The starting point of this article is the observation that the emergence of the Anthropocene rehabilitates the need for philosophical reflections on the ontology of technology. In particular, if technological innovations on an ontic level of beings in the world are created, but these innovations at the same time create the Anthropocene World at an ontological level, this raises the question how World creation has to be understood. We first identify four problems with the traditional concept of creation: the anthropocentric, (...) ontic and outcome orientation of traditional concepts of creation, as well as its orientation of material fabrication. We subsequently develop a progressive concept of World creation with four characteristics that move beyond the traditional conceptuality: a materialistic concept of creation that accounts for the ontogenetic process and the ontic and ontological nature of creation, and is conceptualized as semantic creation of the World in which we live and act. (shrink)

In Différence et répétition, Deleuze's ontology is structured by his theory of dialectical Ideas or problems, which draws features from Plato, Kant, and classical calculus. Deleuze unifies these features through a theory of Ideas/problems developed by the mathematician and philosopher Albert Lautman. Lautman worked to explain the nature of the problems or dialectical Ideas mathematics engages and the solutions or mathematical theories endeavouring to understand them. Lautman drew upon Heidegger to do this. This article clarifies Deleuze's theory of dialectical Ideas/problems (...) by analysing its debts to Lautman and Heidegger and demonstrates a Heideggerian influence on Deleuze via Lautman. (shrink)

The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his Homo Sacer-cycle, has developed a new paradigm for thinking the Shoah. Departing from Michel Foucault’s biopolitical thought, he argues that modern political power is made possible by the helix-structure of sovereign power and homo sacer. Sovereign power is situated at the threshold of the prevailing juridico-political order and can, in a state of exception, violently suspend or establish the law. In this decision, homo sacer is legally excluded from the law. When the state (...) of exception is made general, the law of sovereignty governs all life and everyone becomes homo sacer. This happened concretely in the Shoah. In the concentration camps, the Muselmann is produced. During the Shoah by Bullet, as happened in Lithuania, the generalised sovereign biopolitics turns into radical thanatopolitics. (shrink)

Das Leben hat sich auf unserem Planeten zu einer unermesslichen Fülle von Formen ausdifferenziert, die in komplexen Weisen interagieren. Durch die Zerstörung unserer natürlichen Umwelt bedrohen wir das Wunder der globalen Biodiversität in seinem Fortbestand. Dabei verdrängen wir, dass auch die Menschheit weiter von der Produktivität jener Ökosysteme abhängig bleibt, zu denen sich das Leben evolutionär organisiert hat. Doch wie lässt sich überzeugend für den Erhalt von Biodiversität argumentieren? Sind Arten und Ökosysteme nur als Voraussetzungen gelingenden menschlichen Lebens schützenswert? Oder (...) haben sie darüber hinaus einen von uns unabhängigen Eigenwert? Andreas Hetzel gibt philosophisch fundierte Antworten auf diese Fragen und diskutiert konkrete Möglichkeiten des Biodiversitätsschutzes. (shrink)

For Heidegger, to experience and think being as such in its finite temporality necessitates that one exist in exposure to one’s own possibility of death. In the thirties, when he thinks of being in...

Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit presents one of the most striking reflexions on human facticity, i.e. the fact that Dasein fundamentally exists in a world letting Dasein and world be co-extensive. By quoting two central personages in theology, Pascal and Augustine, Heidegger refers to a concept of love that is constitutive for Dasein’s facticity to truth and to knowledge. By investigating the claim that love is as good as absent from Sein und Zeit, the article intends to show that the (...) scanty references to love nevertheless have a central role in Heidegger’s early work and, furthermore, why Heidegger returns to it in his later thinking. Interesting in this regard is the connection between the theological concept of love and Heidegger’s concept of ‘world’. The article places Heidegger’s Destruktion of the metaphysical tradition in the realms of his Dasein analysis focussing on facticity. Taking its methodological cues from Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida, the article shows how the concepts of possibility and impotentiality (Ohnmacht) become essential in Heidegger via his reference to love. Lastly, the article examines to what extent Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit paraphrases the old angelology letting the Dasein concept become its secularisation. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a hermeneutic version of ontological pluralism, addressing the question of the discursive articulation of ways of being. The first section presents the notion of a pluralism of ways of being as a restriction of an ontological monism. The second section puts forward a criticism of Kris McDaniel’s proposal of understanding ways of being as kinds of quantifiers. The third section analyses the notion of way of being as a modal concept, explaining ways of being as (...) internal possibilities endowed with a normative force regarding the identity-conditions of entities. The fourth one is a statement about the need of developing a pluralist account of the propositional reference to entities based on ontological pluralism. The fifth section deals with the issue of the discursive articulation of ways of being. The two last sections present a hypothesis concerning a semantic condition for an adequate articulation of ways of being. I argue for a kind of finitude-sensitivity in the semantics of the discursive articulation of internal possibilities, which implies the requirement of developing a hermeneutic notion of silence that may properly work in the discursive articulation of ways of being. (shrink)

Człowiek w logoterapii Viktora E. Frankla charakteryzuje się trzema podstawowymi sposobami bycia: fizycznym, psychicznym, duchowym. Duchowy sposób bycia jest sferą autonomiczną, w której jesteśmy zdolni do pozyskania sensu przez przeżycie i robienie czegoś wartościowego oraz dzięki któremu możemy nabrać dystansu i odnieść się do chorobowych symptomów zaburzonej psychiki. Wypełnienie się sensem przez robienie czegoś wartościowego jest możliwe dzięki trzem zdolnościom, zakorzenionym w strukturzebycia ludzkiego: zdolności do intencjonalnego kierowania się poza siebie do świata zewnętrznego, zdolności transcendowania siebie ze względu na doświadczenie (...) czegoś wartościowego i zdolności do dystansowania się od siebie, dzięki której w ogóle możemydoświadczyć czegoś takiego, jak to, że jesteśmy także duchowymi osobami i objawić się w swoim człowieczeństwie. W artykule ukazano antropologiczne podstawy logoterapii Frankla, akcentując aspekt ludzkiej wolności. ------------------------- Zgłoszono: 28/11/2022. Zrecenzowano: 26/04/2023. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 02/05/2023. (shrink)

The Philosophical Forum, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 65-78, Spring 2021.

This essay is concerned with a topic that has been widely discussed in East Asia for decades – the relationship between Martin Heidegger’s thought and Daoism. At the centre of my reflections is a motif that appears in Heidegger’s 1945 “Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia, between a Younger and an Older Man” – a “doing that is a letting”. Starting from this, I discuss Heidegger’s approach to the Daoist “thinking of the useless” expressed in his (...) Black Notebooks and other texts. In the development of Heidegger’s thought the “turning” marks an important juncture. I propose speaking of a second or transcultural turning, which begins around 1943. For this transformation in Heidegger’s thought, what has been of outstanding importance is his preoccupation with Daoist texts, and especially his reading of the classical texts Lǎozǐ and Zhuāngzǐ. This is evident in his numerous explicit or implicit references to the Daoist classics. In 1945, in a situation of extraordinary emergency, Heidegger refers to Zhuāngzǐ’s motif of uselessness and the “necessity of the unnecessary”. This can be seen as a personal escape from responsibility, but also, importantly, as a way out of his deep entanglement with National Socialism. Although the way Heidegger proposes is arguably twisted and disturbing, its value lies in its providing a necessary perspective from which to unfold the critical potential of transcultural philosophy. (shrink)

Стаття присвячена розгляду однієї зі станових для гайдеґґерового доробку проблем, предметом якої виступає іменування Буття під натиском універсалізованої Гайдеґґером ідеї про безосновність Буття, вкоріненої в феномені Ніщо. Радикалізуючи сказане: у статті розгортається проблема пошуку більш зрозумілого, самоочевидного та прозорого для Буття поняття, аніж самé буття, що обіймала наукові пошуки пізнього Гайдеґґера. Серед значного корпусу його робіт можна зустріти окреслений діапазон понять, якими він послуговувався як альтернативними у веденні мови про Буття. Варто підкреслити, що наразі йдеться не про уособлене в Dasein (...) буття сущого, а Буття з великої літери в сенсі вже узвичаєної в україномовному перекладі Прояви, тобто Ereignis. Проте, у статті затверджується думка, що воно аж ніяк не єдине з імен, нічим не опосередкованого Буття, окрім ототожнень останнього з тотальним Ніщо. Широкоформатність гайдеґґерових імен Буття розглянуто на прикладі найбільш вживаних ним понять, серед яких автор, окрім Ereignis, виокремлює насамперед грецьку істину-ἀλήθεια, а заразом супутні їм поняття ἐνέργεια, es gibt та copula. Побіжно прочиняється негативна проблематика кайрологічного та еонтологічного часів, що вкотре підтверджує закономірність обраного Гайдеґґером феномену часу нарівні з Буттям у своїй magnum opus. Крім того, у статті не полишені увагою такі локальні гайдеґґерові поняття, як Abßgrund, Ungrund, Austrag, Verwüstung та Gründung, завдяки аналітиці яких, поміж інших, нігітологічний погляд Гайдеґґера на Буття набуває остаточної цілісності. Поняття нігітології було обрано автором задля окремої акцентуації на зверненні Гайдеґґера до історико-філософської традиції погляду на феномен Ніщо із усіма похідними від нього поняттями, які мають пряме відношення до негативної інтерпретації Буття. Незважаючи на те, що примітивізація феномену негативності в бік спрощених форм заперечення вже відбулась в історії філософії, як і розтрачування імені буття до Гайдеґґера, у статті особливо підкреслюється ідея про те, що сáме із визначення греками негативних тез у питанні про буття бере початок Західний тип мислення як такий, що перетворив об’єкт власного неспокою у вигляді фігури Ніщо на одне з центральних для онтології понять. Спільною рисою вищезазначених імен Буття є їхня суперлативність, що водночас спричиняє контрінтуїтивність висновків, до яких вони призводять. Власне, завдяки цьому підтверджується актуальність поточного дослідження в рамцях станової для усіх форм онтології проблеми: приведення Буття до поняття, враховуючи негативну тенденційність імен буття до самоприховування та присутності в них семантичних мотивів нестачі й надлишковості водночас. Відтак, аналітика імені буття у масштабах нігітології має супроводжуватись загальним демонтажем позитивно-укласичненого сенсу заявлених понять, і виключно за таких умов перехід до так званого нового початку, ініційованого Гайдеґґером, можна вважати таким, що остаточно відбувся. (shrink)

This paper tries to read some structure into the perplexing diversity of the literature on Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity. It argues that many of the interpretations available rely on views that are false and cannot be Heidegger ’s. It also shows that the only correct interpretation of Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity emerges from a synthesis of Dreyfus ’ later interpretation and Haugeland’s interpretation of this concept. A synthesis of these interpretations yields an interpretation, according to which Dasein’s being (...) is authentic only if it is capable of using tools or language in radically new ways. (shrink)

This paper argues for a fundamental re-reading of Heideggerian philosophy, especially regarding the logical structures presented by Heidegger in the thirties and onward. The field, which this logic organizes, shows an explorative formal element of language in and of itself, and is therefore different from an analytic concept of logic. An analytic conceptualization of logic is understood here as a reflection on the inner structures of already existing notions. An explorative logic, on the other hand, explores the relations between already (...) existing notions and the possible, but yet unknown, development of new notions. The logic of Heidegger is explorative, as it describes the relational, formal structures between the already established semantic field and its virtual excess. This virtual excess, while formal, must be nonetheless considered the primary access to whatever we call external to language in the transcendental sense in Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore, the central question of this logical re-reading of Heidegger is the formal relation to the unknown real. (shrink)

The phenomenological attitude is essential for practising phenomenology. Many refer to wonder and wonderment as basic attitudes and ways of being present with and listening to phenomena. In this article a critical view is placed on the typically psychologically-loaded language and tonality that is used by phenomenological researchers in the human sciences in order to describe the wonder and openness they try to be a part of when doing phenomenology. With reference to the difference between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s views on (...) Socratic dialectics the author points to an ontological dimension in the phenomenology of wonder that cannot be reached by taking only an emotional-bodily-oriented approach (the psychological approach) or an aesthetical-intuitiveoriented approach (the late Heidegger poeticised philosophizing). Instead this dimension must be reached through a Socratic questioning and Community of Wonder. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 12, Special Edition July 2012. (shrink)

MacIntyre characterises liberal societies as suffering distinctive, structural forms of malaise: they are a ‘disaster’, a ‘moral calamity’, sites of ‘barbarism and darkness’. I argue that, whilst we well understand why MacIntyre thinks liberalism is false, it is unclear why this falsity should imply such moral catastrophe. I begin by motivating the question and distinguishing it from the classic liberal-communitarian debates (§§1-2). In particular, I highlight liberalism’s ability to offer ‘workarounds’, accommodating at least some of MacIntyre’s commitments and so forestalling (...) the prospect of moral disaster. I then introduce two arguments which supply the missing premises, in each case juxtaposing MacIntyre with other critics of liberalism. First, I argue that liberalism’s conception of the private sphere systematically marginalizes MacIntyre’s vision of pedagogy (§3). I compare the argument and the attendant conception of privacy with Adorno’s (§4). In §5, I introduce the second premise: I argue that liberalism espouses a conception of maturity that actively undermines MacIntyre’s model of development, subverting liberal ‘workarounds’. I contrast this claim with recent attacks on liberalism by Deneen. I close with some methodological implications: MacIntyre’s case against liberalism should be seen as a form of external, not immanent, critique. (shrink)

This paper returns to one of Heidegger’s pivotal references to ethics – his remarks in the “Letter on Humanism” – and attempts to follow up on a line of thinking in those remarks that Heidegger himself did not expand upon, namely, the link between ethics and Sophoclean tragedy. Reading Heidegger’s analysis of Heraclitus’s Fragment 119 on ἤθος with reference to Sophoclean tragedy and in conjunction with Heidegger’s thinking and his comments elsewhere on ethics and tragedy, the paper seeks to clarify (...) how the thinking of being is, as Heidegger called it, an “original ethics” and what that means for ethical thinking following Heidegger. (shrink)

In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time. Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world is ‘opened (...) up’ and revealed to us as a world that is suffused with values and entities that already matter to us. In this companion essay, our aim is to expand our analysis of affectivity in the following ways: first, we revisit our discussion of Befindlichkeit in light of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of BT; second, we discuss the basic or fundamental mood of boredom and its ontological significance; we conclude by providing a brief characterization of how Heidegger's notion of mood changes in his later thinking. (shrink)