Multistable figures offer an intriguing model for arbitrating conflicting positions. Moving back and forth between the different aspects under which something can be seen, one recognizes that mutually contradictory descriptions can be equally valid and that disputes over the correct account can be resolved without dissolving differences or establishing a higher synthesis. Yet, the experience of a gestalt switch also offers a model for radical conversions and revolutions – that is, for irreversible leaps to incommensurable alternatives foiling ideals of rational (...) choice while providing the possibility and necessity of decision. Accentuating the temporal dimensions of multistable figures, this multidisciplinary volume illuminates the critical potentials and limits of multistability as a complex figure of thought. (shrink)

This monograph contributes to the scientific misconduct debate from an oblique perspective, by analysing seven novels devoted to this issue, namely: Arrowsmith by Sinclair Lewis (1925), The affair by C.P. Snow (1960), Cantor’s Dilemma by Carl Djerassi (1989), Perlmann’s Silence by Pascal Mercier (1995), Intuition by Allegra Goodman (2006), Solar by Ian McEwan (2010) and Derailment by Diederik Stapel (2012). Scientific misconduct, i.e. fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, but also other questionable research practices, have become a focus of concern for academic communities (...) worldwide, but also for managers, funders and publishers of research. The aforementioned novels offer intriguing windows into integrity challenges emerging in contemporary research practices. They are analysed from a continental philosophical perspective, providing a stage where various voices, positions and modes of discourse are mutually exposed to one another, so that they critically address and question one another. They force us to start from the admission that we do not really know what misconduct is. Subsequently, by providing case histories of misconduct, they address integrity challenges not only in terms of individual deviance but also in terms of systemic crisis, due to current transformations in the ways in which knowledge is produced. Rather than functioning as moral vignettes, the author argues that misconduct novels challenge us to reconsider some of the basic conceptual building blocks of integrity discourse. (shrink)

This paper is a revised version of the essay that won the Zapffe Prize in 2017. -/- In «The Last Messiah» and On the tragic, Peter Wessel Zapffe suggests that humankind should cease to reproduce, as the meaning of life cannot be found and human life at its best is tragic. The theory has been criticized for assuming that the meaning of life must be explained by an external cause and implicitly asks for an infinite causal chain. In this paper, (...) I argue that it is possible to escape this critique by adding a new element to the definition of the tragic: namely, the insight that the tragic cannot come into existence if the subject does not demonstrate its greatness. Precisely because a human, on Zapffe’s understanding, must prove its brilliance if tragedy is to arise, I argue that the tragic cannot be devoid of meaning. In contrast, the individual seems to be provided with a tragic meaning of life, rather than being deprived of it. Furthermore, the new definition of the tragic affects Zapffe’s antinatalism, because a tragic meaning of life does not necessitate that humankind should cease to reproduce. Yet, the definition does not suggest that humans should reproduce either. Instead, it confronts us with the following question: Should one bring new life into the world, when the meaning of life only can be found in the tragic? (shrink)

In Seminar XVII, entitled The reverse side of psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan presents his famous theorem of the four discourses. In this rereading I propose to demonstrate that Lacan’s theorem entails a transferable dialectical method for studying processes of knowledge production, enabling contemporary scholars to develop a diagnostic of the present, notably scholars interested in issues such as the vicissitudes of knowledge production under capitalism, the crisis of the university and the proliferation of electronic gadgets. In short, I will argue that (...) Lacan’s theorem of the four discourses entails a dialectical diagnostic of technoscientific knowledge during late capitalism. First, the four discourses will be briefly outlined, emphasising the extent to which they entail, albeit in an ambivalent manner, a return or detour to the logic of Hegel. Subsequently, each discourse will be presented in more detail, emphasising how they allow us to come to terms with the current status of technoscientific knowledge. Special attention will be given to the political backdrop of the seminar: the crisis of the university. Finally, I will discuss the historical dimension, outlining both the predecessor of the four discourses and their current predicament under neoliberal/capitalist conditions. (shrink)

This paper develops a dialectical methodology for assessing technoscience during the Anthropocene. How to practice Hegelian dialectics of technoscience today? First of all, dialectics is developed here in close interaction with contemporary technoscientific research endeavours, which are addressed from a position of proximity and from an ‘oblique’ perspective. Contrary to empirical research, the focus is on how basic concepts of life, nature and technology are acted out in practice. Notably, this paper zooms in on a synthetic cell project called BaSyC (...) as a concrete instantiation of converging views of life, nature and technology currently at work in technoscience. While dialectics is used to explore the significance of this project, the synthetic cell as a case study also allows us to demonstrate the remarkable relevance of dialectics for understanding contemporary research, notably because it incites us to see the synthetic cell project as a concrete exemplification of life under Anthropocenic conditions. Should we assess the synthetic cell as the ultimate realisation of the technoscientific will to control and optimise life, or rather as an effort to bridge the disruptive collision between technoscience and nature, or both? (shrink)

I wholeheartedly sympathize conceptually with Coeckelbergh’s paper. The dialectical relationship between vulnerability and technology constitutes the core of Hegel’s Master and Slave. Yet, the empirical dimension is underdeveloped and Coeckelbergh’s ideas could profit from exposure to case studies. Building on a movie/novel devoted to vulnerability coping and living with ICT, I challenge the claim that modern heroism entails overcoming vulnerability with the help of enhancement and computers.

The hypothetical approach to the supersensible developed by Kant in his three Critiques, exemplified by his analysis of the aesthetic and reflective judgment in his third Critique, with their principle fortuitous purposiveness, can be considered as the basis for a new foundation of metaphysics. According to Kant’s limitation of cognition to the realm of sense intuition, theoretical knowledge of God, the subject, things-in-themselves, transcendental ideas is impossible. This leads to a kind of “negative theology” of the highest principle and the (...) supersensible as a whole. The reasons are rooted in the character of propositional thought, which can only circumscribe a singular, supersensible reality by means of predicative sentences and discursive thought. Taking Kant’s lead, but in contrast to his terminology, I call really existent singularities, including the thinking, knowing, desiring, feeling unique individuals we know as human beings, spontaneities, in order to distinguish them from descriptive characteristics attributed to them by predicative thought. Kant’s “practico-dogmatic” account of the postulates of God and immortality of the soul, based on the “fact of freedom” and its connection to the moral imperative, ensure the possibility of the “highest good” as final aim of moral behaviour — but cannot satisfy our need for knowledge of the supersensible. To “lay the groundwork” for experience of our own self-conscious reality, the reality of others like ourselves, of things which transcend the boundaries of sense intuition, and of true reciprocity, a different method is needed, one which leads us “beyond being and thought” to the unconditional beginning of conditional reality. (shrink)

All understanding is dependent on interpretation. The hermeneutic tradition reflects the possibilities and problems associated with this. The analytical-hermeneutic method presented here draws partly on this tradition. It attempts to rationalise and objectify the process of interpretation. The analytical aspect of the method has the purpose of logically and rationally aligning and verifying the understanding of meaning (“Sinn-Verstehen”) of the hermeneutical part. After interpretation, when the question of truth is tobe posed to the text, it is relevant once more. An (...) indispensable basis for the successful application of the method, however, is the interpreter’s willingness to engage with the text without reservation and not to make himself or herself the criterion of interpretation. Seen in this light, understanding is a form of self-transcendence – a transgression of the ego, which transforms itself in the understanding of the other and the examination of its own thinking. (shrink)

Answering the challenge of G. W. F. Hegel's idealism and its perceived logocentrism has arguably been a defining feature of nineteenth- and twentieth-century continental philosophy. Today, in the midst of a Hegel renaissance, Hegel's legacy within continental philosophy is far more ambivalent. In this essay, I cut across debates about the status of Hegel's idealism in order to offer a reflection on the legacy of Hegel by reconstructing a Hegelian notion of legacy. I develop this notion in response to Jacques (...) Derrida's discussion of inheritance in Specters of Marx (1993). Both Hegel and Derrida articulate the structure of legacy, inheritance, and history on the basis of the strictures of gathering. For both, gathering is an act of memory that determines a legacy as a legacy, a history as a history. Gathering determines an event, norm, idea, or institution as something to be passed on for a future to come. While Derrida concludes that inheritance implies decision, Hegel's recollection provides the basis for what I will call a critical history, which contributes to any such decision in crucial ways. (shrink)

In “Violence and Metaphysics” Jacques Derrida suggests that “the only effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to be…to consider false-infinity…irreducible.” Inversely, refuting the charge of logocentrism associated with Hegelian true infinity ( wahrhafte Unendlichkeit ) would involve showing that Hegel’s speculative logic does not establish the infinity of being exempt from the negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s challenge, and argues that true infinity is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of (...) ideality as a question of normative authority, which does not fall prey to logocentrism. Through an exposition of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Hegel’s Science of Logic , I argue that true infinity is not an ontological category that eliminates division, but rather refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a philosophical account of determinacy. Although fully achieved at the end of the Logic , the metalogical standpoint that Hegel elaborates in the Seinslogik under the banner of the true infinite already clarifies that determinacy is a product of normative authority that is itself precarious. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Das Projekt einer philosophischen Umgestaltung des Daoismus begleitet mich schon seit langem als vorläufige Idee. In der 1995er Ausgabe der Philosophical Dynamics Nr. 4 veröffentlichte ich einen kurzen Artikel mit dem Titel Ein vorläufiger Überblick über die Umgestaltung der daoistischen Philosophie, der später als Vortrags Transkript in meine Vierzehn Vorlesungen über die Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie aufgenommen wurde. 邓晓芒: 道家哲学改造德临时纲要, 收入《哲学史方法论十四讲》, 重庆大学出版社, 2015 年, 第 246–283 页 [Deng Xiaomang: Siebte Vorlesung: Ein vorläufiger Überblick über die Transformation der daoistischen (...) Philosophie, in: Vierzehn Vorlesungen über die Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie, Chongqing: Verlag der Universität Chongqing, 2015, S. 246–283.]. Im Prozess der Kritik der traditionellen chinesischen Philosophie durch den Vergleich chinesischer und westlicher Kulturtraditionen kam ich auf die Idee, dass, wenn wir westliche Elemente in unsere traditionelle chinesische Kultur aufnehmen und ein neues Gedankengebäude errichten wollen, dieses Projekt als ein gemeinsamer Ausgangspunkt dienen kann. Während der moderne Neukonfuzianismus auf der „kreativen Transformation“ der Tradition des Konfuzianismus basiert, beruht meine Wiedergeburt der traditionellen chinesischen Kultur auf der Kritik am Konfuzianismus und der Umgestaltung der daoistischen Philosophie. Vor zwanzig Jahren jedoch befand sich dieses Projekt noch im Stadium einer Skizze und ich hatte keine Zeit, sie zu entwickeln, also nannte ich sie einen „vorläufigen Entwurf“. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz möchte ich diese Fragestellung auf den historischen Spuren der daoistischen Philosophie weiter vertiefen. (shrink)

The present essay aims to throw light on the study of dialectical thinking from a cultural-historical perspective. Different forms of dialectic are articulated as ideal types, including the Greek dialectic, the Hegelian dialectic, the contemporary German negative dialectic, the Chinese dialectic, and the Indian negative dialectic. These influential cultural products in the history of the East and the West, articulated as ideal types, serve as constellations that could facilitate further empirical studies on dialectical thinking. An understanding of the complexity of (...) these constellations reveals the pitfalls of investigating dialectical thinking without an appropriate conceptualization of the research target. With the ideal types of dialectic as "figure," and Vygotsky's thesis of the cultural-historical origin of higher psychological processes as "ground," we explore possibilities for further lines of inquiry on dialectical thinking. Adhering to the Scribnerian multilevel scheme that reconstructs Vygotsky's thesis, and returning to the core ideas of Vygotsky himself, we discover new, meaningful questions about the study of dialectical thinking. In the research area of "culture and cognition," consideration of a cultural-historical perspective appears to be both necessary and promising. (shrink)

‘Universalist’ moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant’s specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate (...) judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant’s Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant’s Critical principles and methods in connection with ‘practical anthropology’ and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community. (shrink)

The apparent implications of the latest findings of the life sciences for our freedom and autonomy are both exciting and controversial: They undermine a common view of human freedom: a fundamentally Cartesian view. A superior account of our freedom was developed by Kant and Hegel. Key features of Hegel's account show that we can expect from the life sciences further insights into the biological basis of our freedom and autonomy, but not their repudiation. I begin with basic features of Cartesian (...) self-transparency (II) and then review three findings of contemporary life sciences (III). I then detail key features of Hegel's anti-Cartesianism (IV), in order to formulate the basic question about our freedom posed by the claim that biology explains away human freedom (V). I criticize this biological determinism by drawing upon Hegel's account of human freedom as autonomy (VI), and comment briefly on biologism in moral theory (VII). (shrink)

Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of a morally motivating feeling (...) seems incoherent. My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Kant’s theory in a way that overcomes this threat. By way of conclusion, I show how my reconstruction brings a new perspective to a long-standing dispute over intellectualist and affectivist views of moral motivation. (shrink)

This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing (...) is used for a new purpose. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences (statements), this suggests something already existing––natural signs (such as indexical objects)––was used for the declarative function and thereby integrated into communication. I show that index display (such as the display of hunting trophies) can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences. The view developed in this paper is broadly consistent with the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber, which suggests that reasoning is less adapted to decision making than to social purposes such as winning disputes. In this paper I extend this view to the evaluation of propositions expressed in declarative sentences. According to my proposal, the first declarative sentence emerged as the negation of the (implicit) negation of an implicit statement. Thereby, I suggest that the binary structure of the truth value underlying any declarative sentence is founded on disagreements based on conflicts of interests. (shrink)

This study reviews research about the recognition of one’s own face and discusses scientific techniques to investigate differences in brain activation when looking at familiar faces compared to unfamiliar ones. Our analysis highlights how people do not possess a perception of their own face that corresponds precisely to reality, and how the awareness of one’s face can also be modulated by means of the enfacement illusion. This illusion allows one to maintain a sense of self at the expense of a (...) precise discrimination of self-face. The internal dynamics of different brain processes, associated with the construction of bodily identity and the sense of self and capable of integrating signals from different sensory channels, particularly visual and tactile, create a mirror-mask effect. According to this effect, the self-face reflected by a mirror becomes a mask for the self, which has the features of the subject’s face, but nonetheless does not correspond perfectly to its characteristics. This poses interesting questions about the nature and construction of one’s self, as self-face reflections allow the mind to mediate between analogue and virtual reality, between past and future events, between memories and plans of action and, most importantly, between beliefs about our identities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper intends to build a dialogue between Nāgārjuna and Schelling on Self, world, and standpoints, taking as main references Nāgārjuna's The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way and Schelling's Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. Whereas Nāgārjuna criticizes the substantialization of beings by resorting to the discourse of the dependent co-origination in order to overcome suffering, Schelling, on his turn, refutes the fanaticism based on dogmatism's tenets in favor of the criticism interpreted according to its spirit, and not (...) according to its letter, in order to emancipate humanity. Starting with a succint contextualization of the Eastern and Western philosophical discourse, proceeding further to discuss the philosophies of both thinkers, the paper is concluded by assessing their theories. RESUMO O artigo pretende construir as linhas gerais do diálogo entre Nāgārjuna e Schelling sobre o eu, o mundo e os pontos de vista sobre eles, tomando como referência seus respectivos textos: Versos fundamentais sobre o caminho do meio e cartas filosóficas sobre dogmatismo e criticismo. Enquanto Nāgārjuna critica a substancialização dos entes em favor da explicação destes por meio do discurso calcado na cooriginação dependente tendo em vista a superação do sofrimento, Schelling, por seu turno, rejeita o delírio fanático ancorado nas teses do dogmatismo em favor de uma filosofia crítica, interpretada segundo seu espírito e não de acordo com sua letra, tendo em vista emancipar a humanidade. Iniciando com uma sucinta contextualização do discurso filosófico oriental e ocidental, passando, posteriormente, para a apresentação do pensamento dos dois autores, o artigo é encerrado com uma avaliação de suas teorias. (shrink)

The example of a political leader who has to decide whether he would allow the torture of a suspect in order to get information about a ticking bomb has become notorious in ethical discussions concerning the tension between moral principles and political necessity. The relation between these notions must be made as clear as possible before a sincere moral evaluation of ticking bomb situations can be given. The first section of this article considers whether the concept of political obligation is (...) different from moral and legal obligations or whether it is a special kind of moral obligation. In the second section, the idea that the dirty hands problem confronts us with the ambiguities of moral life is rejected because it would imply an untenable moral paradox. The thesis that is developed is, namely, if there is such a thing as political necessity, it must be some form of moral obligation. The third section analyses the concept of political necessity and concludes that it cannot overrule basic moral principles and that the international legal prohibition of torture must be considered to be a categorical imperative. In the last section, these ideas concerning political and moral necessity are brought in against the defence of torture, which should be tolerated in the ‘War on Terror’. There it will be argued that the use of the ticking bomb argument not only supports a highly hypocrite political practice but is also deceptive as a moral and political argument. (shrink)

Moral particularists and generalists alike have struggled over how to incorporate the role of moral salience in ethical reasoning. In this paper, I point to neglected resources in Kant to account for the role of moral salience in maxim formation: Kant's theory of reflective judgment. Kant tasks reflective judgment with picking out salient empirical particulars for formation into maxims, associating it with purposiveness, or intentional activity (action on ends). The unexpected resources in Kantian reflective judgment suggest the possibility of a (...) particularist universalism, where recalcitrant particulars directly inform, and in some cases revise, moral principles. Such an account improves on particularist accounts of moral salience and moral perception: rather than deriving moral sensitivity solely from an agent's upbringing or cultural resources, the reflective dimension is situated alongside the universalist dimension of moral principles typically identified with Kantian ethics, allowing for a critical approach both to moral universals and to the reception of moral particulars. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta mostrar cómo el examen del supuesto panteísmo del sistema de Spinoza, que abre las Investigaciones filosóficas sobre la esencia de la libertad humana de Schelling, presenta no solo su propia posición ante la polémica del panteísmo, sino que también implica una discusión con el pensamiento moderno, en particular en lo que se refiere al lugar, función e implicancias de la noción de sistema y su relación con la libertad. Una exposición del análisis crítico de Jacobi de la (...) historia de la filosofía occidental —en el que afirma que el sistema no es compatible con el conocimiento de lo incondicionado— permitirá iluminar los términos en los que se plantea este diálogo del pensador de Leonberg con la tradición. (shrink)

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of “second nature” and “recognition”. To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post- Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is signifi cant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of “space of reasons” that stems from the Hegelian concept of “Spirit”. I thus broach the notion of “second nature” as a bridgeconcept (...) that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the “space of reasons” within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novelties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between fi rst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makes to the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalness. (shrink)

To overcome the art-craft dualism, a root and branch reform of a traditionally hegemonic view on human activities is needed. By focusing on Gilbert Simondon’s fundamental claims, the article aims to display the most important consequences of a more in-depth understanding of poiesis, especially in relation to its reintegration with the sphere of praxis and collective ethos and to its connections with the idea of creativity. The field of production will lastly be associated with the concept of “living practice”, regarded (...) as important for the definition of a contemporary poietics. (shrink)

What is social construction? This essay offers a survey of the various ways in which something could be socially constructed and then addresses briefly the questions whether social constructionism involves an untenable anti-realism and what, if anything, unifies all social construction claims.

This essay initiates a fundamental discussion about education’s nature and character, and raises the questions: Is education reliant on other disciplines as, for example, psychology, sociology and philosophy? Or may education be thought of independently, without being reliant on other disciplines? These questions are discussed in the light of Theodor Litt’s educational reading of Hegel’s understanding of dialectics, as it appears in the book Phenomenology of Spirit, in order to support that education has a relational and dialectic nature. In the (...) second part, we connect the concept of ‘Hegelian dialectic structure’ with scientific theory. More specifically, we introduce a theoretically oriented concept, based on semantic theory construction; namely, ‘relational parameter bundles’. This concept clarifies the difference between education and other ‘scientific,’ often more empirically based disciplines, such as psychology, on which education, or rather, educational researchers, traditionally rely. Through our theoretical approach we aim to uncover fundamental differences within different disciplines’ scientific thinking, and their use of theories and models, which then manifest themselves in the discipline’s scientific assessments and practical actions. An uncritical integration of other disciplines in education may destroy the ‘true’ nature of education, and thus pose a danger to education’s character, problem areas and ways of conducting research. That does not mean that education shall be isolated from other disciplines, it is rather a question of when perspectives from other disciplines should be included in educational matters. Not before the educational questions are raised and worked through will it be appropriate to obtain knowledge from other disciplines, if, that is, it is deemed necessary based on educational judgment. (shrink)

This article explores critical theory's relations to German idealism by clarifying how Adorno's thought relates to Hegel's. Adorno's apparently mixed responses to Hegel centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic proper, and the speculative . Adorno's allegiance to Hegel's dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical process whereby enlightenment reverts (...) to myth and human domination over nature reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticizes Hegel's dialectic as the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel's view that dialectical contradict.. (shrink)

Worlds are always in motion; what kind of movement is at stake? In this essay, I will argue that Heidegger moves beyond Hegel by making the concept of world central to phenomenology. But how do wor...

The purpose of this study is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the 'Geisteswissen-schaften' are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it has to be shown how intentional contexts (...) can be dealt with. Carnap's programme was to reconstruct scientific discourse within a truth-functional language. It is argued that his reduction of belief-sentences was not successful. It is further argued that in the logical empiricist's discussions of the problem of Verstehen, only motivational understanding is taken account of, what Max Weber calls observational understanding is overlooked as we try to show through a discussion of Theodore Abel's well-known explication of 'the operation called Verstehen'. From this it is concluded that the founda-tional problems of social science are different from those of natural science, and this conclusion is further elaborated through an exposition of views held by authors in the German tradition, which, in the fifties, many philosophers held to be obsolete. (shrink)

Practical philosophy in the classical German tradition from Kant to Hegel seems to be moralistic and even ascetic. The core of its moral and legal philosophy is a concept of freedom as independence from any longing for pleasure and happiness. Tracing the development of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective, objective and absolute spirit, however, exhibits a deep systematic connection between the forms of freedom and happiness in all their traditional and modern meanings. Many of them can be compared with modern conceptions, (...) but others have to be saved from oblivion and defended against reductive conceptions of freedom and happiness in modern philosophy. (shrink)

Prior to A Process Model, Gendlin’s theoretical and practical work focused on the interfacing of bodily-felt meaningfulness and symbolization. In A Process Model, Gendlin does something much wider and more philosophically primary. The hermeneutic and pragmatist distinction between the concept of experience, on the one hand, and actual experiential process, on the other, becomes for Gendlin the methodological basis for a radical reconceptualization of the body. Wittgenstein’s formulation of “meaning” as “language-use in situations” is spelled out by Gendlin in embodied (...) terms, yielding a profound new grasp of language, meaning, situation, language-use and culture as interactional body-process. Gendlin, in building his text, answers the pragmatist critique of a wrong progression of thinking where the results of an inquiry are read back to be its premises. With his central concept “eveving” Gendlin shows how the seeming determinacy of preceding structure is opened in the actual occurring. He thereby elaborates a new conception of continuity where the possibility for responsive novelty is emergent in the event itself. The conceptual development of the text itself instances this kind of emergent novelty. We will somewhat follow Gendlin’s own path in using language-in-situations as entry-point into his more fundamental process-thinking, thereby asking ourselves how to engage his new kind of model. In the last part, we introduce some of the philosophical roots of Gendlin’s A Process Model. (shrink)

The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an (...) infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account. (shrink)

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance (...) ? in short: education ? of our moral intuitions. (shrink)

The question of the relationship between faith and reason marks one of the fundamental issues for classical German philosophy. The paper is guided by a systematic interest in identifying some common features in the approaches taken by Kant and Hegel that are also of interest for the contemporary discussion: 1. The specific modernity of Kant’s and Hegel’s considerations, evident in their rejection of the resources traditionally appealed to by religion and rationalist metaphysics; 2. the anti-naturalist conviction that, in contrast to (...) animals, a metaphysical dimension is inscribed into the human mind; and 3. the thesis that metaphysical questions are existential questions arising from an impulse toward freedom, and hence that a purely theoretical approach is inadequate to address them. (shrink)

Nombrar al mal: soberanía, seguridad y guerra ilegal Este artículo defiende la importancia fundamental del "nombrar al mal" como operación constitutiva del discurso político moderno. Para lograr este objetivo, el artículo llama primero la atención sobre cómo los discursos institucionales y públicos globales, y aparentemente consensuados, han definido al Estado Islámico de Irak y Siria como una forma contemporánea del "mal" y cómo la comunidad internacional ha concebido su posicionamiento de cara a esta entidad. Basándose en este análisis y en (...) la historia de las luchas de los primeros tiempos de la modernidad contra los piratas y los "enemigos de la humanidad", el artículo muestra que la modernidad política no ha logrado borrar la práctica "arcaica" de nombrar al mal, sino que se ha apoyado constantemente en ella. Para fundar esta afirmación, el artículo identifica los patrones discursivos y los efectos prácticos de la nominación del mal, y destaca la relación ambivalente entre la nominación del mal y la soberanía y la seguridad como piedras angulares de la modernidad política. El artículo concluye abordando la cuestión de si, y hasta qué punto, el concepto del mal puede ser criticado y descartado, como han argumentado algunos estudiosos. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos indagar acerca del lugar y significado que asume la categoría de autonomía estética en lo que Hegel denomina “consideración liberal de lo bello”. A tales fines, analizamos los aspectos de su teoría de la religión del arte, cuyo modelo puede encontrarse en la organización ético-política de la polis griega, así como también los presupuestos filosóficos de su célebre teorema acerca del carácter pasado del arte “en su determinación suprema”. La hipótesis que nos guía en esta (...) lectura sostiene que la estética hegeliana se encuentra tensionada por un movimiento doble que impide ubicar al arte en un lugar fijo: al mismo tiempo en que sostiene la necesidad de una categoría de libertad para la determinación conceptual de lo bello, ella es motivo de una constante complejización por una perspectiva que la excede. Esa perspectiva filosófico-histórica se fundamenta en una categoría del sujeto moral que justifica la interpretación del arte como medio de tránsito hacia figuras más avanzadas del espíritu. (shrink)

Wandering Beyond Tragedy Content Type Journal Article Pages - Authors Franklin Thomas Perkins, Department of Philosophy, DePaul University Journal Comparative and Continental Philosophy Online ISSN 1757-0646 Print ISSN 1757-0638 Journal Volume Volume 3 Journal Issue Volume 3, Number 1 / 2011.

One could define a “tragic” viewpoint in many ways, but its core is the claim that things in this world do not always work out for the best. Probably the greatest tragic figure in the Zhuangzi is the defiant praying mantis, who waves her arms to fend off the oncoming chariot. This praying mantis is surely a symbol of Confucius, who was said in the Lun Yu to know that what he does is impossible but to do it anyway. In (...) the Zhuangzi, such characters are fools, not heroes. While the view of life in the Zhuangzi is certainly not an optimistic trust that virtue is rewarded, it is just as surely not a tragic text. It tends rather toward comedy or play. This paper will examine the Zhuangzi in relationship to the tragic. The underlying claim is that the Zhuangzi’s rejection of the optimism of an anthropocentric universe is more radical than tragedy and helps reveal how a tragic viewpoint remains under the sway of an anthropocentric European tradition. Ultimately, pessimism and optimism both assume the validity of human categories, but this is precisely what is attacked in the Zhuangzi. Ironically, it is precisely the unique flexibility of human beings that allows us not just to recognize the insignificance of our goals and values in the world (seeing our situation as tragic) but to accept and take up that insignificance (seeing it rather as comic). The paper concludes with some reflections on why Zhuangzi’s position is both attractive and disturbing. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Text ist der Versuch einer Dekonstruktion der herrschenden ideologischen Annahmen des gegenwärtigen Corona-Diskurses. Er ist der Versuch, diese ideologischen Gedankengänge in ihrer Mangelhaftigkeit darzustellen und ihren ideologischen Charakter zu benennen, sohin der Versuch eines Nachvollzugs des herrschenden Nachdenkens über Corona. Dieses herrschende Nachdenken über Corona und dessen Fortgehen von der einen ideologischen Annahme zur nächsten können als Metamorphosen des pandemischen Bewusstseins bezeichnet werden. Seinen Ausgangspunkt nimmt das pandemische Bewusstsein bei der Diagnose des krisenhaften Charakters der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft, dem (...) es eine „alte Normalität“ entgegenimaginiert. Hier betreibt es eine Rechtfertigung des alten, in dessen Krisencharakter jedoch nicht durchschauten, Zustandes der Gesellschaft. In Sehnsucht nach der Idylle der präpandemischen Gesellschaft entwirft es eine „solidarische“ Gemeinschaft gegen die Bedrohung durch einen äußeren Feind und konstituiert sich also negativ als homogenes Ganzes. Seine Sehnsucht wird zur Harmoniebedürftigkeit im Hier und Jetzt, die es sich durch seinen Glauben an die gute Herrschaft zu stillen weiß, wenn es sich über die Unverhältnismäßigkeit der staatlich verordneten Corona-Maßnahmen echauffiert. Dabei fühlt es sich durch den staatlichen Appell an den gesunden Menschenverstand im täglichen Umgang mit Corona bestätigt und lauscht in aufklärerischem Ethos seiner ewigen Vernunftfähigkeit. In dialektischer Akrobatik veranstaltet es das pandemische Bewusstsein, in der Isolation eine neue Form der Solidarität, das Glück im Unglück zu entdecken, ohne zu erkennen, dass es damit seine Rückkehr zum „Normalzustand“ der bürgerlichen als einer warenproduzierenden Gesellschaft vollzogen hat. Mit gutem Gewissen enthält es sich eines kritischen Urteils über die Corona-Krise und resigniert staatstreu vor der Einsicht in die Wirklichkeit. So lässt es sich gut regieren. (shrink)

La epistemología histórico-filosófica de la "visión de los vencidos" suponía la existencia de una verdad, complementaria a la del vencedor. Sin embargo, esa perspectiva conduce, sin proponérselo, a un debilitamiento de la idea de verdad en relación con el continente americano. Eso abre la puerta a la desrealización de éste, evolucionando hacia la idea de que América es un juego de lenguaje dentro de otros juegos de lenguaje, sin remitir a una realidad o a una verdad epistemológico-filosófica. El análisis de (...) algunos aspectos de la obra de Miguel León Portilla, Peter Mason, Peter Sloterdijk y de la Jornada de Omagua de Dorado, escrita en 1561, sirven de apoyo para lo aquí planteado. The historical-philosophical epistemology of the vision of the vanquished supposed the existence of a true, complementary to the defeated's one, in all discourse on America. Nevertheless, that perspective leads, unwillingly, to a weakening of the idea of truth in relation to the continent. This opens the path to its derealisation and leads to the idea that America is a speech game within another speech games, and does not address a reality or a philosophical-epistemological truth. Our statements are supported by analysis of some aspects of the work of Peter Sloterdijk and Peter Mason and of the Journey of Omagua y Dorado, written in 1561. (shrink)

Abstract“What we call meaning is bound to vanish”: Under this heading, an interview with Max Horkheimer was published in Der Spiegel (Jan 5, 1970). Revisiting this interview, the article focuses on Horkheimer’s thesis that human beings share the “longing that the injustice which characterizes the world must not be the final word”. It examines the extent to which Horkheimer’s notion of the “desire for the totally other” may be inspired by Kant’s claim that religion is grounded in the “need of (...) practical reason”. A further topic of discussion is Horkheimer’s critical assessment concerning current tendencies toward a “total administration of the world” that may ultimately “reduce thinking to the level of industrial processes”. Relating this critique to Kant’s reflections on the “unbelief of reason (Vernunftunglaube)”, which is based on “the maxim of reason’s independence of its own need”, the article raises the question of Horkheimer’s significance today: What relevance does Horkheimer’s method of casting doubt on any “politics that is not based on theology, metaphysics and, of course, morality” have for today’s discourse on such matters? In this context a brief glance is cast at Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical reading of Horkheimer’s “negative theology”. Die Forschung zu diesem Beitrag wurde durch das Russian Academic Excellence Project at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Aleksandra Nevskogo Street 14, 236016 Kaliningrad, Russische Föderation) unterstützt. (shrink)

Purpose. The aim of this piece is to study the manifestations of humanistic pursuits in a literary fiction work. The main interest is related to the interpretation of those existential and sociocultural concepts that underlie the dystopian novel by Lois Lowry. The theoretical basis of the study is based on works on phenomenology and the theory of reader reception. The method of phenomenology is a descriptive method: the phenomena of consciousness cannot be reduced to limited cognitive forms, and therefore language (...) and means of description are important along with their ability to reveal consciousness through phenomena. Originality of the study lies in the investigation of the humanistic aspect of a dystopian society, depicted in the modern literary fiction. The main attention is focused on the phenomenological identification of existential ideas and their manifestation in the literary characters of the given work. The conclusions speak about the tendencies of humanization and dehumanization of a man and society in the context of philosophical, ethical and aesthetic issues, which are the most important and urgent problems of our time. The current study finds out that in the modern dystopian literature and philosophy, the main subject of attention is a human. This human is perceived and depicted as a phenomenon that cannot be grasped by the notions of intimation and essence. The human is a creature whose freedom presupposes a constant departure from nature and habitual reality to the realm of transcendent through the desire to comprehend his or her certain way of existence. (shrink)

This study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank’s early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank’s theory of a “personal absolute”, exploring its surprising parallels with the religious philosophy of I. (...) H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel’s absolute, before finally turning to Schelling’s immediate intuition of subject-object identity. (shrink)

Is violence senseless or is it at the origin of sense? Does its destruction of meaning disclose ourselves as the origin of meaning? Or is it the case that it leaves in its wake only a barren field? Does it result in renewal or only in a sense of dead loss? To answer these questions, I shall look at James Dodd’s, Hegel’s, and Carl Schmitt’s accounts of the creative power of violence—particularly with regard to its ability to give individuals and (...) groups their sense of self-identity. I shall also follow up on Peg Birmingham’s suggestion that Socrates’ defense at his trial points to an alternate source of our self-identity—one that is ultimately less barren. (shrink)