Peer commentary on Herta Nagl-Docekal, “The Feminist Transformation of Philosophy”.

Chapter 2 primarily discusses Bernstein’s account and its differences both from Nagle’s metaphysical realism and Rorty’s postmodern pragmatism. Trying to diagnose assumptions that polarize thinkers to become objectivists and relativists, Bernstein articulates a Cartesian Anxiety he thinks they ironically both share. Descartes’ anti-skeptical wave of rigor was presented as a rationalistic project of rebuilding an unstable and dilapidated ‘house of knowledge’ on secure philosophical and scientific foundations. His overtly foundationalist metaphor of rebuilding from timbers set “in rock or hard clay” (...) shapes Descartes’ attempt to refute the skeptic and to secure the objectivity of knowledge as pursued by a more rigorous and analytical method of knowing. (shrink)

La 23 august 1939 Germania și Uniunea Sovietică au semnat la Moscova pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov, conform căruia URSS revendica Bucovina de Nord și Basarabia. În septembrie 1939 Polonia este invadată de Germania. În acest context Consiliul de Coroană a decis, la 6 septembrie 1939, proclamarea neutralității României, securizând frontierele și evitând confruntarea militară prin activarea “Blocului Balcanic al Neutrilor”, a Acordului Balcanic din 1934 și prin încercarea de a încheia un pact de neagresiune cu URSS. La 29 martie 1940, V. M. (...) Molotov vorbește despre “existența unei chestiuni litigioase nerezolvate, aceea a Basarabiei, a cărei anexare de către România nu a fost niciodată recunoscută de Uniunea Sovietică, cu toate că aceasta n-a pus niciodată chestiunea înapoierii Basarabiei pe cale militară”. Prin tratatul Hitler-Stalin, Tratatul de la Craiova și Al Doilea Arbitraj de la Viena (Dictatul de la Viena) România pierde peste o treime din teritoriu și peste un sfert din populație), inclusiv Ținutul Herța care nu făcea parte nici din Bucovina, nici din Basarabia și nu fusese revendicat inițial de URSS. O parte din Basarabia este alipită Ucrainei, iar cealaltă parte formează Republica Sovietică Socialistă Moldovenească, -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24746.49604 . (shrink)

The image of a copy of Praxiteles’ Aphrodite—nude but demurely shielding her pubic region—which adorns the dust cover of Pearson’s superb monograph, Aristotle on Desire</i>), suggests to the casual book buyer that the volume encased therein will explain Aristotle’s thoughts about sexual desire—perhaps as a central part or the paradigm case of his general theory of desire. But the goddess likes being tricky: Aristotle has very little to say about sexual desire (at best it is a subcategory of <i>epithumia</i>, set (...) alongside the desires for eating and drinking and reduced to tactile stimulation), and it is not immediately apparent that he possesses a general theory or account of desire. No doubt, Aristotle discusses many aspects of <i>orexis</i> (Aristotle’s general term for desire) in relationship to human action, in his consideration of the rhetorical manipulation of the emotions, and in his examination of animate motion. But as Pearson notes, neither in Aristotle’s catalog of writings nor in his surviving works is there an Aristotelian <i>peri orexeôs</i>. Pearson’s monograph, which is the “distant descendant” of a Ph.D. completed at Cambridge in 2004, thus is an exercise in detective work which combs through Aristotle’s discussions of desire throughout the corpus (albeit with focus on the ethical treatises, the <i>Rhetoric</i>, and <i>De Anima</i>) in order to reconstruct what a general theory of desire would look like for Aristotle. Pearson does a masterful job at drawing together into a coherent whole many of Aristotle’s scattered remarks about the different aspects of desire and provides a model for textual analysis of philosophically abstruse passages. Along the way, he overturns a number of scholarly orthodoxies (for instance, that Aristotle’s account of <i>thumos</i> retains elements of Platonic <i>thumos</i> or “spiritedness” or that <i>thumos</i> has a unique relationship to the <i>kalon</i> or what is fine) and situates Aristotle’s theory amidst contemporary philosophers of desire such as Thomas Nagle, Thomas Scanlon, and G.F. Schuler. The result is a landmark work of scholarship that scholars working on Aristotle’s moral psychology will need to engage and argue with. Whether the work warrants the adornment of Aphrodite is a question to which I will return in my conclusion. (shrink)