En una de sus lecciones en Friburgo, hacia fines de 1951, Martin Heidegger pronunció una frase llamada a ser fuente de controversias y de exégesis inacabables: «La ciencia no piensa». La lección en la que aparece su frase provocadora se publicaría luego en su libro _¿Qué significa pensar?_, en 1954. En este trabajo analizamos las interpretaciones de esta frase, discutimos su dimensión política, y repensamos su significado en relación a su circularidad, i.e. a su carácter de dispositivo definitorio.

Philosophical theories of causation are commonly judged by their ability to correctly determine whether there is a causal relation present in intuitively clear example scenarios. If the theories survive this test, they are then used to answer big philosophical questions about causation. This Method of Examples is attractive because it seems to allow us to determine the quality of a theory of causation independently of answering the big philosophical questions; which is good, since it means that we can then non-circularly (...) use the theories judged to be best to answer those questions. However, the current article argues that this virtue of the Method of Examples is an illusion. In particular, I argue that the necessary step of judging whether a proposed analysis of causation is reductive can only be taken after many of the most vexing philosophical questions about causation have already been answered. It is then shown that a rejection of the methodological supremacy of the Method of Examples leads to a more pluralistic method of judging theories of causation, a pluralism that benefits non-standard approaches like interventionism and agency theories. (shrink)

This article answers the question raised by the special issue of this journal in a positive way: managerial practices do need philosophy. In particular, it argues for a more concrete claim: managerial practices have needed philosophy in the past to develop some important intellectual tools, and today they still need to be open to the continuous conceptual and methodological innovations introduced by competing philosophical research programmes, because loyalty to just one favourite philosophical paradigm can hinder the ability of managerial practices (...) to express their full potential, whereas openness to philosophical innovation can help managers keep their conceptual tools up to their tasks. The authors argue for this thesis in concreto: they discuss a specific branch of managerial practice—marketing—and illustrate that a preeminent form thereof, i.e. Experiential Marketing, has needed philosophy, and still needs it nowadays, in order to achieve its goals and overcome certain problems. They also point out that Experiential Marketing needs to renew and integrate some of its philosophical assumptions and conceptual tools in the light of innovations brought about by a recent philosophical turn. In particular, the authors argue that philosophy has provided essential conceptual tools for the articulation of the notions of experience and authenticity used in Experiential Marketing; they claim that the excessive reliance of Experiential Marketing upon a problematic and somewhat outdated ontology produces paradoxes with important repercussions upon managerial practice; and they show that those problems can be overcome by integrating and partially renewing its assumptions and conceptual tools, in the light of a fresher philosophical framework. Shortcomings and solutions are discussed with reference to a specific case study: Venice as an experientially rewarding and authentic tourist destination during the Covid19 crisis, but also as a World Heritage property whose management entails difficult choices. The fruitfulness of the paradigm revision is shown also by integrating the conceptual toolkit of Experiential Marketing with three relatively new notions, deriving from a new realist framework: independence, attrition and perception. (shrink)

Transcendental conceptions of subjectivity, beginning with Descartes and including Kant, Fichte, and Husserl as well as neo-transcendental accounts of the 20th century, try to explicate a subject’s subjectivity as a necessary condition for all theoretical and practical validity claims. According to this conception, only this subject-theoretical presupposition allows for an adequate foundation of terms of authorship of action and self-determination. However, the conceptual self-explication of this position faces some inherent difficulties, which has repeatedly been pointed out even by representatives of (...) this school of thought themselves. Moreover, it seems as if the constitutional achievements of transcendental philosophy are increasingly being detached from philosophy: due to the development of the modern sciences of man, they are step by step conceived as objects of empirical research. This paper looks critically into this thesis of detachment. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo de investigación trataré de repensar, dentro de la intuición marcada por Heidegger en su interpretación de Kant, el papel que juega la noción de imaginación, en su vinculación inexorable, por un lado, con la apercepción trascendental, y con el tiempo, por otro, a fin de alcanzar, al menos, un esbozo temático de tal imaginación en términos de auto-afección radical del sí-mismo. Y todo ello para mostrar la posibilidad de una lectura interpretativa que haga valer la importancia, (...) justamente, de un sí mismo y/o mismidad.In this paper, I will try to rethink Heidegger’s interpretation of the role of transcendental imagination within his understanding of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. My paper focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception on the one hand and the time on the other. In this sense, I will try to develop a thematic outline of such imagination in terms of radical self-affection of Selfhood. And this in order to show the possibility of an interpretative reading that asserts the importance, precisely, of a self and/or selfhood. (shrink)

El presente artículo intenta explorar una relación metódica y temática entre dos existenciarios: mismidad y temporalidad, en sus respectivos límites de aparición, en una obra de gran complejidad como Ser y Tiempo, a fin de poder captar, con la radicalidad que solo la fenomenología permite hacer valer, la unidad integral del ser del Dasein, un ente caracterizado y señalado, a diferencia de los demás entes intramundanos, por la existencia de un modo raigal, ontológico. La conclusión apuntará a vertebrar el análisis (...) existencial en una experiencia primaria como la del sí-mismo. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo de investigación, desde los límites intrínsecos de los §§. 39-42 de la obra Ser y Tiempo, busca tematizar la mismidad del Dasein, en tanto saber de un sí-mismo no cósico que es correlato de la existencialidad y la facticidad de este ente, desde el modo de aparecer del existenciario cuidado, precisamente aquel encargado de dotar de unidad o totalidad estructural a los momentos constitutivos del ser-en-el-mundo como tal. Este análisis es ejercido con el fin de potenciar una (...) posible vinculación entre cuidado y mismidad, donde, según parece, la mismidad se constituye como condición necesaria y suficiente del cuidado, responsable no solo de favorecer su unidad temática, sino el tránsito de la impropiedad a la propiedad existencial.: From the intrinsic limits of §§. 39-42 of the work Being and Time, this research paper seeks to thematize the Selfhood of Dasein understood as a non-thingness wisdom of self, the which is correlative of the existentiality and facticity of this entity. This searching is carried out from the mode of appearing of existential Care, precisely this existential word is responsible for endowing of unit and / or structural totality to the constitutive moments of the being-in-the-world as such. This analysis also is exercised in order to enhance a possible link between Care and Selfhood, where, as it seems, the Selfhood is constituted as a neccesary and sufficient condition of Care. This Selfhood is responsable for not only to favor the unity of Care, but the transition from impropriety to existential property of Dasein. (shrink)

This paper returns to one of Heidegger’s pivotal references to ethics – his remarks in the “Letter on Humanism” – and attempts to follow up on a line of thinking in those remarks that Heidegger himself did not expand upon, namely, the link between ethics and Sophoclean tragedy. Reading Heidegger’s analysis of Heraclitus’s Fragment 119 on ἤθος with reference to Sophoclean tragedy and in conjunction with Heidegger’s thinking and his comments elsewhere on ethics and tragedy, the paper seeks to clarify (...) how the thinking of being is, as Heidegger called it, an “original ethics” and what that means for ethical thinking following Heidegger. (shrink)

The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative variation as applied to (...) the specific regional ontology of biology. Thus, at a time when the clarification of the essence of our biological embodiment is of growing interest for phenomenology, we suggest that artificial life should be seen as a method of externalizing some of the insurmountable complexity of imaginatively varying the phenomenon of life. (shrink)

Although there are many points of continuity, there are also a number of changes in the pedagogical form of the anatomy lecture over the longue durée, over centuries of epistemic change, rather than over years or decades. The article begins with an analysis of the physical and technical arrangements of the early modern anatomy lecture, showing how these present a general underlying similarity compared to those in place today. It then goes on to consider examples of elements of speech and (...) presentation, description and illustration that are used in the biology lecture from the early modern (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries) and late modern (or contemporary) eras. The anatomy lecture thus demonstrates a basic physical and technical continuity in the classroom or theater, whereas the larger epistemic functions in which it is embedded have changed: from a descriptive, discursive function, focusing on individual organs and their physicality, to one that is more integrative, systemic and also performative in both form and content. (shrink)

To be human is to be in the world with others, and so what it means to be goes to the root of ethical and political life. One would have to be exceptionally obtuse not to recognize that this age, which we now share as a planetary humanity, is indeed in crisis, despite all our apparent progress if not because of it: the economic and political upheavals that threaten to throw whole regions into uproar, the shifts in climate that threaten (...) the entire globe with unparalleled disruption, the “advances” in technology that threaten to lay waste to entire cities and reduce human beings to “human resources.” Despite these ongoing or potential disasters, what Heidegger’s work challenges us to think is that the most fundamental disaster is a failure to think what it means to be human, that these other dangers can only be addressed if we confront this question first. My argument here is that Heidegger misreads a form of thinking vital to ethical–political life, phronêsis, so-called practical wisdom, because his radical historicism prevents him from seeing the intersection of principled norms with life as we find it. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen, Machenschaft, and Geviert, several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s (...) attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” and “The Question concerning Technology”. Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt den Versuch, Gadamers Ideen zur Begriffsbildung und Textbedeutung einer rationalen Rekonstruktion im Licht neuerer Entwicklungen in der linguistischen und philosophischen Semantik zu unterziehen. Anschließend an eine Kritik gewisser auf Heidegger zurückgehender Annahmen in Gadamers Wahrheit und Methode werden seine Begriffe der Applikation und der Geschichtlichkeit von Textbedeutungen reformuliert. Dies geschieht unter Bezugnahme auf J. J. Katz' Bedeutungs- und Referenztheorie, H. Putnams Theorie der Stereotypen und J. M. E. Moravcsiks Begriff der 'aitiational frames'. Es wird im besonderen (...) die These vertreten, daß Gadamers Idee der Interpretation als eines Prozesses, bei dem Autor und Leser zu einer Übereinkunft über die 'Sache' kommen , neu und fruchtbar in Begriffen der Interaktion zwischen semantischer Kompetenz und Alltagswissen im Leseprozeß überdacht werden kann. In Verbindung mit weiteren Teilen linguistischer Theorie würde ein solcher Neuansatz es ermöglichen, die Frage zu beantworten wie Verstehen im Prinzip möglich ist. Eine rationale Rekonstruktion von Gadamers Begriff der Applikation in dieser Richtung würde es ferner erlauben, Antworten auf eine Reihe weiterer schwieriger Fragen wie zum Beispiel der nach dem Grad der Unbestimmtheit von Textbedeutungen und der 'Korrektheit' von Interpretationen zu erhalten. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt den Versuch, Gadamers Ideen zur Begriffsbildung und Textbedeutung einer rationalen Rekonstruktion im Licht neuerer Entwicklungen in der linguistischen und philosophischen Semantik zu unterziehen. Anschließend an eine Kritik gewisser auf Heidegger zurückgehender Annahmen in GadamersWahrbeit und Methode werden seine Begriffe der Applikation und der Geschichtlichkeit von Textbedeutungen reformuliert. Dies geschieht unter Bezugnahme auf J. J. Katz' Bedeutungs- und Referenztheorie, H. Putnams Theorie der Stereotypen und J. M. E. Moravcsiks Begriff der ‘aitiational frames’. Es wird im besonderen die (...) These vertreten, daß Gadamers Idee der Interpretation als eines Prozesses, bei dem Autor und Leser zu einer Übereinkunft über die ‘Sache’ kommen (am Leitfaden der theologischen und juristischen Hermeneutik), neu und fruchtbar in Begriffen der Interaktion zwischen semantischer Kompetenz und Alltagswissen im Leseprozeß überdacht werden kann. In Verbindung mit weiteren Teilen linguistischer Theorie würde ein solcher Neuansatz es ermöglichen, die Frage zu beantworten wie Verstehen im Prinzip möglich ist. Eine rationale Rekonstruktion von Gadamers Begriff der Applikation in dieser Richtung würde es ferner erlauben, Antworten auf eine Reihe weiterer schwieriger Fragen wie zum Beispiel der nach dem Grad der Unbestimmtheit von Textbedeutungen und der ‘Korrektheit’ von Interpretationen zu erhalten. (shrink)

In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time. Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world is ‘opened (...) up’ and revealed to us as a world that is suffused with values and entities that already matter to us. In this companion essay, our aim is to expand our analysis of affectivity in the following ways: first, we revisit our discussion of Befindlichkeit in light of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of BT; second, we discuss the basic or fundamental mood of boredom and its ontological significance; we conclude by providing a brief characterization of how Heidegger's notion of mood changes in his later thinking. (shrink)

For the larger part of modern western intellectual history, it has been assumed that the study of morality and religion requires special methodology, insulated from, and in some important aspects incongruent with, the scientific method commonly used in the realm of natural sciences. Furthermore, even if it would be granted that moral and religious behavior is amendable to scientific analysis, the prospects of using evolutionary theory in particular to do the heavy lifting in explanation of these phenomena have been bleak, (...) since many scholars doubted that a biological theory could possibly offer any valuable contribution. Recent advances in the fields of Evolutionary Ethics and Cognitive Science of Religion disprove both claims, emphasizing empirically founded explanations, demonstrating extraordinarily high degree of methodological consilience, and revealing utmost importance of the application of evolutionary theory in fields of study once deemed to be exclusive domains of social sciences and philosophy. (shrink)

This essay reveals the destructive possibility inherent in the deformalization of the Kantian notion of time governing Levinas' engagement with Rosenzweig. It demonstrates that this programme of deformalization not only retains Rosenzweig's idea that the abstract aspects of time can be deformalized, and thus grounded concretely, in the biblical events of temporality, but also moves toward an ethical destruction of the schematism understood as an exposition of the temporality of the Other which can be distinguished essentially as a threefold grounding (...) of time in the Kantian sense. This unique connection between the temporality of the Other and this ethical destruction of the schematism is then developed according to the ontological destruction of the schematism in Heidegger's exposition of the problematic of temporality on the one hand, and to the repetition or renewal of this temporal problematic of the schematism in Levinas' deformalization of the Kantian notion of time on the other. The essay concludes.. (shrink)

Después de las concepciones de Descartes sobre el mundo como res extensa y de Newton acerca de la distinción entre espacio absoluto y espacio relativo, el movimiento fenomenológico logra alcanzar un conjunto nuevo de conceptos para comprender el espacio: la noción de cuerpo vivido, la espacialidad originaria del Dasein, el espacio antropológico, el espacio sagrado. Partiendo del concepto de un espacio vivido, sostenemos que: 1) existe una radical diferencia entre dicho espacio y el espacio geométrico; 2) el espacio vivido conlleva (...) cuatro intencionalidades básicas: la cognitiva, la deóntica, la sintomática y la estética; 3) el espacio sagrado es una modalidad de espacio vivido, en la cual las intencionalidades se articulan en torno a lo sagrado, y más específicamente, Dios. (shrink)

Hermeneutic research in nursing: developing a Gadamerian‐based research method This paper takes the stance that although there are many different approaches to phenomenological and hermeneutic research, some of these have become blurred due to multiple interpretations of translated materials. Working from original texts by the German philosophers, this paper reconsiders the relevance of phenomenology and hermeneutics to nursing research. We trace the development of Gadamer's philosophy in order to propose a research method based in this tradition. Five steps have been (...) identified as a guide for nurse researchers. These are deciding upon a question, identification of preunderstandings, gaining understanding through dialogue with participants, gaining understanding through dialogue with text and establishing trustworthiness. (shrink)

It is over 20 years since Michael Crotty's groundbreaking critique of phenomenological research in nursing. However, rather than entering into the acrimonious discussions that followed, we developed a research method that we believed translated Gadamer's philosophy into the world of empirical research. Fundamental to that work was our differentiation of hermeneutics from phenomenology. The aim of the present paper was to provide a critical analysis of the citations from publication in 2003 until the end of 2017. We identified 402 citations (...) of which 362 were included. One hundred and sixty‐three articles mentioned the article in passing, usually in a list of authors who had discussed hermeneutics. Sixteen citations misrepresented the method mainly claiming that we discussed a method for hermeneutic phenomenology (or phenomenological hermeneutics). Of the 117 citations that partially used the method, the main focus was the four steps of data analysis. Sixty studies used our method in totality although they derive from varying philosophical standpoints. Disappointingly, there has been little critique of our Gadamerian research method. For health disciplines to truly make progress in the academic stage, it is vital that we engage in with critique, some of which will come through open and honest reflexive engagement with our topics. (shrink)

Los conceptos y problemas de la filosofía kantiana juegan un papel central en el pensamiento del joven Heidegger. Este trabajo analiza la comprensión del concepto de a priori que Heidegger ofrece principalmente en las lecciones de 1925 y en Kant y el problema de la metafísica. Sin la aspiración a una nueva metafísica, Heidegger extrae todo el rendimiento ontológico de lo a priori/trascendental que contiene la Crítica de la razón pura, una vez que ha quedado desligado de la legitimación del (...) conocimiento objetivo, y lo enlaza con un concepto clave de la fenomenología: la intencionalidad. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la interpretación heideggeriana en clave fenomenológica de Confesiones X. Mantiene que san Agustín es un fenomenólogo avant la lettre cuando propone como criterio del conocimiento de sí mismo “practicar la verdad en el corazón”. Se trata de algo más que un consejo; es un criterio de la verdad y para la verdad que reaparece una y otra vez a lo largo del libro X. Heidegger, sin embargo, menosprecia el pensamiento agustiniano por demasiado griego. Los dos ejes de (...) la lectura de Heidegger son: a) la resistencia agustiniana a reducir la experiencia vital a un sistema de conceptos; b) la exposición de la vida fáctica como inseguridad, inquietud, apertura existencial a Dios. (shrink)

Abstract: For William Blattner, Heidegger's phenomenology fails to demonstrate how a nonsuccessive temporal manifold can ‘generate’ the appropriate sequence of world-time Nows. Without this he cannot explain the ‘derivative’ status of ordinary time. In this article I show that it is only Blattner's reconstruction that makes failure inevitable. Specifically, Blattner is wrong in the way he sets out the explanatory burden, arguing that the structure of world-time must meet the traditional requirements of ordinary time logic if the derivation is to (...) succeed. He takes this to mean: mundane ‘tasks’, the contents of world-time nows, must form a transitive series, importing back into world-time the very structure that Heidegger says is derived by its levelling-off. I argue, instead, that world-time nows, seen at the level of lived content, can be quite ‘irrational’ but this is perfectly consistent with the generative thesis. Adapting Blattner's useful suggestion that temporality is sequence building or ‘iterative’ I show that iteration does not manifest itself at the level of tasks but at the ‘existential’ level of my involvement in a task. Depriving that involvement of its expressive content is what accounts for the levelling-off of the world-time now and thus the derivation of the ordinary concept of time. (shrink)

As Husserl already noticed, artworks themselves have a phenomenological character. This means, however, that to experience artworks as phenomena no “epoché” and no “phenomenological reduction” is necessary. The leading question of my essay is whether, and possibly how, this observation can be methodologically generalized for understanding phenomena. I discuss if, and possibly how, a phenomenological reflection on art allows and even demands a general conception of phenomenology that nevertheless does not confuse artworks with phenomena in general. My intention is to (...) show that and how phenomenality can be clarified with reference to its spatial character. Accordingly, works of architecture that are artworks will play a decisive role in my argument. (shrink)

In the article I discuss Husserl’s conception of the Lifeworld as developed in his Crisis Book, in order to find out whether art can be especially illuminative in order to understand the Lifeworld and one’s own living in it. I draw a parallel between the sciences as discussed by Husserl as abstractions from the Lifeworld that offer a special view of what in the Lifeworld as such remains disclosed. However, scientific and artistic abstraction differs in character. Whereas the sciences establish (...) formal systems and thereby discover the world as to its computability, the arts abstract from the everyday set of meanings and go back to the primordial and original experience of the world in its perceptibility. Thus they are able to draw attention to the essential character of the Lifeworld as such. (shrink)

The paper addresses the methodological tensions between Husserl’s phenomenology and history by reinterpreting the Addendum III of the Krisis-work in view of genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts out by retracing the traditional criticism against the unhistorical character of Husserl’s phenomenology as voiced by Heidegger, Adorno and others. Afterwards, it moves on to analyse the troubled relationship between static and genetic phenomenology, on the one hand, and between genetic phenomenology and empirical genesis, on the other hand. Finally, it arrives at (...) a step by step methodological reconstruction of Husserl’s considerations on the “origin of geometry”, which are regarded to be an application of the methods of genetic phenomenology to the field of history. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungUnser Beitrag versucht den Widerhall gewisser Husserlscher Begriffe und Fragestellungen in den frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen Heideggers zu verfolgen. Zu diesem Zweck wird vornehmlich der Begriff Bekundung in Erwägung gezogen, den Husserl im zweiten Buch seiner Ideen anführt, und den Heidegger seinerseits, in seiner Freiburger Vorlesung Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, prägnant einsetzt. Diesem Begriff wird sowohl in Husserls Lehre zur Konstitution der Materialität und der kausalen Realität, als auch in seinen Untersuchungen zum personalen Selbst nachgegangen, wobei eben die Spannungen zwischen diesen beiden (...) Perspektiven mit Nachdruck betont sind. In weiterer Folge soll gezeigt werden, dass Heideggers Gebrauch desselben Begriffes, im Zusammenhang seiner Freiburger Vorlesung des WS 1919/20, in etlichen Hinsichten als ein Versuch angesehen werden kann, gewisse Bedenken des Husserlschen Ansatzes zu lösen. Damit soll zugleich ein Einblick in die konkrete Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Freiburger phänomenologischen Kreises, in den frühen zwanziger Jahren, gewonnen werden. (shrink)

Heidegger’s doubts concerning the concept of “empathy” are unequivocally proven not only by his general tendency to avoid it, but also by his sharp critique of this term, as presented in both Being and Time and the lectures from the Summer Semester 1925, History of the Concept of Time. However, the concept of empathy is used by Heidegger in a positive, albeit rather allusive fashion, in three consecutive lectures of his early Freiburg period: Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Phenomenology of Intuition (...) and Expression and The Phenomenology of Religious Life. The present paper analyzes these three passages of Heidegger’s early lectures in close detail, revealing their connection to the conceptions of empathy found in the works of both Dilthey and Scheler. Thus it aims to connect Heidegger’s rather idiosyncratic conception of intersubjectivity with some of the discussions on that topic in the phenomenological millieu of the early 1920s. (shrink)

EinleitungDer Begriff Kinästhese ist in der Husserl-Literatur durchaus geläufig. Trotzdem fehlt bis heute eine umfassende Erörterung seiner Bedeutung und seiner Spielformen sowie auch seiner konkreten Entwicklungsgeschichte bei Husserl.Zu erwähnen wären in dieser Hinsicht besonders: Claesges (1964), Claesges’ „Einleitung des Herausgebers“ zu Hua XVI, Drummond (1984), Melle (1983), S. 114–120, Piedade (2001), Przybylski (2006) und Mattens (2009). Vermutlich würde fast jeder Husserl-Kenner – wenn danach fragt – ohne weiteres antworten, Kinästhesen seien jene Bewegungsmöglichkeiten des leiblichen Subjekts, durch die sich seine Wahrnehmungsgegenstände (...) auf ihrer elementarsten Stufe (jene der sogenannten „Sinnesdinge“) konstituieren. Das ist bestimmt richtig, da für Husserl in der Tat Wahrnehmung ihre Gegenstände eben nicht in einer augenblicklichen „Impression“ voll erschließt, sondern sie vielmehr in mannigfaltigen Zusammenhängen von „Abschattungen“, d. h. in zusammenhängenden Sequenzen pa. (shrink)

Unser Beitrag versucht den Widerhall gewisser Husserlscher Begriffe und Fragestellungen in den frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen Heideggers zu verfolgen. Zu diesem Zweck wird vornehmlich der Begriff Bekundung in Erwägung gezogen, den Husserl im zweiten Buch seiner Ideen anführt, und den Heidegger seinerseits, in seiner Freiburger Vorlesung Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie , prägnant einsetzt. Diesem Begriff wird sowohl in Husserls Lehre zur Konstitution der Materialität und der kausalen Realität, als auch in seinen Untersuchungen zum personalen Selbst nachgegangen, wobei eben die Spannungen zwischen diesen (...) beiden Perspektiven mit Nachdruck betont sind. In weiterer Folge soll gezeigt werden, dass Heideggers Gebrauch desselben Begriffes, im Zusammenhang seiner Freiburger Vorlesung des WS 1919/20, in etlichen Hinsichten als ein Versuch angesehen werden kann, gewisse Bedenken des Husserlschen Ansatzes zu lösen. Damit soll zugleich ein Einblick in die konkrete Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Freiburger phänomenologischen Kreises, in den frühen zwanziger Jahren, gewonnen werden. (shrink)

Para comprender Ser y Tiempo es inevitable preguntar hasta el final cómo articula Heidegger las dos dimensiones de la existencia a las que denomina la propiedad y la impropiedad. Frente a la interpretación habitual, en este artículo se defiende que el discurso heideggeriano se apoya en una bien controlada ambigüedad, tras la que se esconde una fuerte tesis, según la cual la impropiedad es el único modo posible de la existencia. El estado de resuelto no constituye una existencia alternativa a (...) la impropia, sino que es, más bien, el reconocimiento de que la única existencia posible es la impropia. Por ello la cura, esto es, la existencia impropia, es la única definición del Dasein propuesta por Heidegger. En realidad, el titánico intento de Ser y Tiempo no es otro que el de mostrar que el nihilismo o el escepticismo es la única opción aceptable para el pensar. (shrink)

As a commentary on the initial paragraph of Benjamin’s “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” this article shows that its characterisation of the “sphere of moral relations” as circumscribed by the poles of law and justice generates the rationale for the critique of violence. After describing how Benjamin reproduces the structure of Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten, the article outlines the procedure whereby the initial definition of Gewalt as an “intervention” into moral relations is supplemented by an exposition of the situation in which (...) law “encroaches” upon “the living” by presenting itself as an “expiation” of moral ambiguity; but inasmuch as the sphere of moral relations is constitutively split between the mutually repugnant poles of law and justice, the process of expiation intensifies the ambiguity of the situation law purports to resolve. Benjamin’s solution to this dilemma consists in claiming the reality of “de-expiation”, which he associates with “pure” and thus “divine” violence. (shrink)

Based upon a brief outline of existential-phenomenological ontology we present a theoretical and practical understanding of humanbeing, which is suited for a methodologically reflected approach to qualitative research. We present the phenomenological distinction between threedimensions of corporeal intentionality(structural, generative and dialectic intentionality) that form elementary events and structures of meaning. Various aspects of human being are better scrutinized with these concepts of intentionality, such as the association of individual being or collective being (e.g. groups) with the less differentiated anonymity of (...) human being. The aim of our framework is to support the qualitative researcher in grasping the experience of the human life in closer accord with how this being actually unfolds and is lived. Application of the presented framework is illuminated with empirical examples from educational, health and psychological contexts. Finally, we discuss the methodological implications that our approach has for qualitative investigations of human being. (shrink)

Jeff Malpas’ book Experience and Place has become a significant landmark in philosophy. I take the publication of the revised and extended second edition of the book in 2018 as an opportunity to re...

Gewürdigt wird die Philosophie, die Karl Löwith in der Weimarer Zeit formuliert hat. Es wird gezeigt, wie Löwith zwischen Existenzphilosophie und marxistischer Theorie und aus den Wurzeln des 19. Jahrhunderts eine anthropologische Philosophie entwickelte.

El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar el Curso de Xavier Zubiri de 1975 Reflexiones sobre lo estético a la luz de la “noología”, horizonte de pensamiento que el autor español dejó planteado al final de su vida. Allí lo estético cobra otra dimensión en su estudio al vincular las tres esferas de la noología: la aprehensión primordial de la realidad, el logos sentiente y la razón sentiente. A partir de estas tres categorías cardinales, vemos lo estético en un primer (...) nivel de la aprehensión misma, otro segundo nivel en donde lo estético se diseña y son las artes las que expresan lo fruitivo de la realidad y por último, un tercer nivel que son las obras de arte propiamente dichas. (shrink)

Lo que este artículo busca es pensar el problema filosófico existencial que se volvió, después de la filosofía de Nietzsche, el tema de Dios como Fundamento a comienzos del siglo XX a la luz de dos grandes pensadores: Heidegger y Zubiri. Por medio de la crisis de fe de Zubiri podemos barruntar lo que le sucedía a toda una época a comienzos de siglo y cómo fue necesaria otra filosofía, la de Heidegger, para poder repensar y vivir la experiencia del (...) Fundamento. What this article looks is to think the philosophical existential problem that turned, after Nietzsche’s philosophy, the God's topic since I Base at the beginning of the 20th century in the light of two big thinkers: Heidegger and Zubiri. By means of the crisis of Zubiri’s faith we can feel what was happening to him to the whole epoch at the beginning of century and how another philosophy was necessary, that of Heidegger, to be able to rethink and live through the experience of the Foundation. (shrink)

Heidegger's Being and Time sets out a view of ourselves that shows in positive terms how a reification of ourselves as minded beings can be avoided. Heidegger thereby provides a view of ourselves that fits into one of the main strands of today's philosophy of mind: the intentional vocabulary in which we describe ourselves is indispensable and in principle irreducible to a naturalistic vocabulary. However, as far as ontology is concerned, there is no commitment to the position that being minded (...) is something beyond the physical. In particular, this paper shows how Heidegger's claim that being minded is tied to being-in-the-world links up with (a) externalism and (b) a social theory of intentionality. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the almost forgotten early dissertation of the phenomenologist Hans Reiner Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem der Willensfreiheit engages with what I call the unity problem of activity. This problem concerns the question whether there is a structure in virtue of which all instances of human activity—and not only “full-blown” intentional actions—can be unified. After a brief systematic elucidation of this problem, which is closely related to the contemporary “problem (...) of action,” I elaborate and critically discuss two relevant threads running through Reiner’s work. The first view concerns the alleged motivational asymmetry between activity and passivity according to which it is essential only for active experiences to be motivated by an underlying passivity. The second view focuses on Reiner’s phenomenology of the will, especially on his notions of “ego-centrality” and “inner will” the latter being introduced in analogy to Brentano’s notion of “inner consciousness.” These two notions are supposed to unify all manifestations of the human will, including “full-blown” intentional actions and non-intentional doings such as laughter. Reiner’s extension of will-based actions to non-intentional activity is one of the most remarkable aspects of his early work. Finally, I show that Reiner ultimately answers the unity problem in the negative because he ends up with the view that besides will-based agency he also acknowledges so-called “motor activity” which is not intrinsically related to the will. I close with a couple of tentative proposals how volitional and motor actions might be unified nonetheless. (shrink)

In his first Kant book of 1929 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Martin Heidegger focusses, not surprisingly, on one of the two central themes from his two years earlier major book Being and Time — the question of the essence of time. It cannot be overseen that he tries to show that his conception of time is superior to Kant’s. Nevertheless, it is high time to examine whether Heidegger’s claim can bear up against a micro-hermeneutical and micro-analytical test. Such (...) an examination, to be fair and appropriate to the leading aspects of the two philosophers, has to bear in mind from the very beginning the deep differences of these leading aspects: Kant concentrates on the formal structure and the strictly subjective status of time as a form of intuition, Heidegger concentrates on the roles time plays in the daily human world orientation. Under these methodical and conceptional pre-suppositions a close examination must come the result, that both conceptions complement, even complete one another. Heidegger comes closer to the type of time-experience as it is exposed by St. Augustine, Kant exposes a strict analysis of the human way to conceive of the successive form of time. It is evidently possible for us today to continue on both paths. (shrink)

Heidegger thinks that humans enjoy openness to being, an openness that distinguishes them from all other entities, animals included. To safeguard openness to being, Heidegger denies that humans are animals. This position attracts the criticism of Derrida, who denies the difference between humans and animals and with it the human openness to being. In this paper, I argue that human difference and human animality are not mutually exclusive. Heidegger has the conceptual resources in his thought and in the history of (...) philosophy to affirm human animality while safeguarding the human difference. A cause transforms the meaning of a condition. The case of the human hand, an animal appendage that serves our openness to being, illustrates splendidly this transformation. The human hand not only grasps things in its environment but also points things out, makes things, acts, and welcomes others in the world. Humans are animals transformed by openness to being. (shrink)