Transzendental wird hier, abweichend von Kant, im Sinn transzendentaler Argumente verstanden. Im Kontext der Letztbegründungsdiskussion sind diese dadurch definiert, dass ihre Verneinung zu einem pragmatischen Widerspruch führt. Nun ist Hegels Philosophie auf die ‚logische Idee‘ gegründet, also auf die in Hegels Verständnis fundamentale dialektische Logik. Sein philosophischer Systementwurf hat dadurch, wie gezeigt wird, transzendentalen Charakter und schließt dementsprechend auch eine transzendentale Naturphilosophie ein. Gezeigt wird weiter, dass Grundbe- stimmungen der Natur, die üblicherweise einfach vorausgesetzt werden, in diesem Rahmen grundsätzlich erklärt (...) werden können: die Existenz der Natur und ihr (räumlich-zeitliches) Auseinandersein, ferner die Erkenn- barkeit der Natur, ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit, Kontingenz und immanente Idea- lisierungstendenz. Dass sich so auch konkrete Naturphänomene erschließen, wird an zwei Exempeln verdeutlicht: in der Begründung dimensionaler Raumstrukturen und in der Begründung des Relativitätsprinzips der Bewe- gung – letzteres mit der Pointe (im Sinn einer Philosophie der (speziellen) Relativitätstheorie), dass die Relativität der Körperbewegung und die Absolutheit der Lichtbewegung so als logisch zusammengehörende Momente kinematischer Relativität verstehbar werden. (shrink)

Both Hegel and the later Wittgenstein were concerned with the problem of how to begin speculation, or the problem of beginning. I argue that despite many differences, there are surprising similarities between their thinking about the beginning. They both consider different kinds of beginnings and combine them into complex analogies. The beginning has a subjective and an objective moment. The philosophizing subject has to begin with something, with an object. For Hegel, the objective moment is pure being. For Wittgenstein, the (...) objective moment is something that cannot be doubted. As regards the subjective moment, the philosophizing subject has to decide, without any reason, to conclude her quest for the presuppositionless beginning and finally begin at the beginning. The arational moment of this decision is echoed throughout any rational thought. Any application of a (rational) rule is, ultimately, a blind decision to apply this rule. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I seek to explain G.W.F. Hegel’s view that human accessible conceptual content can provide knowledge about the nature or essence of things. I call this view “Conceptual Transparency.” It finds its historical antecedent in the views of eighteenth century German rationalists, which were strongly criticized by Immanuel Kant. I argue that Hegel explains Conceptual Transparency in such a way that preserves many implications of German rationalism, but in a form that is largely compatible with Kant’s criticisms of (...) the original rationalist version. After providing background on Hegel’s relationship to the traditional rationalist theory of concepts and Kant’s challenge to it, I claim that Hegel’s central task is to provide a theory of conceptual content that allows a relationship to the objective world without being dependent on the specifically sensory aspect of the world, which Kant’s theory of concepts required. Since many interpreters deny that Hegel’s use of the term “concept” is comparable to other historical philosophers (or our own), I first show that Hegel’s critique of standard conceptions of concepts presupposes an agreement of subject matter. I then show how Hegel’s account of the “formal concept” provides the skeleton for a view of conceptual content that relies on negative relations between terms, rather than a relation to sensibility, to provide content. Hegel’s account of conceptual content is completed when he shows how a universal term is further specified so that it can determine singular objects. This occurs in its adequate form in a teleological process. I argue that Hegel’s account of teleology in the Science of Logic is an attempt to explain how and where Conceptual Transparency obtains. A teleological process is one in which a concept constitutes an object, and this means that a concept is perfectly adequate to express that thing’s nature and not merely to represent it. However, in the final chapter, I show that Hegel’s concept of teleology is meant paradigmatically to illuminate how human purposive processes have constituted a social world that is conceptually accessible to us. In this way, the primary “province” of Hegel’s rationalism is the human constructed world. (shrink)

Among Kant's innovations in the understanding of logic (‘general logic’) were his claims that logic had no content of its own, but was the form of the thought of any possible content, and that the unit of meaning, the truth-bearer, judgement, was essentially apperceptive. Judging was implicitly the consciousness of judging. This was for Kant a logical truth. This article traces the influence of the latter claim on Fichte, and, for most of the discussion, on Hegel. The aim is to (...) understand the relations among self-consciousness, reason and freedom in the idealist tradition. (shrink)

El tema predilecto en la filosofía moderna ha sido desde sus comienzos el de la subjetividad. Una subjetividad que ha permitido grandes avances pero también peligros para el ser humano, y es que al centrarse demasiado en la conciencia de sí mismo, el hombre y su filosofía han perdido la conexión con la realidad racional con la que conviven. El idealismo hegeliano, entendido como filosofía del espíritu, pretende ser a la vez una superación de este distanciamiento mutuo y una nueva (...) forma de comprender la filosofía, el hombre, la realidad y la articulación racional que todos ellos encuentran en lo absoluto. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel developed the concept of institutionalized education, which reflected public schooling and its legitimacy in the context of rapid transformation of European feudal societies to modern societies. The concept of school reflects the Hegelian theory of Bildung and the concept of modern society. What makes Hegel’s philosophy interesting is his conviction that the processes of Bildung can take place only in the context of social institutions and in the highly organized forms of human interaction regulated by those (...) institutions. Hence the development of an individual, according to Hegel, depends exclusively on institutionalized forms of interaction. In modern society, pedagogical institutions have a specific function: on the one hand, schooling is essentially an institutional form of initiating the process of Bildung in which an individual acquires culture and applies it to life—a life which consequently becomes consciously led by an individual self; on the other, schooling is essentially a way for modern society to ensure its self-preservation by preparing the individual to respond to the demands of civic society so that she or he can take part in the economic production and reproduction of modern society. (shrink)

Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot be (...) considered sufficient in this respect. It does not enable us to defend the dialectical procedure against objections or to answer questions of method. In the following, a detailed reconstruction of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing' in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' will reveal basic structures of dialectical argumentation. As will be shown, antinomic structures play a key role. Such a 'reconstruction', however, will not be a simple confirmation of Hegelian texts, but will always have the character of a critique. In fact, it will turn out that in comparison with Hegel's development of categories, radical revisions are to be expected. ----- Bisherige Bemühungen, das Verfahren Hegelscher Dialektik einer Klärung näherzubringen, geben Anlass zur Skepsis. Die Frage: „Was ist Dialektik?“, so Dieter Henrich, sei „bisher ohne Antwort geblieben“. Das objektiv-idealistische Programm Hegels ist indes so sehr mit der Möglichkeit einer dialektischen Logik verknüpft, daß über die Stringenz dialektischer Argumentation Klarheit zu gewinnen ein dringliches Desiderat darstellt. Das aber ist nur auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der Dialektik möglich. Hegels eigene Methodenreflexion kann diesbezüglich nicht als zureichend erachtet werden. Sie versetzt uns nicht in die Lage, das dialektische Verfahren gegen Einwände zu verteidigen oder Methodenfragen zu beantworten. Im Folgenden sollen in einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Dialektik von ‘Sein’ und ‘Nichts’ in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ Grundstrukturen dialektischer Argumentation sichtbar gemacht werden. Wie gezeigt wird, kommt dabei antinomischen Strukturen eine Schlüsselfunktion zu. Eine solche 'Rekonstruktion' wird allerdings nicht eine umstandslose Bestätigung der Hegelschen Textvorlage sein können, sondern immer auch den Charakter einer Kritik haben. In der Tat wird sich ergeben, daß im Vergleich mit Hegels Kategorienentwicklung einschneidende Revisionen zu gewärtigen sind. (shrink)

A argumentação que aqui se apresenta tem como objetivo fazer algumas considerações sobre o início da Ciência que nos permitam uma descrição mais clara do Ser puro em Hegel. Sabe-se que o Ser puro para Hegel é indefinível, não há uma tese propriamente dita, apenas a afirmação de um início imediato, indeterminado e idêntico a si mesmo. Partindo de considerações sobre os movimentos lógicos de uma filosofia científica nos perguntamos sobre o que consiste a mediação imediata do início da Ciência (...) da Lógica. (shrink)

This paper “on the logics of language” discusses the fundamental role which the reality of language plays in the thinking of Hölderlin as well as in Hegel. Common to both is the emphasis on the ‘Wirklichkeit der Sprache’ – in the double sense of this phrase: the reality language is, and the reality language has. At the same time there is, of course, the great difference that for Hegel the logic of language fulfils itself in the ‘work of the concept(s)’ (...) [“Arbeit des Begriffs”], while for Hölderlin it is fulfilled in forms of poetry or in the broader sense of poetic work. The paper explores the origins, conceptual basics and consequences of the dialectic between moving ‘from language to logics’ in Hegel and moving ‘from logics to language’ in Hölderlin. The main works of Hegel considered here are Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, Wissenschaft der Logik and some parts of the Enzyklopädie (1830); from Hölderlin the focus is on the theoretical fragments Seyn, Urtheil, …, Das untergehende Vaterland … and Wenn der Dichter einmal des Geistes mächtig ist …. One central issue treated by exploring the discussion between Hegel and Hölderlin is their respective concepts of memory and its development. Reflecting on the connection between the power of imagination and the necessity of forms of utterance is the other. The primary aim of the paper is to explain the relevance that Hölderlin’s poetic work has in philosophical perspective – a relevance which can be explained in relation to Hegel. (shrink)

Why should philosophy, or even thinking, get in the way of seeing? In attempting to address this question, this paper identifies post-Romanticism as a phenomenologically inflected response to the failure of both pre-Romantic Reflexionsphilosophie and Hegelian speculative overcoming, one that seeks to express our relation to the world in a way that does not rely on a reflection model of consciousness and gives no support to the notion of a cognitively inaccessible absolute. It will be suggested that the poetry of (...) Fernando Pessoa offers lessons in such a post-Romanticism, showing how a phenomenological attentiveness to the world-disclosive power of poetry and to the everyday mereness of things constitutes a more coherent way of relating to the world. With reference to Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy, it will be argued that Pessoa’s poetry shows us that it is by reining in the reflection model of consciousness that we achieve a greater sense of the world and our position in it. (shrink)

Resumen: Todo lo real, y especialmente lo vivo es, desde el punto de vista de Hegel, un sujeto más o menos desarrollado. Según el filósofo alemán, los sujetos tienen la capacidad de determinarse y realizarse a sí mismos, lo cual requiere la facultad de juzgar. A diferencia de Kant, sin embargo, Hegel entiende el juicio de manera ontológica. Concibe, por un lado, los sujetos como totalidades que están enfrentadas al mundo; por otro lado, considera el mundo como algo que pertenece (...) al ser de aquellos. Para Hegel el problema del límite consiste, por tanto, en concebir el límite de manera inmanente y dialéctica —como su contrario—, esto es, como relación, como conexión y mediación.: From Hegel's point of view, all that is real, and especially the living things, is a more or less developed subject. According to the German philosopher, subjects have the faculty to determine and realize themselves, which requires the faculty to judge. Unlike Kant, however, Hegel understands the judgment in an ontological way. On the one hand, he conceives subjects as totalities that are facing the world; on the other hand, he considers the world as something that belongs to the being of subjectivity. For Hegel, the problem of limit consists, therefore, in understanding the limit in an immanent and dialectical manner, that is, as relation, as connection and mediation. (shrink)

En las primeras páginas de la Ciencia de la lógica, el pensar tiene la pretensión de iniciar su propio movimiento sin aceptar ningún pensamiento dado o presuposición como la paradójica y pura autorreferencia del vínculo de ser y nada. De acuerdo conesto, proponemos una lectura que afirma la presencia de una negatividad que explica la actividad inmanente del pensar en el inicio de la Ciencia de la lógica.

Trata-se de abordar o problema da teoria hegeliana da linguagem a partir do ponto onde pragmática e ontologia se articulam. Isto exige uma reflexão sobre a maneira com que Hegel organiza as dinâmicas da pragmática da linguagem levando em conta os modos de manifestação de uma negação ontológica no interior do campo de experiências lingüísticas da consciência.

From Hegel's point of view, all that is real, and especially the living things, is a more or less developed subject. According to the German philosopher, subjects have the faculty to determine and realize themselves, which requires the faculty to judge. Unlike Kant, however, Hegel understands the judgment in an ontological way. On the one hand, he conceives subjects as totalities that are facing the world; on the other hand, he considers the world as something that belongs to the being (...) of subjectivity. For Hegel, the problem of limit consists, therefore, in understanding the limit in an immanent and dialectical manner, that is, as relation, as connection and mediation. (shrink)

The aim of the work is to examine the relationship between the concepts of “immanence” and “politics” in the works of Hegel and Deleuze. Both Hegel and Deleuze are thinkers of immanence and they explicitly think this concept in relation to the problem of political practice. As I show, they attempt to “ground” politics in immanence. The purpose of this work is to prove that there exists an inherent paradox in the undertaking to “ground” politics in immanence. Both philosophers are (...) confronted with a paradox that emerges from this “grounding”. The paradox appears in the form of natural violence. Both authors fail to contain this violence through arguments. In order to show this, I examine the relationship between two further concepts: history and the state. I compare Hegel’s and Deleuze’s formulations of world-history and universal history, tracing the analogies and differences in how they think the relationship of the state to history. Based on the conclusions I then focus on the relationship of politics to immanence. The paradox of natural violence, I show, emerges from the relationship of the state at the “end of history”. (shrink)