Horisk replies that, in any event, the expressive role of truthtalk that Williams emphasizes disqualifies deflationary accounts—at least extant varieties—from combination with Davidsonian semantics. She argues, in particular, that this is so for Quine's disquotationalism, Horwich's minimalism, and Brandom's prosententialism. I argue that Horisk fails to establish her claim in all three (...) 

One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express socalled ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a (...) 

I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are selfreferential. Truly selfreferential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True selfreference is possible only if we expand the language to include functionsymbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of selfreference. 

This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? It turns out that, in a wide range of cases, we can get some nice answers to this question, but only if we work in a framework that is somewhat different from those usually employed in discussions of (...) 

In this paper, I outline and defend a novel approach to alethic pluralism, the thesis that truth has more than one metaphysical nature: where truth is, in part, explained by reference, it is relational in character and can be regarded as consisting in correspondence; but where instead truth does not depend upon reference it is not relational and involves only coherence. In the process, I articulate a clear sense in which truth may or may not depend upon reference: this involves (...) 

The existence of a close connection between results on axiomatic truth and the analysis of truththeoretic deflationism is nowadays widely recognized. The first attempt to make such link precise can be traced back to the socalled conservativeness argument due to Leon Horsten, Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland: by employing standard Gödelian phenomena, they concluded that deflationism is untenable as any adequate theory of truth leads to consequences that were not achievable by the base theory alone. In the paper I highlight, (...) 

Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth  Objects of truth  Tarski  Truth and set theory  Technical preliminaries  Comparing axiomatic theories of truth  Disquotation  Classical compositional truth  Hierarchies  Typed and typefree theories of truth  Reasons against typing  Axioms and rules  Axioms for typefree truth  Classical symmetric truth  KripkeFeferman  Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic  Grounded truth  Alternative evaluation schemata  Disquotation  Classical logic  Deflationism (...) 