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  1. Explanation and rationality naturalized.David Henderson - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):30-58.
    Familiar accounts have it that one explains thoughts or actions by showing them to be rational. It is common to find that the standards of rationality presupposed in these accounts are drawn from what would be thought to be aprioristic sources. I advance an argument to show this must be mistaken. But, recent work in epistemology and on rationality takes a less aprioristic approach to such standards. Does the new (psychological or cognitive scientific) realism in accounts of rationality itself significantly (...)
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  • Testimonial beliefs and epistemic competence.David Henderson - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):190–221.
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  • Norms, invariance, and explanatory relevance.David Henderson - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
    Descriptions of social norms can be explanatory. The erotetic approach to explanation provides a useful framework. I describe one very broad kind of explanation-seeking why-question, a genus that is common to the special sciences, and argue that descriptions of norms can serve as an answer to such why-questions. I draw upon Woodward’s recent discussion of the explanatory role of generalizations with a significant degree of invariance. Descriptions of norms provide what is, in effect, a generalization regarding the kind of historically (...)
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  • Norms, normative principles, and explanation: On not getting is from ought.David Henderson - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):329-364.
    It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principles—insofar as they are the sort of things with normative force—is explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further considers various understandings of norms. Key Words: (...)
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  • Comments on Rosenberg's Paper.David K. Henderson - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):205-216.
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