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Works by Philip Hugly
8 found
Order:
- Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
- (2 other versions)The Internal/External Question.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Grazier Philosophishe Studien 47:31-41.For Rudolf Carnap the question ‘Do numbers exist?’ does not have just one sense. Asked from within mathematics, it has a trivial answer that could not possibly divide philosophers of mathematics. Asked from outside of mathematics, it lacks meaning. This paper discusses Carnap ’s distinction and defends much of what he has to say.
- Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Theory and Decision 50:67-75.Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
- (1 other version)Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
- Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
- Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):425-429.The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
- What’s So Special About Sentences?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1995 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25.This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
- Offices and God.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Sophia 29 (3):29-34.Pavel Tichy presents an interpretation of Anselm’s Proslogion III argument. Tichy presents an interpretation of this argument and raises doubts about one of the premises. The authors contend that Tichy’s interpretation of Anselm is wrong. The argument Tichy comes to raise doubts about is not Anselm’s.
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