- El problema de las razones inadecuadas.Miranda del Corral - 2014 - Factótum 11:103-111.details
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Is epistemic agency possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.details
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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
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A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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Moral Responsibility and Merit.Matt King - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-18.details
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Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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(2 other versions)Replies to critics.Richard Moran - 2007 - Theoria 22 (1):53-77.details
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Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.details
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A field guide to social construction.Ron Mallon - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):93–108.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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Doxastic Wronging and Evidentialism.Sophia Dandelet - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):82-95.details
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In Defense of Clutter.Brendan Balcerak Jackson, DiDomenico David & Kenji Lota - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Normative Resilience.Henrik Andersson & Jakob Werkmäster - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):195-208.details
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(1 other version)A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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An Account of Extrinsic Final Value.Levi Tenen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):479-492.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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Reasons, rationality, reasoning: how much pulling-apart?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Problema 12:59-93.details
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Fitting Attitude Theory and the Normativity of Jokes.Stephanie Patridge & Andrew Jordan - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1303-1320.details
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Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.details
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(1 other version)Responding to Aesthetic Reasons.Andrew McGonigal - 2017 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 54 (1):40–64.details
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One dogma of philosophy of action.Matthew Noah Smith - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2249-2266.details
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(1 other version)Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts.Cain Todd - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Control of Belief and Intention.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):337-346.details
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Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)“But it would be wrong”.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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Judgment's Aimless Heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism).Florencia Rimoldi & Federico Penelas - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Hutcheson's Contributions to Action Theory.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2):103-120.details
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Desire and Goodness.Allan Hazlett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):160-180.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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Against boredom : 17 essays on ignorance, values, creativity, metaphysics, decision-making, truth, preference, art, processes, Ramsey, ethics, rationality, validity, human ills, science, and eternal life to Nils-Eric Sahlin on the occasion of his 60th birthday. [REVIEW]Johannes Persson, Göran Hermerén & Eva Sjöstrand - unknowndetails
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From Skepticism to Paralysis.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (2):369-392.details
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A new moral sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.details
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Doing (better) what comes naturally: Zagzebski on rationality and epistemic self-trust.Elizabeth Fricker - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):151-166.details
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Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.details
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Sosa on the normativity of belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.details
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Explaining the Instrumental Principle.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.details
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Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness.Heath White - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):339-364.details
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Morality, reasons, and sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.details
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