It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which (...) features are attributed by a predication-like relation. In this paper, I reconsider this solution and claim that the Many Properties problem can be solved without invoking the notion of “subject”. What is more, I argue that an alternative approach has stronger justification given the empirical data concerning human vision. (shrink)

While it is widely accepted that human vision represents objects, it is less clear which of the various philosophical notions of ‘object’ adequately characterizes visual objects. In this paper, I show that within contemporary cognitive psychology visual objects are characterized in two distinct, incompatible ways. On the one hand, models of visual organization describe visual objects in terms of combinations of features, in accordance with the philosophical bundle theories of objects. However, models of visual persistence apply a notion of visual (...) objects that is more similar to that endorsed in philosophical substratum theories. Here I discuss arguments that might show either that only one of the above notions of visual objects is adequate in the context of human vision, or that the category of visual objects is not uniform and contains entities properly characterized by different philosophical conceptions. (shrink)

In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.

Este texto surge de un intercambio epistolar mantenido con David Armstrong a propósito de su libro Universals. An Opinionated lntroduction. Se presenta en forma de diálogo y ha sido dividido en seis temas. El primero trata el problema de si las diferentes teorías ontológicas, al postular diferentes relaciones básicas, se hallan también en diferentes condiciones para afrontar el argumento del regreso infinito planteado por Bradley. El segundo presenta una duda. Los universales que postula Armstrong, tales como masa, carga electromagnética, etc., (...) son "agregativos": admiten la categoría de cantidad. Pero se supone que los universales no admiten dicha categoría. Pareciera, pues, que los "universales" postulados por Armstrong no constituyen auténticos universales. El tercer tema concierne a la relación entre la teoría del haz y el Principio de identidad de los indiscernibles. El cuarto trata la opinión de Armstrong según la cual la teoría del haz se vería obligada a postular el carácter autosubsistente de los universales. El quinto consiste en la discusión acerca de si la teoría del haz debe admitir la existencia de hechos. Finalmente, el sexto concierne a la naturaleza de los tropos. This text originates in an exchange of letters I held with David Armstrong when his book Universals. An Opinionated Introduction was published. It is offered as a dialogue and has been divided into six topics. The first one deals with the problem of whether different ontological theories, which posit different basic relations, are also differently prepared to deal with Bradley's infinito regress argument. The second one raises a doubt. Those universals posited by Armstrong, such as mass, electric charge, etc., are "aggregative", which means they are subject to the category of quantity. But universals are not supposed to differ quantitatively. Thus, those "universals" favored by Armstrong become suspect of not being real universals. The third one addresses the relation between the Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles. The fourth one deals with Armstrong's opinion according to which the bundle theorist is forced to conceive of universals as self subsistant entities. The fifth one discusses whether the Bundle Theory has to accept the existence of facts. Finally, the sixth one deals with tropes. (shrink)

Ontology is the philosophical discipline which aims to understand how things in the world are divided into categories and how these categories are related together. This is exactly what information scientists aim for in creating structured, automated representations, called 'ontologies,' for managing information in fields such as science, government, industry, and healthcare. Currently, these systems are designed in a variety of different ways, so they cannot share data with one another. They are often idiosyncratically structured, accessible only to those who (...) created them, and unable to serve as inputs for automated reasoning. This volume shows, in a nontechnical way and using examples from medicine and biology, how the rigorous application of theories and insights from philosophical ontology can improve the ontologies upon which information management depends. (shrink)

Paper responding to critique of Maurin (2002) presented by Herbert Hochberg in his “Relations, Properties and Particulars” (2004).

Peter Geach proposed a substitutional construal of quantification over thirty years ago. It is not standardly substitutional since it is not tied to those substitution instances currently available to us; rather, it is pegged to possible substitution instances. We argue that (i) quantification over the real numbers can be construed substitutionally following Geach's idea; (ii) a price to be paid, if it is that, is intuitionism; (iii) quantification, thus conceived, does not in itself relieve us of ontological commitment to real (...) numbers. (shrink)