The phenomenological attitude is essential for practising phenomenology. Many refer to wonder and wonderment as basic attitudes and ways of being present with and listening to phenomena. In this article a critical view is placed on the typically psychologically-loaded language and tonality that is used by phenomenological researchers in the human sciences in order to describe the wonder and openness they try to be a part of when doing phenomenology. With reference to the difference between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s views on (...) Socratic dialectics the author points to an ontological dimension in the phenomenology of wonder that cannot be reached by taking only an emotional-bodily-oriented approach (the psychological approach) or an aesthetical-intuitiveoriented approach (the late Heidegger poeticised philosophizing). Instead this dimension must be reached through a Socratic questioning and Community of Wonder. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 12, Special Edition July 2012. (shrink)

En este trabajo indagaremos en torno al estatuto de la acción y la praxis en la obra de Heidegger a partir de un análisis de la figura del despertar relativa al aburrimiento profundo, en su trabajo de 1929-1930. Con ello, buscaremos demostrar que las implicancias relativas al actuar, pensar y filosofar allí expuestas, permiten cotejar continuidades y diferencias de tipo fronterizo tanto con sus elaboraciones anteriores, como respecto a su perspectiva posterior a la kehre. Para dar cuenta de ello, primero (...) abordaremos aspectos fundamentales de su interpretación de la filosofía práctica aristotélica y sus reelaboraciones hasta Sein und Zeit. (shrink)

Der soziotechnische Wandel bringt neue Phänomene des Zufalls hervor, die sich den üblichen Strategien des Umgangs mit Risiken und Unsicherheit entziehen. Diese Akzidenzphänomene sind prinzipiell unvorhersehbar und in ihrer komplexen Effektgesamtheit jenseits von Kalkulation und Antizipation. Eine allgemeine Verzukünftigung unseres Weltbezuges mit spezifischen weitreichenden Problemen ist die Folge und lässt klassische Agenturen des Risikomanagements und der Unsicherheitsbewältigung an ihre Leistungsgrenzen stoßen. Bruno Gransche zeigt, dass Philosophie und Zukunftsforschung gemeinsam großes Potenzial aufweisen, hier zu helfen.

Husserls Ansatz der Transzendentalphänomenologie wird gemeinhin als Versuch einer rationalen Letztbegründung von Erkenntnis überhaupt gedeutet. Sein Verständnis der konstitutiven Rolle des reinen Bewußtseins gegenüber dem Weltphänomen als solchem sowie seine Betonung des teleologischen Aspektes der transzendentalen Vernunft scheint sein Denken von vornherein in radikalen Gegensatz zu all jenen phänomenologischen Entwürfen zu bringen, die – wie etwa Heidegger oder Fink – die Beziehung von Subjekt und Welt sowie die Philosophie als ganze wesentlich vom Spiel her zu verstehen suchen. Andererseits hat die (...) phänomenologische Epoché durch die in ihr liegende Neutralisierung der Existenzsetzung von transzendenter Wirklichkeit bisweilen in dem Ruf gestanden, sich in die freischwebende Sphäre der „reinen Denkbarkeiten und Fiktionen zurückziehen zu wollen. Ausgehend von gewissen kritischen Bemerkungen Husserls zu den Analysen der praktischen Verwendungs- und Verstehenszusammenhänge in Sein und Zeit soll in diesem Artikel gezeigt werden, daß der Spielbegriff bei Husserl so vielschichtig ist wie die intentionale Struktur des Bewußtseins selbst. Zwischen der existenzneutralen Betrachtung „freischwebender eidetischer Strukturen einerseits und der Betonung des absoluten teleologischen Zwecksinnes der transzendentalen Bewußtseinsaktivität andererseits versucht Husserl, die Motivation des Durchbruchs der rein theoretischen Haltung als solcher vor dem Hintergrund spielerischer Freiheit und Spontaneität zu verstehen. Im Gegensatz zu Heidegger wird die „spielerische Neugierde der theoretischen Haltung, die auch der Epoché zugrunde liegt, als ein positives Grundphänomen verstanden, das auf die Freiheit des transzendentalen Subjekts von dinglichen Zweckzusammenhängen und damit auf seine überweltliche Würde als transzendentale Person verweist. (shrink)

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the "paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology," and for this reason, she concludes, "We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified with (...) openness to unpredictability." The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

Phenomenological descriptions are supposed to be revelatory and coincide with the self-showing of the things themselves. These features of phenomenological descriptions lead to the peculiar character of their expression, which has the effect of making them difficult to communicate. That is, the problem with communicating the findings of phenomenological researches is a consequence of the descriptive nature of the endeavor and the disclosive character of phenomenological descriptions. In the Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl recognized that the problem has three facets: how (...) does one state the findings of phenomenological researches, how can one effectively communicate these findings, and how can these communications be persuasive? In this essay I elaborate on these problems and then show that Heidegger’s method of formal indication was designed to solve these problems just as Husserl understood them. We can thus take formal indication as a model for dealing with these problems—and for informing phenomenological discourse—because it solves them with a single strategy. (shrink)

My aim in the present paper is to show the significance of Heidegger's phenomenology of religion as an important step on his way to his magnum opus . First, I wish to exhibit traits characteristic of Heidegger's path of thinking in terms of his confrontation with phenomenology, historicism, hermeneutics, and Lebensphilosophie . I will then argue, in a second step, that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, as well as (...) of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in Being and Time . Both theology and philosophy offer a conceptual elaboration of something previously enacted or lived and, in doing so, are at the same time meant to refer back to and reinforce what they grow out of—faith or factical life. (shrink)

Este artículo se centra en la interpretación del concepto de facticidad en los cursos impartidos por Heidegger entre 1921 y 1923. La facticidad será allí entendida en términos de cierto dinamismo, al tiempo que vacilantemente asimilada al “sentido del ser” del ente que somos. En relación a ello, trataremos de mostrar cómo en el problema al que esta noción apunta cabe ya reconocer la cuestión por el sentido del ser en general planteada en Ser y tiempo.

In his Kant interpretations of the late 1920s and in Being and Time, Heidegger develops two distinct, yet related, derivations of the possibility of judgment from temporal conditions. This paper presents each derivation, establishes the strict analogy between the two, and uses it to explain the structure and shortcoming of the interpretation of ecstatic temporality as the unitary ground of objective experience.

La serenidad parece abundar en la actitud resignada ante un mundo tecnificado cuya marcha irredenta solo podrá ser detenida ya solo por un dios que pueda aún salvarnos. En mi opinión, esta conocida lectura obvia la parte activa y comprometida de la serenidad cuya fertilidad emerge cuando se entiende vinculada al cuidado como esencia del Dasein. Este artículo defiende que esta interpretación es posible toda vez que se descubra la raíz cristiano-paulina de la Gelassenheit como la actitud adecuada para ser (...) en el mundo sin ser del mundo. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende realizar uma breve exposição acerca da crítica de Levinas à tradição filosófica até então vigente, cujos espectros, desdobramentos e necessidades giram ao redor e se sustém no alicerce da Razão ou do ser. Tal postura pode ser observada mesmo no início da filosofia ocidental, aponta Levinas, com Sócrates e a maiêutica, ou mais ainda, com os filósofos da physis e sua busca por um arché, o princípio regulador de todas as coisas. Haveria uma espécie de relação com (...) o conhecimento e o intuito “controlar” e ocultar nossas próprias fraquezas perante o desconhecido. Levinas rompe com a tradição, buscando colocar o humano no cerne da questão, bem como a investigação acerca da pulsão anterior à toda tematização, oriunda da alteridade radical. (shrink)

In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of “apperception” should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically “indicated” with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions “appresenting” a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to “ad-memorized” ( hinzuerinnert , ad - memoriert ) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in (...) our apprehension of historical traces and relics, but also in that of causal relations, familiar objects, and cultural objects in general. Following several later notations of Husserl concerning the topic of “apperceptions,” this paper outlines the specific intentional structure of retrospective or evocative apperceptions, analyzing their various possible forms. (shrink)

Na preleção de verão de 1923, intitulada “Ontologia: hermenêutica da facticidade”, Martin Heidegger estabelece seu programa filosófico em termos de uma investigação fundamental, nomeada por ele como hermenêutica fenomenológica da facticidade. De acordo com esta, a interpretação da vida fática não se realiza sem que se tome o ser e o falar como fenômenos privilegiados, ou seja, sem que se recupere o vínculo essencial em que nós, seres humanos existentes, já nos descobrimos sendo no mundo como seres capazes de fala. (...) Tendo em vista que é a partir do constructo ser-no-mundo que o filósofo alemão consegue dar um passo atrás no esquema sujeito-objeto, não é por acaso então que ele busca encontrar, desde muito cedo, modos de dizer o ser que não mais o entifiquem, com o intuito de pensá-lo para além do registro da referência e, portanto, da objetivação. É com base nessa situação que se torna premente que sua análise tenha início a partir do horizonte do ente privilegiado, uma vez que é para este que o sentido do ser se torna um problema. Assim, este artigo parte da hipótese de que a hermenêutica da facticidade se constitui por conta da tentativa de Heidegger de ater-se ao problema do ser que compreende ser, tendo como premissa uma ampla problematização em torno da significação da palavra vida. Palavras-chave: Heidegger; hermenêutica; facticidade.: In the summer lecture of 1923, entitled Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Martin Heidegger established his philosophical program in terms of a fundamental research, named by him as phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. According to this, the interpretation of the factical life is not achieved without taking the being and the speaking as privileged phenomena, i.e., without recovering the essential bond in which we, existent human beings, have already discovered ourselves being in the world as being capable of speaking. Given the fact that it is from the construct being-in-the-world that the German philosopher is able to step back on subject-object scheme, it is not by accident that he tries to find, since the beginning, ways of expressing being that no longer turn it into an entity, with the intention of thinking it beyond the scheme and, therefore, any objectualization registry. It is based on this situation that it is pressing that his analysis starts from the horizon of a privileged entity, since it is for this the sense of being becomes a problem. In fact, this paper starts from the hypothesis that hermeneutics of facticity is constituted due to Heidegger’s attempt on holding to the problem of being that understands being, with the premise of a wide problematization regarding the significance of the word life. Keywords: Heidegger; hermeneutics; facticity. (shrink)

The paper addresses the methodological tensions between Husserl’s phenomenology and history by reinterpreting the Addendum III of the Krisis-work in view of genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts out by retracing the traditional criticism against the unhistorical character of Husserl’s phenomenology as voiced by Heidegger, Adorno and others. Afterwards, it moves on to analyse the troubled relationship between static and genetic phenomenology, on the one hand, and between genetic phenomenology and empirical genesis, on the other hand. Finally, it arrives at (...) a step by step methodological reconstruction of Husserl’s considerations on the “origin of geometry”, which are regarded to be an application of the methods of genetic phenomenology to the field of history. (shrink)

Eldred offers a remedy to the consequences of ancient Greek misconceptions of time that are also entrenched in today’s mathematized physics. Here time is spatialized as the one-dimensionally linear ‘arrow of time’ for the sake of predicting and controlling movement. But such spatialized time distorts the phenomenon of time itself. An alternative, hermeneutic-phenomenological path begins with a pre-spatial concept of time that is genuinely three-dimensional. This paves the way for recasting who we are as humans in belonging, first of all, (...) to the free openness of 3D-temporality. This belonging enables temporally 3D-vision of the psyche that empowers us to see movement at all and reconcile its inherent contradictoriness. We are then also able to conceive ourselves no longer merely as internally cogitating, self-conscious subjects, but as engaged existentially in temporally 3D-interplay, mutually estimating and esteeming who we are. This unpredictable interplay is constrained, however, by being played out in the sociating medium of thingified value, the accumulative movement of thingified value having gained the upper hand in dictating our life-movements as well as our interplay with the earth. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE La hermenéutica filosófica de Gadamer ha restituido la historia global de la hermenéutica para el pensamiento contemporáneo. Su proyecto filosófico se alinea a una historia que incluye pensadores como Heidegger, Dilthey o Schleiermacher. Pero en esta línea histórica la hermenéutica durante su etapa ilustrada ha quedado olvidada. La hermenéutica ilustrada de los siglos XVII y XVIII no ha sido tenida en cuenta por los proyectos hermenéuticos contemporáneos. Nuestro interés radica en observar (...) cómo esta etapa, a pesar de haber sido relegada, influye en el proyecto contemporáneo de la hermenéutica gadameriana. Según esto, nos abocaremos a dilucidar cómo actúa la naciente hermenéutica profana durante la modernidad. Para ello nos centraremos en algunos autores modernos como Chladenius y Dannhauer, a través de los cuales observaremos las problemáticas que trabajan en el campo hermenéutico y sus intentos de resolución. Y por último, intentaremos delinear aquellos aportes propios de estos autores en el proyecto contemporáneo de Gadamer. (shrink)

Max Scheler's Reformation of Philosophy of Religion The following contribution aims to show the relevance of Max Scheler's reflections on the relation of Christianity and modernity for the present situation. It interprets Scheler's philosophy of religion in terms of a principle of reformation that can be implicitly found in Scheler's critical assessment of the historical impact of Lutheran Protestantism. Scheler's principle of reformation provides four criteria: autonomy of the religious sphere, dialectics of life and spirit, community beyond religious denominations, and (...) metaphysical determination of the divine. On that basis, we will see that Scheler's "catholic” phenomenology of religion from 1921 only partly meets his own criteria, whereas his "post-catholic” metaphysics of panentheism, developed after 1922, is more suitable to meet these criteria. Two factors are crucial: First, the divine is characterized by a fundamental metaphysical tension between spirit and vital impulsion, which leads to transferring the responsibility of balancing this tension to the history of mankind. Second, the community that corresponds to this metaphysical conception is not delimited by religious denomination but is integrated by solidarity among all human and living beings instead. (shrink)

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the “paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology,” and for this reason, she concludes, “We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified with (...) openness to unpredictability.” The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)