This text offers a critique of a certain development in political discourses on progress, namely the “decoupling” of notions of moral from notions of technological progress. This decoupling yields fatal social, economic and ecologic consequences in practice that ultimately amount to a virtual perversion of progress. The second part of the paper reflects upon the psychosocial drivers of this dynamic. I venture that the only motive that may explain why we reproduce this dynamic even as we increasingly suffer from its (...) consequences is a compulsive avoidance of limitation, i.e. non-satisfaction of needs. Finally, I offer some tentative suggestions as to what a mature approach towards limitation would entail. (shrink)

In our age of globalization, we need a theory of global management consistent with our common human nature. The place to begin in developing such a theory is the philosophy of traditional cultures. The article focuses on African philosophy and its fruitfulness for contributing to a theory of management consistent with African traditional cultures. It also looks briefly at the Confucian and Platonic-Aristotelian traditions and notes points of agreement with African traditions. It concludes that the needed theory of global management (...) should regard the firm as a community, not a collection of individuals, and should understand the purpose of management as promoting the common good. (shrink)

The concept of dignity is notoriously vague. In this paper it is argued that the reason for this is that there are three versions of dignity that are often confused. First we will take a short look at the history of the concept of dignity in order to demonstrate how already from Roman Antiquity two versions of dignity can be distinguished. Subsequently, the third version will be introduced and it will be argued that although the three versions of dignity hang (...) together, they should also be clearly distinguished in order to avoid confusion. The reason for distinguishing the three versions is because all three of them are only partially effective. This will be demonstrated by taking the discussion about voluntary ‘dying with dignity’ as an example. Inspired by both Paul Ricoeur’s concept of ethics and the ethics of care a proposition will be done as to how the three versions of dignity may sustain each other and help achieve what neither one of the versions can do on its own. (shrink)

Abstract: How can the decisions of “autonomous” individuals provide a rationale for freedom and self-governance if a mechanical and causal sense of the self leads us to question the foundational nature of the individual? If most of our decisions originate in brain function below the level of consciousness, we live in a virtual world produced by mechanisms outside our control, arising from transparent self-models of which we are not aware. “Opacity,” the gift of not perceiving directly, of not automatically believing (...) what we are experiencing, is precisely what makes it possible for us to question our first-person perspectives. While we do not have direct access to the mechanisms that give rise to our sense of ourselves, our investigation can make it possible for us to analyze and understand those very mechanisms consciously. The deployment of that knowledge in the act of decision making and the infinite regress of interacting conscious individuals underlies our existential freedom. (shrink)

Garfinkel's dissertation, "The Perception of the Other," was completed and defended 15 years prior to the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology. This essay seeks hints of the familiar ethnomethodological themes (indexicality, reflexivity, accountability) within his thesis. It begins by examining the contributions of earlier social theorists, particularly Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schütz, to Garfinkel's thought. It then examines the dissertation itself seeking evidence to support the claim that Garfinkel was already moving in the direction of an 'incommensurable, asymmetric, and alternate' (...) program of sociological inquiry well before the term 'ethnomethodology' had even been coined. (shrink)

The corporate responsibility (CR) discussion has so far been rather fragmented as academics tackle it from their own areas of expertise, which guarantees in-depth analyses, but leaves room for broader syntheses. This research is a synthetic, interdisciplinary exercise: it integrates philosophical, psychological and managerial perspectives of corporate responsibility into a more holistic CR-model for the benefit of academics, companies and their interest groups. CR usually comprises three areas: environmental, social and economic responsibilities. In all these areas there should be a (...) match between corporate values, discourses and actions. The aim of this multidisciplinary research is to build a CR-model by integrating (1) utilitarian/egoistic, duty/rights/justice and virtue ethical corporate values with (2) increased consciousness of psychological defences in corporate discourses, in order to achieve (3) responsible environmental, social and economic corporate actions. The resulting CR-model can be tested in companies and executed through corporate strategic and operational management. (shrink)

To be and to remain ethical requires struggle from organizations. Struggling is necessary due to the pressures and temptations management and employees encounter in and around organizations. As the relevance of struggle for business ethics has not yet been analyzed systematically in the scientific literature, this paper develops a theory of struggle that elaborates on the meaning and dimensions of struggle in organizations, why and when it is needed, and what its antecedents and consequences are. An important conclusion is that (...) the greater the ethics gap and opposing forces, the greater the struggle required. Viewing business ethics as struggle has several implications for theory and practice. (shrink)

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a collective noun for all kinds of alternative methods to formal dispute resolution. Business ethics attempts to theorize the different forms of normative coordination of corporate acts that remain within the lifeworld and outside the formal sphere of the legal system. In this context, business ethics could offer a positive approach to ADR, as ADR would be an effective, practical form of casuistry ethics. In this manner, concrete conflicts of interest and disagreements between economic actors (...) could be resolved based on moral intentions and moral validity claims. This approach of ADR through business ethics is confirmed by many articles in business ethical journals. In two important aspects, namely justice and autonomy, law is contrary to ethics. ADR lacks exactly these ethical characteristics; thus the idea that ADR belongs to the discourse of business ethics is misleading. This article will argue that ADR is not in the realm of the ethical, but in the realm of the legal. This critical analysis of ADR will show a deeper dimension in the relationship between business ethics and law, namely the systematic colonization of ethical methods by law. (shrink)

Although mind-wandering occupies up to half of our waking thoughts, it is seldom discussed in philosophy. My paper brings these neglected thoughts into focus. I propose that mind-wandering is unguided attention. Guidance in my sense concerns how attention is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time. Roughly speaking, someone’s attention is guided if she would feel pulled back, were she distracted from her current focus. Because our wandering thoughts drift unchecked from topic to topic, they are unguided. One motivation (...) for my theory is what I call the “Puzzle of the Purposeful Wanderer”. On the one hand, mind-wandering seems essentially purposeless; almost by definition, it contrasts with goal-directed cognition. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that our minds frequently wander to our goals. My solution to the puzzle is this: mind-wandering is purposeless in one way—it is unguided—but purposeful in another—it is frequently caused, and thus motivated, by our goals. Another motivation for my theory is to distinguish mind-wandering from two antithetical forms of cognition: absorption and rumination. Surprisingly, previous theories cannot capture these distinctions. I can: on my view, absorption and rumination are guided, whereas mind-wandering is not. My paper has four parts. Section 1 spells out the puzzle. Sections 2 and 3 explicate two extant views of mind-wandering—the first held by most cognitive scientists, the second by Thomas Metzinger. Section 4 uses the limitations of these theories to motivate my own: mind-wandering is unguided attention. (shrink)

Benefit/cost analysis is a technique for evaluating programs, procedures, and actions; it is not a moral theory. There is significant controversy over the moral justification of benefit/cost analysis. When a procedure for evaluating social policy is challenged on moral grounds, defenders frequently seek a justification by construing the procedure as the practical embodiment of a correct moral theory. This has the apparent advantage of avoiding difficult empirical questions concerning such matters as the consequences of using the procedure. So, for example, (...) defenders of benefit/cost analysis (BCA) are frequently tempted to argue that this procedurejust isthe calculation of moral Tightness – perhaps that what itmeansfor an action to be morally right is just for it to have the best benefit-to-cost ratio given the accounts of “benefit” and “cost” that BCA employs. They suggest, in defense of BCA, that they have found the moral calculus – Bentham's “unabashed arithmetic of morals.” To defend BCA in this manner is to commit oneself to one member of a family of moral theories (let us call thembenefit/cost moral theoriesorB/C moral theories) and, also, to the view that if a procedure is (so to speak) the direct implementation of a correct moral theory, then it is a justified procedure. Neither of these commitments is desirable, and so the temptation to justify BCA by direct appeal to a B/C moral theory should be resisted; it constitutes an unwarranted short cut to moral foundations – in this case, an unsound foundation. Critics of BCA are quick to point out the flaws of B/C moral theories, and to conclude that these undermine the justification of BCA. But the failure to justify BCA by a direct appeal to B/C moral theory does not show that the technique is unjustified. There is hope for BCA, even if it does not lie with B/C moral theory. (shrink)

The phenomenon of war occupies one of the leading places in socio-philosophical and cultural studies. War also has an ambiguous position in human life. On the historical map we see the ongoing waves of armed conflicts, which inevitably lead to fatal consequences for countries, peoples and human beings. War mainly appears in the form of horrors and tragedies. However, in philosophical studies, war is considered from different angles. Philosophers often emphasize the ambiguity and multidimensionality of war. In this work, the (...) authors analyze the phenomenon of war, given a certain “attractiveness” and even the “necessity” of this phenomenon for humans. The authors also summarize the available range of answers to the question of where the desire for violence comes from, that is, the so-called “thirst for war”. It is this desire that gives rise to a constant stay of people in a state of war. The results of this study show that war is indeed an important phenomenon, which can also be considered one of the fundamental attributes of human nature. Analyzing various approaches that explain the causes of war the authors note that the source of any armed conflict is precisely the “militancy” in the very essence of homo sapiens. Human beings must constantly fight for their existence. And such a struggle often takes various forms, which can be considered as concrete variants of the same phenomenon. This phenomenon at the theoretical and philosophical level is fixed in the concept of war. Despite the natural sense of horror that the word “war” evokes at the level of everyday consciousness, pain and hope, death and freedom, faith in human and the justice of the universe, as well as a willingness to fight for this justice, are simultaneously hidden under this “ language shell”. All these internally contradictory meanings are united within the framework of the philosophically processed concept of war, and are also embodied in many different “wars” that a person constantly wages due to his / her specific “being structure”. Human, therefore, is a “warring creature,” or, as the authors propose to denote this feature, “homo militaris”. (shrink)

Networked computer systems simultaneously destroy and build up old and new kinds of global and local jobs. Digitally networked ultra-modern structures in work, company and administration bring us turbulent times. This development is analyzed from an ethical, technological and economical point of view and illustrated by empirical data. The main emphasis of this article is placed on considerations, from the point of view of business ethics, of the conception of workplaces – in the office, at home and abroad (mobile work) (...) – equipped for computer-supported information exchange. In order to make better use of these new technologies, ethical, action-oriented guidelines should be considered. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Habgood-Coote : 1033–1065) I argued that we should abandon ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, on the grounds that these terms do not have stable public meanings, are unnecessary, and function as vehicles for propaganda. Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson, and Rachel Sterken and Étienne Brown : 144–154) have raised worries about my case for abandonment, recommending that we continue using ‘fake news’. In this paper, I respond to these worries. I distinguish more clearly between theoretical and political reasons for abandoning (...) a term, assemble more evidence that ‘fake news’ is a nonsense term, and respond to the worries raised by Pepp, Michaelson and Sterken, and Brown. I close by considering the prospects for anti-fascist and anti-authoritarian conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Prompted by Derrida's work on the animal-fable in eighteenth-century debates about political power, this article examines the role played by the fiction of the animal in thinking of pity as either a natural virtue (in Rousseau's Second Discourse) or as a natural passion (in Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees). The war of fables between Rousseau and Mandeville – and their hostile reception by Samuel Johnson and Adam Smith – reinforce that the animal-fable illustrates not so much the proper of (...) man as the possibilities and limitations of a moral philosophy that is unable to address the political realities of the state. (shrink)

The present essay examines the conflicting ontological assumptions that one can find behind the word dao in the texts of the Laozi and Zhuangzi and argues that the relative indifference to these texts toward whether or not dao has an ontic reality should not be considered a flaw of early Daoism. Rather, the historical process by which the term dao collects various possible ontological implications can be thought of as a philosophical stance in its own right. That is, if the (...) terms which one is obliged to use in discussing the immaterial necessarily hide, at least as much as they explain, the nature of Being, then it is a reasonable response to decline to ground one’s ethics in an ontology, and that while the resulting philosophy may not qualify as a fully-adumbrated system, this does not diminish its potential usefulness. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...) However, the “state of war” ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist. (shrink)

A quick survey of the literature reveals that authors disagree as to which sentiments are moral and which are not, they disagee as to how to distinguish between moral and other sentiments, and finally that often the same author will claim a sentiment is moral at some times but not at others. These difficulties arise, I argue, from an underlying concept of emotion that I call atomism. Viewing emotions as means of coordination among agents, rather than as psychic atoms, suggests (...) a radically different approach to the question of morality and affects, one where emotions pave the way for normative expectations. (shrink)

This essay examines the contemporary masculinity of straight, white men in the business classes of the United States as a category of identity. I argue that this form of masculine identity is currently in crisis, and, through a reading of the 1995 film Toy Story, develop an argument about the value of ‘downsizing’ masculinity in an era of diminished work expectations.

This article argues that sustainability is essentially a contested concept that not only cannot be sufficiently defined in a one-forall blueprint, but requires a new mode of self-actualization of human potential in dialogical, cooperative learning processes. Inherent aporias and their ethical implications are illustrated by an analysis of the mainstream interpretation of the sustainability concept in the context of the relationship between the logic of accumulation and improvement and insatiable human desires as off-springs of a deeper ontological transformation of modernity. (...) A philosophical account of technology and modern sciencewill be introduced in order to investigate overconsumption driven by mimetic desires and the transformative and dialectic dynamics of desire. A contemplative learning model is suggested as a useful basis for a reasonable interpretation of the sustainability concept. (shrink)

In his autobiography, Skinner states that Walden Two was an anarchist society because no person was in control and the community was planned in such a way that institutions were not needed. Based on that statement, this article aims to evaluate an anarchist interpretation of Walden Two. The text is divided into 3 parts. The first part presents a definition of anarchism, covering its criticism of domination and a defense of self-managed society (anarchy). In the second part, some convergence points (...) of Walden Two and anarchism are indicated in 3 social spheres (economic, political, and cultural). The last part analyzes the divergences between the community described in Walden Two and an anarchist society, with an emphasis on the issue of Walden Two’s political inequality. It is concluded that the divergences between Walden Two and anarchism are decisive and prevent the community described in Skinner’s book from being classified as an anarchist one, and, therefore, they counter Skinner’s own statement. (shrink)

Kirjoitus tarkastelee kahta jännitteessä olevaa näkemystä mielestä, komputationalismia ja eksternalismia. Komputationalismin mukaan mielen toiminta on mahdollista kuvata yksikäsitteisistä askeleista muodostuvana laskentana. Eksternalismin mukaan mielen toimintaa ei ole kuitenkaan mahdollista ymmärtää ottamatta huomioon niitä merkitysrelaatioita, joita mielellä on maailmaan. Näiden kahden näkemyksen välillä on selvä jännite: eksternalismin korostamat merkitysrelaatiot eivät voi luonteensa vuoksi olla komputationaalisen kuvaukseen sisältyviä ominaisuuksia. Vertailemalla Jerry Fodorin ja René Descartesin näkemyksiä esitän, että mahdollisuudet komputationalismin ja eksternalismin yhteensovittamiseen riippuvat suuresti siitä, minkälaisen laajemman teoreettisen hierarkian osiksi komputationalismi ja (...) eksternalismi käsitetään. Kiinnitän huomiota myös siihen, että eksternalismin tueksi tavallisesti esitetty ajatuskoe, Hilary Putnamin nk. kaksoismaa-ajatuskoe, näyttää riippuvan huomattavasti arkisemmasta ajattelun ilmiöstä kuin on esitetty. Esitän Descartesin käsittävän teoreettisesti keskeisimmäksi tasoksi kognitiivisten relaatioiden tason, ja täten alistavan muut teoreettisen kuvauksen tasot mielestä näiden ensisijaisten suhteiden toteumiksi. Fodorilaisessa näkemyksessä komputationaalinen kuvaus nähdään ensisijaisena, jolloin ongelmallisesti muut kuvaukset joudutaan selittämään pikemmin tuon komputationaalisen kuvauksen laajennuksina. Tämän näkökulmaeron ymmärtäminen auttaa myös näkemään, miten Descartesin näkemys kykenee sovittamaan komputationalismin että eksternalismin osaksi yhtä näkemystä. Kiinnitän huomiota erityisesti siihen, että mielen toiminnan ymmärtäminen yksityiskohtaisen mekaniikan tai laajojen relaatioiden tasolla on välttämättä riippuvaista siitä laajemmasta teoreettista viitekehyksestä, joka meillä ajattelun luonteesta on. Tässä hankkeessa perinteisen metafysiikan tärkeyttä ei tulisi aliarvioida. (shrink)

Abstract: Justice is one of the core humanistic values and behavioral model in societal life. In the mythology of the ancient Roman civilization, Veritas refers to an ultimate moral ideal, whereas in Greek tradition fairness and equity essentially define Aequitas. Hence, political theory determining the inner interpretation of Veritas et Aequitas finds justice in truth as truth is just. While people are naturally inclined to justness, different cultures differently understand its internal norm of correctness and power of apprehending justice appears (...) as either human-created or what came into being itself. However, what is potentially ambiguous is whether it belongs to all or only to some. The often conflicting interpretations of justice made the study unfold the notion through the basic features of its transitional, retributive and distributive inner, show what the Original Position evolved into, reveal (in)conformity between fundaments of liberty, individual and general, and point to exaggerating complexity in defining the core of the notion. (shrink)

Thaler and Sunstein advocate 'libertarian paternalism'. A libertarian paternalist changes the conditions under which people act so that their cognitive biases lead them to choose what is best for themselves. Although libertarian paternalism manipulates people, Thaler and Sunstein say that it respects their autonomy by preserving the possibility of choice. Conly argues that libertarian paternalism does not go far enough, since there is no compelling reason why we should allow people the opportunity to choose to bring disaster upon themselves if (...) sometimes they will make the wrong decision. She defends 'coercive paternalism'. The present paper argues that errors in reasoning are not due only to cognitive biases. People also make errors because they have an insufficient level of general intelligence. Intelligence is distributed on a continuum. Those who fall on higher levels of the continuum have greater abilities, in certain contexts, to reason about both their own and others' interests. Coercive paternalism may sometimes be appropriate to prevent less intelligent people from engaging in self-destructive behavior due to errors of reasoning. (shrink)

For Foucault, Hobbes is important for the transition from sovereignty to governmentality, but he does not always go into great detail how. In “Society Must Be Defended”, Hobbes’s reactions against the political historicism of his time lead him to an ahistorical foundation to the state. In Security, Territory, Population, his contract is emblematic of the art of government still caught in the logic of sovereignty. Management techniques, one of which being inheritance laws like primogeniture, inducing changes in a population’s milieu (...) so that its interest is properly directed allow the art of government to escape this logic. Hobbes supports primogeniture, but its historical position in the common law makes this support unexpected. This article examines the historical context of primogeniture and the reasoning for Hobbes’s support of it in light of Foucault’s claims about him in order to give more precision to those claims. The result is that primogeniture as a law of nature produces the family as an interested unit of the population. Yet this interest is itself historicized, so Hobbes’s attempt to de-historicize politics did not fully succeed. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify and defend the distinction by Isaiah Berlin between “negative liberty” on the one hand, and “positive” and “communal liberty” on the other. This distinction has been attacked by those who believe it breaks the necessary harmony with equality or fraternity, virtues that many progressive authors place on the same plane as freedom. Instead of speaking of “negative liberty,” as proposed by Berlin, we propose to call it “classical” or “formal” liberty. In turn, rather than speaking (...) of “positive” liberty, we propose to say “possessive liberty” and “communal liberty.” Thus, Isaiah Berlin should have spoken of three concepts of liberty and have stressed that the latter two may be destructive of the first. Possessive and communal liberty can be significant aspects of a society, but should not be confused with personal liberty. The promotion of possessive and comunal liberty is often accompanied by invasions of formal liberty. (shrink)

A Hobbesian Realist position concerning Nation States and their generative grounds in the Social Contract obligates the United States to accept any and all refugees of conflict who are willing to recognize the sovereign power of the United States by submitting to citizenship requirements determined by the United States.