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  1. Foldor' solipsisms: dont's look a gift horse in the ….Donald A. Norman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):90-90.
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  • Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
    The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...)
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  • The content of a representation also depends on the procedure interpreting it.A. K. Joshi - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):84-84.
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  • Synthetic Biology and Synthetic Knowledge.Christophe Malaterre - 2013 - Biological Theory (8):346–356.
    Probably the most distinctive feature of synthetic biology is its being “synthetic” in some sense or another. For some, synthesis plays a unique role in the production of knowledge that is most distinct from that played by analysis: it is claimed to deliver knowledge that would otherwise not be attained. In this contribution, my aim is to explore how synthetic biology delivers knowledge via synthesis, and to assess the extent to which this knowledge is distinctly synthetic. On the basis of (...)
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  • How to analyze immediate experience: Hintikka, Husserl, and the idea of phenomenology.Søren Overgaard - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (3):282-304.
    This article discusses Jaakko Hintikka's interpretation of the aims and method of Husserl's phenomenology. I argue that Hintikka misrepresents Husserl's phenomenology on certain crucial points. More specifically, Hintikka misconstrues Husserl's notion of "immediate experience" and consequently fails to grasp the functions of the central methodological tools known as the "epoché" and the "phenomenological reduction." The result is that the conception of phenomenology he attributes to Husserl is very far from realizing the philosophical potential of Husserl's position. Hence if we want (...)
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  • What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.
    Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that "s knows-wh" (e.g. "John knows who stole his car") is reducible to "there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause." Anti-reductionists hold that "s knows-wh" is reducible to "s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause." I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind (...)
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  • Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
    Attitude reports are reports about people’s states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude reports are successful. Some (...)
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  • Physical symbol systems.Allen Newell - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (2):135-83.
    On the occasion of a first conference on Cognitive Science, it seems appropriate to review the basis of common understanding between the various disciplines. In my estimate, the most fundamental contribution so far of artificial intelligence and computer science to the joint enterprise of cognitive science has been the notion of a physical symbol system, i.e., the concept of a broad class of systems capable of having and manipulating symbols, yet realizable in the physical universe. The notion of symbol so (...)
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  • Phantasie and Phenomenological Inquiry - Thinking with Edmund Husserl.Andreea Smaranda Aldea - 2012 - Dissertation,
    This dissertation explores and argues for the import of the imagination (Phantasie) in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. It contends that Husserl's extensive analyses of the imagination influenced how he came to conceive the phenomenological method throughout the main stages of his philosophical career. The work clarifies Husserl's complex method of investigation by considering the role of the imagination in his main methodological apparatuses: the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions, and eidetic variation - all of which remained ambiguous despite (...)
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  • Methodological solipsism.Andrew Woodfield - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):98-99.
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  • Semantic Information and the Syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs.Aaron S. White, Valentine Hacquard & Jeffrey Lidz - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (2):416-456.
    Propositional attitude verbs, such as think and want, have long held interest for both theoretical linguists and language acquisitionists because their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties display complex interactions that have proven difficult to fully capture from either perspective. This paper explores the granularity with which these verbs’ semantic and pragmatic properties are recoverable from their syntactic distributions, using three behavioral experiments aimed at explicitly quantifying the relationship between these two sets of properties. Experiment 1 gathers a measure of 30 (...)
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  • Addressing confounding errors when using non-experimental, observational data to make causal claims.Andrew Ward & Pamela Jo Johnson - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):419-432.
    In their recent book, Is Inequality Bad for Our Health?, Daniels, Kennedy, and Kawachi claim that to “act justly in health policy, we must have knowledge about the causal pathways through which socioeconomic (and other) inequalities work to produce differential health outcomes.” One of the central problems with this approach is its dependency on “knowledge about the causal pathways.” A widely held belief is that the randomized clinical trial (RCT) is, and ought to be the “gold standard” of evaluating the (...)
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  • How do we know how?Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52.
    I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, (...)
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  • Dasein's revenge: methodological solipsism as an unsuccessful escape strategy in psychology.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):78-79.
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  • Fodor's guide to cognitive psychology.Jerrold J. Katz - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):85-89.
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  • States' rights.Ned Block & Sylvain Bromberger - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):73-74.
    This is a response to Jerry Fodor’s article, Fodor, J. (1980). "Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63-109.
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  • Paying the price for methodological solipsism.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):97-98.
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  • Computational processes, representations and propositional attitudes.J. J. C. Smart - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):97-97.
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  • Methodological realism.Robert Shaw & M. T. Turvey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):94-97.
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  • Two objections to methodological solipsism.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):93-94.
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  • Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and Kallestrup.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):477-500.
    In "Knowing the Answer" I argued that knowledge-wh is question-relative. For example, to know when the movie starts is to know the answer p to the question Q of when the movie starts. Berit Brogaard and Jesper Kallestrup have each responded with insightful critiques of my argument, and novel accounts of knowledge-wh. I am grateful to them both for continuing the discussion in so thoughtful a way.
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  • Methodological behaviorism: a case for transparent texonomy.David M. Rosenthal - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):92-93.
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  • The formal and the opaque.Georges Rey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):90-92.
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  • To Peirce Hintikka’s Thoughts.Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (2):241-262.
    This paper compares Peirce’s and Hintikka’s logical philosophies and identifies a cross-section of similarities in their thoughts in the areas of action-first epistemology, pragmaticist meaning, philosophy of science, and philosophy of logic and mathematics.
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  • Pedagogy as a Framework for a Proper Dialogue between Science and Literature.Arto Mutanen - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (1):167-180.
    An aim of science is to find truths about reality. These truths are collected together to form systematic knowledge structures called theories. Theories are intended to create a truthful picture of the reality behind the study. Together with all the other fields of science we get a scientific picture or a world view. This scientific world view is open in the sense that not all truths are known by scientists and not all present day theories are true. So, there is (...)
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  • Critical Study: Jon Barwise & John Perry, Situations and Attitudes. [REVIEW]Sten Lindström - 1991 - Noûs (5):743-770.
    The present essay is a critical study of Barwise and Perry’s book, emphasizing the logical and model-theoretical aspects of their work. I begin by presenting the authors’ criticism of the classical view of logic and semantics within the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski. In this connection, I discuss the so-called Frege argument (“the slingshot”). I try to show that the argument appears inconclusive, not only from a situation-theoretic perspective, but also from such alternative perspectives as orthodox Fregean semantics or (...)
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  • Multiple quantifiers and Hintikka's logic of perception.Gregory Mellema - 1982 - Philosophia 11 (1-2):95-103.
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  • James J. Gibson's Ecological Approach: Perceiving What Exists.William M. Mace - 2005 - Ethics and the Environment 10 (2):195-216.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:James J. Gibson's Ecological Approach:Perceiving What ExistsWilliam M. Mace (bio)Environmental Philosophy and EpistemologyThe purpose of this paper is to help an audience attracted to environmental philosophy get to the core of Gibson's system in a compact form and to appreciate the necessity for an account of the environment in epistemology. I hope to show that Gibson's is a consistent and scientifically progressive account of knowing that gives the environment (...)
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  • Syntax, functional semantics, and referential semantics.Brian F. Loar - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):89-90.
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  • A typology for attitude verbs and their anaphoric properties.Nicholas Asher - 1987 - Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (2):125--197.
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  • In support of anti-intellectualism.Victor Kumar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
    Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not (...)
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  • The metaphysics of counterpart theory.Robert Kraut - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):150 – 157.
    The technical apparatus of modal semantics--Possible worlds, World-Lines, Counterparts, Etc.--Continues to arouse suspicion among philosophers of various persuasions. A way to dispel at least some of the suspicion is to provide a naturalistic interpretation of the semantical machinery. My goal here is precisely that. More specifically, I provide a behavioristically acceptable interpretation of david lewis' counterpart theory. Reference to worlds and counterparts is construed in sober, Quinean terms. The result is a "metalinguistic" construal of counterpart semantics, And thus, Of modality. (...)
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  • Implications of Fodor' methodological solipsism for psychological theories.Peter W. Jusczyk & Bruce Earhard - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):84-85.
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  • Sensing and reference.S. D. Isard - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):83-84.
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  • Knowing about formality.Pat Hayes - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):82-83.
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  • Formality and naturalism.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):81-82.
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  • What is methodological solipsism?Gilbert Harman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):81-81.
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  • Some remarks on representations.P. T. Geach - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):80-81.
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  • Methodological solipsism: replies to commentators.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):99-109.
    The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...)
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  • Fodor flawed.Gareth Evans - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):79-80.
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  • On the need for a computational psychology and the hope for a naturalistic one.Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-78.
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  • Causes and representation.Robert Cummins - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-76.
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  • Some defects in Fodor' ‘computational’ theory.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):75-76.
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  • Acquaintance.Romane Clark - 1981 - Synthese 46 (2):231 - 246.
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  • In defense of naturalism.Paul M. Churchland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):74-75.
    History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical (...)
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  • Some aspirin for Dasein.Eugene Charniak - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):74-74.
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  • How to Understand the Extended Mind.Sven Bernecker - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):1-23.
    Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, then we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And if we have deep understanding of the extended mind hypothesis, then the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.
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  • Individual Concepts in Modal Predicate Logic.Maria Aloni - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):1-64.
    The article deals with the interpretation of propositional attitudes in the framework of modal predicate logic. The first part discusses the classical puzzles arising from the interplay between propositional attitudes, quantifiers and the notion of identity. After comparing different reactions to these puzzles it argues in favor of an analysis in which evaluations of de re attitudes may vary relative to the ways of identifying objects used in the context of use. The second part of the article gives this analysis (...)
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