Der Big Data-Technologie wird das Potenzial zugeschrieben, durch Mustererkennung in aggregierten Daten Verhaltensweisen von Personen zu prognostizieren, noch bevor diese intendiert und reflektiert würden. Zumeist widmet sich die Big Data-Debatte daher den Befürchtungen möglicher Einbußen von Privatheit und Freiheit. In unserem Beitrag wählen wir jedoch einen anderen Zugriff und fragen, inwiefern die Big Data-Visionen das Selbstsein betreffen, also das Konzept davon, wer ich selbst eigentlich bin. Wenn Selbstsein, Martin Heidegger zufolge, eigentlich bedeutet, in kritischer Distanz zu vorgegebenen Möglichkeiten zu leben, (...) stellt sich die Frage, welches Kriterium hier eine klare Unterscheidbarkeit gewährleistet: Wie kann ich wissen, echt ich selbst zu sein, ohne nur wiederum andere Üblichkeiten nachzuahmen? Wir fragen daher, ob die Big-Data-Technologie subjektive Verzerrungen und Täuschungen über das Selbst ausschalten könnte. Hierfür wird der Begriff „Selbstsein“ bei Heidegger erarbeitet. Dabei lässt sich allerdings zeigen, dass dieser letztlich ohne Trennschärfe bleibt, da die nur negative Charakterisierung von eigentlichem Selbstsein, Heidegger zufolge, echt oder unecht ausgestaltet sein kann – der aus der Möglichkeit echter oder unechter Selbsterzählung resultierende Relativismus wurde bisher nicht hinreichend beachtet. Big Data kann zwar uneigentliche Erzählmuster vermeiden, nicht aber uneigentliches oder eigentliches Verhalten differenzieren; ob ich z.B. manches – unecht eigentlich – aus Trotz oder Kalkül gegen mein eigenes Selbstverständnis tat, bleibt verborgen. Fazit: Es muss entweder ein Kriterium für echtes Eigentlichsein entwickelt oder der Anspruch, darüber Auskunft zu geben, verworfen werden – bei Heidegger und Big Data. Verzichtet man jedoch auf die Idee einer (echten) Eigentlichkeit verzichtet man auf den Begriff des Selbst. (shrink)

Der Beitrag thematisiert vor allem unterschiedliche philosophische Auffasungen der Andersheit und versucht, sie aus einer hermeneutischen Perspektive zu hinterfragen. Dabei wird vor allem die konzeptuelle Radikalität der assymetrischen Beziehungen kritisiert, indem der hermeneutische Ansatz nicht als bloße Aneignungs- strategie des Anderen oder Fremden aufgefasst wird, sondern als offener Prozess der Verständigung, in dem die Heterogenität der Verständigungs- akteure zwar einer ständiger Veränderung unterzogen, jedoch immer auch gewahrt wird. Davon ausgehend wird auch die kulturphilosophische, aber auch gesellschaftliche und politische Relevanz der (...) Opposition zwischen Kulturpessimismus und Kulturoptimismus in Frage gestellt. (shrink)

Resumo: A transformação pragmática da filosofia é comumente apresentada como uma adaptação necessária à experimentação total do mundo e do homem. É mostrado aqui que ela está baseada numa ilusão: a exclusão do juízo de verdade no diálogo e uma armadilha técnica que culmina nas teorias de atos de palavras, sejam eles monológicos ou dialógicos. A antropologia da linguagem restaura o exercício do juízo de verdade ao descrever os modos de sua presença em toda comunicação.: The pragmatic transformation of philosophy (...) is usually presented as a necessary adaptation to total experimentation of the world and of man. It is shown here that such a transformation is based on an illusion: the exclusion of truth judgment in dialogue and a technical lure that culminates in theories of speech acts, whether monological or dialogical. The anthropology of language restores the exercise of truth judgment by describing the modes of its presence in all communication. (shrink)

Humans and other animals are able not only to coordinate their actions with their current sensorimotor state, but also to imagine, plan and act in view of the future, and to realize distal goals. In this paper we discuss whether or not their future-oriented conducts imply (future-oriented) representations. We illustrate the role played by anticipatory mechanisms in natural and artificial agents, and we propose a notion of representation that is grounded in the agent’s predictive capabilities. Therefore, we argue that the (...) ability that characterizes and defines a true cognitive mind, as opposed to a merely adaptive system, is that of building representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently (yet) true or perceivable, of what is desired. A real mental activity begins when the organism is able to endogenously (i.e. not as the consequence of current perceptual stimuli) produce an internal representation of the world in order to select and guide its conduct goal-directed: the mind serves to coordinate with the future. (shrink)

Es bien conocido el aprecio que desde hace tiempo tiene la Iglesia por el método ver-juzgar-actuar, sin embargo, las reflexiones de la filosofía y la sociología hacen considerar hoy la necesidad de enriquecer el momento del ver, con unos elementos fenomenológicos y hermenéuticos que lo hagan más histórico y menos objetivista y de lograr además una mayor interacción entre los tres momentos. En este sentido, la investigación propone la inserción de las historias de vida de las personas y las comunidades (...) como un camino nuevo de conocimiento de la realidad. En efecto, la realidad no sólo consiste en el hecho desnudo, sino también en el hecho tal y como lo percibe el sujeto; no sólo es suceso, sino también narración. Así, las historias de vida, y el consecuente método autobiográfico constituyen, según la investigación, un recurso vital en la planificación pastoral; no simplemente un apéndice secundario o un recurso simplemente aplicativo, sino, un momento intrínseco de la reflexión y de la experiencia teológica y pastoral. It is well-known the log lasting appreciation of the church for the method see-judge-act, however the current philosophical and sociological considerations are considering the need for an enrichment of the moment of seeing with some phenomenological and hermeneutical elements which could make it more historical and less objective and to achieve, moreover, a major interaction among the three moments. In this sense, the research proposes also the introduction of the stories of people’s lives and of the communities as a new way of awareness of reality. Indeed, reality is not only in the naked event, but also in the event as it is seen by the subject; not only the happened event, but also its narration. For this reason, the life stories and the autobiographical method are, according to the research a vital resource in the pastoral planning; not simply a secondary appendix or a applicative type, but as an intrinsic moment of the theological and pastoral reflection and experience. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discuten los aportes de la teoría sociológica contemporánea al debate filosófico y científico de la ontología, para ello son cotejados los componentes ontológicos de la Teoría General de Sistemas Sociales de Niklas Luhmann, lla Teoría de la Acción Comunicativa de Jürgen Habermas y la Actor-Network Theory de Bruno Latour.

En el escrito Vorläufige Thesen zur Refomation der Philosophie, Ludwig Feuerbach atribuye a Spinoza la autoría de la filosofía especulativa. A la zaga queda Schelling, considerado por Feuerbach únicamente como el restaurador de la misma. En la secuencia establecida por éste, Hegel sería, por su parte, solo un elemento más en la constitución de la filosofía especulativa, aunque tiene el mérito de completar tal sistema de pensamiento. En el presente artículo pretendo determinar en qué medida el autor de esta filosofía (...) se halla presente en el que la consuma. Esbozaré la forma y grado de esa presencia poniendo el foco en un aspecto nuclear, que, al mismo tiempo, servirá de guía del trabajo aquí propuesto: la negación. (shrink)

Husserl’s Logical Investigations has undergone explicitly conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations. For Richard Cobb-Stevens, he has extended understanding into the domain of sensuous intuition, leaving no simple perceptions that are actually separated from higher-level understanding. According to Kevin Mulligan, Husserl does in fact sunder nominal and propositional seeing from the simple or straightforward—and yet interpretative—seeing of particulars. To see simply is not to exercise an individual meaning or a general concept. Arguing that Logical Investigations provides evidence for both views, I endeavour (...) to show that the account of perceptual consciousness in Husserl’s subsequent work is far more clear and consistent. It is one of growing beyond the situation portrayed by Mulligan and into the one explicated by Cobb-Stevens. Though they are notionally separable, pre-conceptual syntheses at the passive and noematic levels are inevitably interwoven with conceptual and categorial articulations in a developed consciousness. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende realizar uma breve exposição acerca da crítica de Levinas à tradição filosófica até então vigente, cujos espectros, desdobramentos e necessidades giram ao redor e se sustém no alicerce da Razão ou do ser. Tal postura pode ser observada mesmo no início da filosofia ocidental, aponta Levinas, com Sócrates e a maiêutica, ou mais ainda, com os filósofos da physis e sua busca por um arché, o princípio regulador de todas as coisas. Haveria uma espécie de relação com (...) o conhecimento e o intuito “controlar” e ocultar nossas próprias fraquezas perante o desconhecido. Levinas rompe com a tradição, buscando colocar o humano no cerne da questão, bem como a investigação acerca da pulsão anterior à toda tematização, oriunda da alteridade radical. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold objective. First, it engages with the interrelation of time, space, and matter in Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida and questions whether and how this interrelation effects the possibility of self-relation. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger suggests that the very structure of subjectivity is constituted by what he calls the ‘pure self-affection’ of time and thus the possibility of self-relation is intimately bound up with the temporalizing of time. In his 1964–65 seminar, Heidegger: the (...) Question of Being and History, Derrida translates this pure affection of time into the more generic term ‘auto-affection,’ which will remain a pivotal reference point for his deconstruction of the metaphysical privileging of time as presence. Derrida shows how the (im)possibility of auto-affection is bound up not only with time but also with space, or rather with the ‘spacing of time’ that he also refers to as ‘the trace.’ Second, the paper moves across the frontiers of philosophy and physics posing anew the question concerning the interrelations of temporality, spatiality, and materiality. With reference to what in general relativity is called ‘the curvature of spacetime,’ the efficacy of materiality in the movement of auto-affection is called into question. (shrink)

This paper proceeds from a schematic analysis of Heidegger’s notion of ‘possibility’ to consider the methodological significance of Heidegger’s conception of what is essential in phenomenology as inhering not “in its actuality as a philosophical ‘movement’”, but in the understanding of phenomenology “as a possibility”. In conclusion, the paper points to the efficacy of possibility and its mode of fulfilment as radically different from the actualization of latent potentiality.

The problem of history in Nietzsche’s second Unfashionable Observation is best approached through that which it is supposed to serve: life, more specifically human life. I argue that Nietzsche presents an oblique but nevertheless complete articulation of the nature of the human soul as consisting of two basic parts, of desiring (the unhistorical) and memory (the historical): of a multiplicity of desires that struggle for domination over the others, and which express themselves in more complex ways through memory-based structures such (...) as conscience. I then discuss some implications of this conception. First, I interpret the significance of the useful kinds of history: rather than being different modes of historical science, they are much more basic modes of practical relating to the matters of our world (especially to other humans and their ways of life) that are external to us both temporally and spatially. Second, I discuss the particular kinds of desires which underpin the three useful kinds of history. Third, I interpret the problem of scientific history as arising from a turning of the normal human structures of meaningfulness against themselves, and as resulting in two specific kinds of psychic damage: to our capacity for growth and self-cultivation, and to our will to do so at all. Finally, I show the importance of the erotic-historic soul for the questions of right and wrong methods of self-knowledge and for the meaning of the imperative “sei du selbst!” that we find in Schopenhauer as Educator. (shrink)

Intimacy and sexuality expressed by nursing home residents with dementia remains an ethically sensitive issue for care facilities, nursing staff and family members. Dealing with residents’ sexual longings and behaviour is extremely difficult, putting a burden on the caregivers as well as on the residents themselves and their relatives. The parties in question often do not know how to react when residents express themselves sexually. The overall aim of this article is to provide a number of clinical-ethical considerations addressing the (...) following question: ‘How can expressions of intimacy and sexuality by residents with dementia be dealt with in an ethically responsible way?’ The considerations formulated are based on two cornerstones: the current literature on older peoples’ experiences regarding intimacy and sexuality after the onset of dementia, and an anthropological-ethical framework addressing four fundamental pillars of human existence namely the decentred self, human embodiment, being-in-the-world and being-with-others. The resulting considerations are oriented toward the individual sphere, the partnership sphere, and the institutional sphere. The continuous interaction between these spheres leads to orientations that both empower the residents in question and respect the complex network of relationships that surrounds them. (shrink)

SÍNTESE - O texto não fala de um confronto entre Heidegger e Freud. A crítica da psicanálise propõe uma nova leitura na forma de uma desconstrução conceitual. O autor faz uma análise da origem metafisica dos conceitos de psicanálise e de seu instrumental mitológico, sugerindo um universo conceituai que nasce da superação da metafisica. Trata-se de "substituir modo de teorizar da psicanálise por um modo de pensar e de conhecer radicalmente diferente.".

Die Simmel-Cassirer-Kontroverse behandelt den grundlegenden technikphilosophischen Gegensatz zwischen Kulturpessimismus und Kulturoptimismus. Diesen virtuellen Dialog beider Denker arbeitet Oliver Honer neu auf und entwickelt in einem aufsteigenden Reflexionsgang die Simmel'sche Rede von der »kulturellen Logik der Objekte« zum Begriff. Damit modelliert er das Verhältnis agierender Individuen zu ihren jeweiligen Möglichkeitsräumen und zeigt deren prekären Subjektstatus in diesen Räumen auf. Die dabei freigelegten Verhältnisse eröffnen angesichts technisch induzierter Eigenlogiken neue Wege einer dialektischen Kulturkritik.

Based on critical readings of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the paper offers a phenomenological study of the ontology of well-being that transcends the opposition between subjective and objective being. By interpreting the Heideggerian notion of Befindlichkeit as the fundamental way in which humans find themselves in the world, being affected by and faced with their own existence, the paper opens a way to understanding well-being that locates the possibility of elevating one’s own being not inside (...) or outside the I but in the affective bond to others called friendship. Aristotle’s reflections on philia play a crucial role in developing this understanding of well-being, according to which humans find themselves well by sharing joy with each other and making a vital contribution to the realization of their own possibilities. (shrink)

El presente artículo intenta explorar una relación metódica y temática entre dos existenciarios: mismidad y temporalidad, en sus respectivos límites de aparición, en una obra de gran complejidad como Ser y Tiempo, a fin de poder captar, con la radicalidad que solo la fenomenología permite hacer valer, la unidad integral del ser del Dasein, un ente caracterizado y señalado, a diferencia de los demás entes intramundanos, por la existencia de un modo raigal, ontológico. La conclusión apuntará a vertebrar el análisis (...) existencial en una experiencia primaria como la del sí-mismo. (shrink)

Para comprender Ser y Tiempo es inevitable preguntar hasta el final cómo articula Heidegger las dos dimensiones de la existencia a las que denomina la propiedad y la impropiedad. Frente a la interpretación habitual, en este artículo se defiende que el discurso heideggeriano se apoya en una bien controlada ambigüedad, tras la que se esconde una fuerte tesis, según la cual la impropiedad es el único modo posible de la existencia. El estado de resuelto no constituye una existencia alternativa a (...) la impropia, sino que es, más bien, el reconocimiento de que la única existencia posible es la impropia. Por ello la cura, esto es, la existencia impropia, es la única definición del Dasein propuesta por Heidegger. En realidad, el titánico intento de Ser y Tiempo no es otro que el de mostrar que el nihilismo o el escepticismo es la única opción aceptable para el pensar. (shrink)

Jeff Malpas’ book Experience and Place has become a significant landmark in philosophy. I take the publication of the revised and extended second edition of the book in 2018 as an opportunity to re...

Heidegger's Being and Time sets out a view of ourselves that shows in positive terms how a reification of ourselves as minded beings can be avoided. Heidegger thereby provides a view of ourselves that fits into one of the main strands of today's philosophy of mind: the intentional vocabulary in which we describe ourselves is indispensable and in principle irreducible to a naturalistic vocabulary. However, as far as ontology is concerned, there is no commitment to the position that being minded (...) is something beyond the physical. In particular, this paper shows how Heidegger's claim that being minded is tied to being-in-the-world links up with (a) externalism and (b) a social theory of intentionality. (shrink)

El hombre posmoderno es un Narciso en busca de su identidad. La evaporación del Padre ha camiado las dinámicas en relación con el Otro y la capacidad de construir una propia identidad tiene que recurrir a los objetos de consumo. En este estudio se propone un camino que va desde la teoría clásica del Psicoanálisis hasta una nueva perspectiva que entra en el campo del Márketing y del estudio de objeto de consumo.

RESUMEN El siguiente artículo tiene como objetivo destacar el carácter polifónico del pensamiento platónico y poner en cuestión el sentido de la autoría de Platón. Suponer, a partir de obstinados prejuicios modernos, que Platón, tal como cualquier escritor moderno, habría expuesto su propia doctrina, es ignorar la importancia de la forma dramática de su pensamiento. El testimonio de la variedad de interlocutores y de puntos de vista que se suceden en los diferentes diálogos, nos invita a prestar atención a la (...) compleja trama del pensamiento platónico, cuya variedad de funciones corresponde a los límites y al alcance del discurso de quienes en un determinado momento y situación cooperan en el diálogo. ABSTRACT The following paper aims to highlight the polyphonic character of Platonic thought and to question the meaning of Plato's authorship. To assume, from obstinate modern prejudices, that Plato, like any modern writer, would have exposed his own doctrine, is to ignore the importance of the dramatic form of his thought. The testimony of the variety of interlocutors and points of view that take place in the different dialogues, invites us to pay attention to the complex plot of Platonic thought, whose variety of functions corresponds to the limits and scope of the discourse of those who, in a given moment and situation, cooperate in the dialogue. (shrink)

At its centennial in 2001, the American Philosophical Association bravely proclaimed: “Philosophy Matters.” But does it? It won’t unless it reaches the concreteness of everyday life. To do so was Martin Heidegger’s ambition, and one can read Saul Kripke’s books as an attempt to get mainstream American philosophy beyond its abstractions. At length, Kripke’s efforts, on one reading, failed while Heidegger’s remained incomplete. A theory of commodification can get us closer to the things that matter to us in everyday life.

En el presente trabajo se compara la fenomenología del mundo de Sein und Zeit con la reflexión de la cuadratura en la conferencia Das Ding para mostrar cómo el peso de la argumentación en 1927 se centra en el «por mor de» mientras que en 1949 ese peso de desplaza hacia la noción del «donar». Este desplazamiento que saca al útil del contexto del «por mor de» y lo sitúa en otro que no se rige exclusivamente por referencia a una (...) «figura antropológica» que asigna finalidades puede ser caracterizado como una depragmatización del útil. Con ello se quiere afirmar que la donación de la jarra expresa la idea de que el útil no requiere de otra finalidad ajena que su propio darse a sí mismo. (shrink)

En el siguiente artículo se aborda el problema de la concepción de sí misma de la filosofía en conexión con la noción de vida fáctica en las lecciones que Heidegger dictara entre los años 1919-1923 en Friburgo. La hipótesis hermenéutica aquí ensayada propone avanzar primero en el modo en que Heidegger plantea la pregunta por la filosofía y cuál es ahí el núcleo problemático, y sólo luego intentar ver cuáles son los elementos formales a los que el tratamiento de la (...) así llamada “vida fáctica” debe dar satisfacción para ser una respuesta a la pregunta. En este sentido la noción heideggeriana de vida fáctica sería una condición metódica básica en relación al proyecto de autocomprensión filosófica. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s remarks in Being and time on the contrast between the modernly thought corporeality based on a mixture of soul-body, of Cartesian roots, and the existential corporeality from the being-in-the-world of Dasein, are widely known. After that, the major thematization on the body goes back to the Zollikon Seminars. This article looks for new ways of understanding the body based on what Heidegger considers as the ambiguity of truth in the various versions of the lecture “Of the essence of (...) truth”. The truth of the body would allow to understand the body in its erring as Körper and, on the other hand, in as much mystery as Leib. Such a perspective allows a non-unilateral understanding of the body and at the same time opens the possibilities for thinking about it from the Being-in-the-world, as Heidegger had announced it at various moments of his work. (shrink)

Reseña de: Willaschek, M., Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics. The Dialectic of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 298. ISBN-13: 978- 1108472630.

The author investigates the prospects of holistic ethics in the contemporary world. From the standpoint of individual existence observed three modes of ethical attitude towards the world in their historic genesis: home, environment, and common world. The ancient idea of home as a place of love and revelation of God was eroded by the expansion of human civilization on the natural, social, and cosmic scale. This process is reflected in the concept of a multiform environment as a source of material, (...) biological, economic, political, cultural possibilities, and a space of physical, social, and informational mobility. The crises of those environments put the problem of the proper ethical norms and values for human survival and further development. The ethical dimension of its solution presents the idea of a common world and the relevant ethical principles of advocacy, responsibility, solidarity, justice with the aim of consensus on the basis of a rational discourse where people represent all the other being’s interests. Thus, based on regularly open for better arguments discussion, the author views the possibility of the formation of a cosmos friendly ethics. (shrink)

In the thinking of Vilém Flusser, the question of subjectivity is linked to the question of being human or becoming human. The human subject should be considered as dependent on media’s cultural and anthropological conditions. In this context, changes in media conditions lead to changes of the human subject. Flusser calls this process a media-cultureanthropological evolution. According to this thesis, the human being is no longer defined as a subject in relation to an object but rather as a “project in (...) a incarnation”. The human subject is progressively freed from its dependency on an objective world. Therefore, the dichotomy of subject and object disappears and our existential condition of being in the world change. We give up the idea of a given and still standing world in favor of an inter-subjective construction, in which the “I”, “You,” and “It” turn out to be projections. The question is: are we still able to talk about the ability to act in the context of a post-historical project? Isn’t acting a genuine gesture/expression of the understanding of the “subject of objects,” and of agency in the “objective world”? (shrink)

The article follows the mutation suffered by the issue of alterity from Husserl to Heidegger and from Heidegger to Lévinas, envisaging it starting from temporality. We aim at replacing the question “Where is the other?” – that betrays the spatializing presuppositions of description – with “When is the other?” that can be clarified starting from the question “When are we together?”. Rather than deducing from the issue of co-presence, the final postponement of all attempt to conceive intersubjectivity in terms of (...) contemporaneity, we subject it to an analysis that raises again the theme of world-time starting from an attention that testifies to the multiple layers that constitute temporality and the plurality of durations that intertwine in it. (shrink)

The paper contains a conceptual proposal, its key idea being that the successful functioning of a rule embedding artifact designed to regulate a practice (not pertaining to its use) produces the same result as the successful performance of the rule-invoking non-communicative actions belonging to the practice in case.

Within the variety of subjects considered by Heidegger after Being and time, the notion of ‘thinking’ stands out for its constant presence and for the central place it occupies in a large part of his later work. In fact, as a path towards overcoming metaphysics and as a means of rethinking the relationship between humans and being, distorted in the world of technique, Heidegger uses the exercise of thinking that is not only the heritage of philosophers, but is latent in (...) many of the habitual practices of individuals. This article aims to elaborate this notion in line with the concepts of forgetting and remembering, which are both human experiences and constitutive elements of being in its happening. The outlined thesis is thus that, in a world dominated by the entity, Heidegger ascribes to the ‘reminiscent thinking’ the task of restoring our relationship with being and thus widening the possibilities of meaning of our existence. (shrink)

En medio del constante replanteo que la filosofía y las ciencias humanas en general han venido haciendo de nociones básicas como la de 'existencia', un horizonte de planteo intercultural permitirá acoger mejor las demandas de las sociedades contemporáneas cruzadas por diferentes centros histórico-culturales y por el fenómeno común de los movimientos sociales exigiendo cada uno reconocimiento de sus propios derechos. Se concibe tal planteo como una 'odisea de la libertad', ya que intenta perseguir el difícil camino de la libertad -en (...) tanto poder ser- hacia la realización de sí mismo, en relación al reconocimiento de sí y de los otros, en el ámbito comunitario y político. Sin olvidar la buena relación con la naturaleza y el cosmos y con lo que trasciende a cada realidad, en tanto abrigo de infinitud en el ámbito artístico y religioso. Se advierte entonces que el camino a la libertad atraviesa todo tipo de dificultades. Amid the constant reconsideration of basic notions such as "existence" by philosophy and human sciences, an intercultural proposal will give a better response to the demands of contemporary societies, which are crossed by different historical-cultural centers and by the common phenomenon of social movements claiming for their own rights. Such proposal is conceived as "an odyssey of freedom", since it pursues the hard path of freedom-as possibility to be-towards his own realization and regarding his own and others' acknowledgement in the community and political sphere, not forgetting the good relationship with nature and the cosmos and with what transcends each reality, as a shelter of infinity in the artistic and religious field. It is then noticed that the path to freedom undergoes all kinds of difficulties. (shrink)

Para qualquer um interessado no lugar da espacialidade no pensamento de Heidegger, um dos principais problemas apresentados por Ser e tempo é a tentativa, feita no § 70, "de derivar o existencial espacialidade a partir da temporalidade". Esta tentativa, que foi considerada "insustentável" pelo próprio Heidegger, mostra-se não ser meramente periférica na análise global. Pelo contrário, ela se liga a certos aspectos centrais e problemáticos no argumento de Ser e tempo, no qual está incluído o tratamento de conceitos espaciais e (...) topográficos em geral, aspectos estes que podem ser vistos como associados ao fracasso do projeto aí ensaiado. Contudo, o argumento do § 70 não suscita apenas questões a cerca do tratamento da espacialidade feito por Heidegger, mas também no que respeita à própria noção de "derivação": se e como é efetivamente possível tal derivação, e de que modo poderia ser entendida a dependência que ela implica. Uma das características centrais da análise desenvolvida em Ser e tempo é o movimento que parte das estruturas da cotidianidade para fundá-las no cuidado, transitando a seguir para a estrutura da temporalidade, e chegando finalmente na estrutura ekstática da temporalidade originária. O que é exibido nesse movimento não é uma relação de dependência, mas uma série de relações que estão supostas. É no interior desse movimento global que estão embutidas dependências mais específicas, inclusive a relação de dependência entre espacialidade e temporalidade. A questão geral da dependência conceitual ou estrutural que aparece aqui, entendida especificamente em termos de "derivação" ou nos termos das noções correlatas de "fundação" ou "fundamentação" , também possui uma relevância que se estende muito além das análises de Ser e tempo, sendo central para a investigação fenomenológica e, de fato, para a investigação filosófica como tal. O que está em jogo nessa questão é a natureza e a base para o ordenamento de conceitos e estruturas, que é uma preocupação central da análise fenomenológica e filosófica. Minha intenção aqui é a de explorar da derivação tal como surge no âmbito de Ser e tempo, mas também prestando atenção para o contexto mais amplo no qual pode-se dizer que a questão também emerge - uma exploração que também nos levará para certas questões sobre espaço e topologia.For anyone interested in the place of spatiality in Heidegger's thinking, one of the key problems presented by Being and Time is Heidegger's attempt, in §70, "to derive existential spatiality from temporality" [i] - an attempt he himself referred to as "untenable" [ii]. This attempt turns out to not to be merely peripheral to Heidegger's overall analysis, but is instead tied to certain central and problematic features in the argument of Being and Time, including its treatment of spatial and topographic concepts in general, that can themselves be seen as associated with the failure of the project attempted there. The argument of §70 does not raise questions only about Heidegger's treatment of spatiality, however, but also regarding the notion of "derivation" itself - about how and whether such derivation is indeed possible in general, and how the dependence that it entails might be understood. One of the central features of the analysis developed in Being and Time is its movement from the structures of everydayness to the grounding of that structure in care, thence to the structure of temporality, and finally, of course, to the ecstatic structure of originary temporality. What is exhibited in this movement is not one, but a series of supposed dependence relations, and it is within that overall movement that more specific dependencies, including that between spatiality and temporality, are themselves embedded. [The general question of conceptual or structural dependence that appears here, whether understood specifically in terms of "derivation" or in terms of related notions of "grounding" or "foundation" , also has a relevance that extends far beyond the analyses of Being and Time, and is central to phenomenological, and indeed, philosophical, inquiry as such. What is at issue in this question is the nature and basis for the ordering of concepts and structures that is a central concern of phenomenological and philosophical analysis. My intention here is to explore this question of derivation as it emerges within the framework of Being and Time, but also with an eye to the larger context in which the question can also be said to emerge - an exploration that will also, as it happens, returns us to certain questions of space and topology. (shrink)

Until now psychoanalytic literature has paid little attention to the psychoanalytic consulting room or the arrangement of couch and armchair and their likely effect on the psychoanalytic process. In this qualitative study, the answers of 20 former analysands reporting about their analyses in a guided interview were interpreted. It was found that room and psychoanalytic process interact very closely with one another. In the course of the analysis analysands define room implicitly in five different ways unaware of their doing so. (...) Room is defined as 1 the complete room in which the couch and armchair stand. Subjectively, the analysand is in the analyst’s room and is assigned a place on the couch for his own use. Analysis consists mainly on the analysand’s adapting to the analytic procedure. 2 the couch setting. Subjectively, the analysand is in his own room. Psychoanalysis consists mainly of regressive dyadic interactions between analysand and analyst. The analysand idealizes the room and is unaware of any irritating element. 3 the couch. Subjectively, the analysand is in his own room, concentrating on the confrontation with himself during the analytic work. The analyst accompanies the process mainly protectively by having the consulting room ready. 4 the complete room with all its details as the basis of the analysand’s own concept of a room. The analysand has an increasingly critical view of the consulting room, the analyst and all the details of the analytic process. He now becomes fully aware of all the elements belonging to room and process. He conceptualises his own idea of the perfect room. His often vehement criticism of all the elements of the room is central to the analytic work at this stage. 5 the complete consulting room including the couch setting. After the end of his analysis, the analysand returns to his old consulting room and discovers, mainly unconsciously, that his former consulting room has become foreign to him. He is no longer in his own room and soberly looks at an unattractive room in which he once experienced all the decisive periods of his life. The analysand goes through these five phases respectively. The process is not reversible. On account of the interaction stated between room perception and psychoanalytic process this room theory can serve as a means of efficacy research in order to evaluate the depth of the psychoanalytic process and the qualitative personality changes within it. (shrink)

In his famous essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Walter Benjamin compares the daily experience of buildings with the perception of films. His comparison relies on the peculiar concept of “tactile reception“, he opposes to the optically oriented traditional attitude towards art. The concept encompasses two essential traits: on the one hand, it designates the fact that films do not require a contemplative, focused attention, but a habitual, distracted approach, similar to that by which we (...) perceive buildings in our everyday life-world. On the other hand, Benjamin’s concept points to a particular “chock-effect” produced by cinematic experience, through its constant change of perspectives and points of view. By this, it challenges precisely the same form of ambient perception required in numerous situations of our daily life in the modern city. The two determinations sketch out a unitary concept that shows obvious similarities to the phenomenological idea of a “life-worldly circumspection” , a specific manner of sight guiding everyday practical life. (shrink)