Though the divide between reason-based and causal-explanatory approaches in psychiatry and psychopathology is old and deeply rooted, current trends involving multi-factorial explanatory models and evidence-based approaches to interpersonal psychotherapy, show that it has already been implicitly bridged. These trends require a philosophical reconsideration of how reasons can be causes. This paper contributes to that trajectory by arguing that Donald Davidson’s classic paradigm of 1963 is still a valid option.

Theodore de Laguna develops and argues for a deflationary view of truth well before the publication of what many have taken to be its source, or at least its inspiration, namely Frank P. Ramsey’s paper ‘Facts and Propositions’. I outline de Laguna’s view of truth and the arguments he offers for it; I also discuss its role in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. My outline and discussion serve as an introduction to de Laguna’s ‘A Nominalistic Interpretation of Truth’, a paper (...) he originally wrote in English but which has hitherto only been published in French. (shrink)

We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Frege’s distinction between sense and reference does not reconcile a classical logic of identity with apparent counterexamples to it involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs.

This paper explores the relationship between Hume's Prinicple and Basic Law V, investigating the question whether we really do need to suppose that, already in Die Grundlagen, Frege intended that HP should be justified by its derivation from Law V.

What Bar-On and Simmons call 'Conceptual Deflationism' is the thesis that truth is a 'thin' concept in the sense that it is not suited to play any explanatory role in our scientific theorizing. One obvious place it might play such a role is in semantics, so disquotationalists have been widely concerned to argued that 'compositional principles', such as -/- (C) A conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true -/- are ultimately quite trivial and, more generally, that semantic theorists have (...) misconceived the relation between truth, meaning, and logic. This paper argues, to the contrary, that even such simple compositional principles as (C) have substantial content that cannot be captured by deflationist 'proofs' of them. The key thought is that (C) is supposed, among other things, to affirm the truth-functionality of conjunction and that disquotationalists cannot, ultimately, make sense of truth-functionality. -/- This paper is something of a companion to "The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles". (shrink)

According to the Dependency Theory, truth asymmetrically depends on the world, in the following sense: true propositions are true because the world makes them true. The Dependency Theory strikes many philosophers as incontrovertible, but in this paper I reject it. I begin by presenting a problem for the Dependency Theory. I then develop an alternative to the Dependency Theory which avoids that problem. This alternative is an immodest Identity Theory of Truth, and I end the paper by responding to Dodd’s (...) charge that immodest Identity Theories are incoherent. (shrink)

In 1893 and 1903, two volumes of the most important of Frege’s works Grundegezte der Arithmetik were published. This period can be called the peak of Frege’s logicism. Although the subject of truth in Frege’s logical and philosophical works has been repeatedly investigated, there is a lack of studies on his view in this period, especially in Polish literature. In this article, therefore, I carry out the following research task: to collect and order Frege’s statements about truth during the period (...) of publishing the two volumes of Grundegezte der Arithmetik. I refer to the texts published during Frege’s life, published posthumously and his correspondence. Particularly noteworthy are: Grundegezte der Arithmetik and the unpublished Logik. That is why there are two separate sections dedicated to these two texts, whereas the discussions of truth from other texts are grouped thematically: the problem of antinomy, geometry, expression of generality, and others. The subject of truth appears there in relation to logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics and ontology. (shrink)

A speculative investigation of how Frege's logical views change between Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze and how this might have affected the formal development of logicism.

Primitivists about truth maintain that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms. Defences of primitivism date back to the early years of analytic philosophy, being offered by G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Gottlob Frege. In more recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers—including Donald Davidson, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Douglas Patterson, and Jamin Asay—have followed suit, defending their own versions of primitivism. I'll begin by offering a brief history of primitivism, situating each of these views within the landscape of (...) primitivist truth theories and detailing some of their core motivations and apparent shortcomings. To close the discussion, I'll offer a diagnosis of the prospects of primitivism, focusing on the mystery challenge, which has loomed large throughout the history of primitivist truth theories, and the methodology that should be used in evaluating primitivist (and other) truth theories going forward. (shrink)

In Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege tried to show that arithmetic is logical by giving gap-free proofs from what he took to be purely logical basic laws. But how do we come to judge these laws as true, and to recognize them as logical? The answer must involve giving an account of the apparent arguments Frege provides for his axioms. Following Sanford Shieh, I take these apparent arguments to instead be exhibitions: the exercise of a logical capacity in order to bring (...) us into a state of judgement. I provide an account of what sort of inferential capacities are at play in such exhibitions, and explain how they lead us to judge that Frege’s primitive laws are general and undeniable. I will also situate my account with respect to other rival interpretations, particularly the elucidatory interpretations of Joan Weiner and Thomas Ricketts. (shrink)

We discuss the many aspects and qualities of the number one: the different ways it can be represented, the different things it may represent. We discuss the ordinal and cardinal natures of the one, its algebraic behaviour as a neutral element and finally its role as a truth-value in logic.

W latach 1893 i 1903 ukazały się dwa tomy najważniejszego dzieła Fregego Grundegezte der Arithmetik. Ten okres można nazwać „szczytem logicyzmu” Fregego. Chociaż temat prawdy w logiczno-filozoficznej twórczości Fregego był podejmowany wielokrotnie, to brakuje pozycji skupiającej się na badaniu poglądów w tym okresie. Dotyczy to w szczególności literatury polskiej. Moim zadaniem jest zebranie i uporządkowanie wszystkich wypowiedzi Fregego na temat prawdy w okresie wydawania wspomnianych tomów. Realizując to zadanie, badam użycie tego pojęcia w pierwszym tomie Grundegezte der Arithmetik oraz w (...) niepublikowanym tekście Logik. Podejmuję zagadnienie funkcjonowania tego terminu w szczególnych kontekstach: antynomii, geometrii i wyrażania ogólności. Na koniec zasygnalizuję kwestię sposobu rozumienia późniejszych wypowiedzi Fregego na temat prawdy. (shrink)