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The Predictive Mind

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2013)

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  1. Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism.Jack C. Lyons - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):463-509.
    The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables that systematically affect processing. The relevant process type for a given token is given by the complete algorithmic characterization of the token, along with the values of all the causally relevant parameters. The typing that results is far removed from the typings of folk (...)
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  • How Reliable is Perception?Gary Lupyan - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):81-106.
    People believe that perception is reliable and that what they perceive reflects objective reality. On this view, we perceive a red circle because there is something out there that is a red circle. It is also commonly believed that perceptual reliability is threatened if what we see is allowed to be influenced by what we know or expect. I argue that although human perception is often highly consistent and stable, it is difficult to evaluate its reliability because when it comes (...)
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  • Jakob Hohwy: The predictive mind: Oxford University Press, 2013, 286 pp, Hardcover, £65. [REVIEW]Victor Loughlin - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):753-758.
    In the following review of Hohwy ‘The Predictive Mind’, I argue that enactive considerations can be used to challenge Hohwy’s claim that the brain is a ‘truth tracker’.
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  • Leave inference alone : Direct inferential social cognition.Patrizio Lo Presti - forthcoming - Theory and Psychology.
    Direct perception and theory-theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This paper argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can (...)
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  • Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing.Piotr Litwin & Marcin Miłkowski - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12867.
    Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...)
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  • What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?Jakub Limanowski - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Attenuating oneself.Jakub Limanowski & Karl Friston - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-16.
    In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within (...)
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  • The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.
    Conciliationism—the thesis that when epistemic peers discover that they disagree about a proposition, both should reduce their confidence—faces a major objection: it seems to require us to significantly reduce our confidence in our central moral and political commitments. In this paper, I develop a typology of disagreement cases and a diagnosis of the source and force of the pressure to conciliate. Building on Vavova’s work, I argue that ordinary and extreme disagreements are surprising, and for this reason, they carry information (...)
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  • Naturalistic Entheogenics.Chris Letheby - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3.
    In this précis I summarise the main ideas of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics. The book discusses philosophical issues arising from the therapeutic use of “classic” psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and LSD. The book is organised around what I call the Comforting Delusion Objection to psychedelic therapy: the concern that this novel and promising treatment relies essentially on the induction of non-naturalistic metaphysical beliefs, rendering it epistemically objectionable. I begin the précis by summarizing material from chapters two and three (...)
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  • Self-knowledge and imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):226-245.
    How do we know when we have imagined something? How do we distinguish our imaginings from other kinds of mental states we might have? These questions present serious, if often overlooked, challenges for theories of introspection and self-knowledge. This paper looks specifically at the difficulties imagination creates for Neo-Expressivist, outward-looking, and inner sense theories of self-knowledge. A path forward is then charted, by considering the connection between the kinds of situations in which we can reliably say that another person is (...)
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  • Is the biological adaptiveness of delusions doomed?Eugenia Lancellotta - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):47-63.
    Delusions are usually considered as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs, one of the primary symptoms of a psychiatric illness and the mark of madness in popular culture. However, in recent times a much more positive role has been advocated for delusions. More specifically, it has been argued that delusions might be an answer to a problem rather than problems in themselves. By delivering psychological and epistemic benefits, delusions would allow people who face severe biological or psychological difficulties to survive in their (...)
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  • Hearing a Voice as one’s own: Two Views of Inner Speech Self-Monitoring Deficits in Schizophrenia.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):675-699.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to explain experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia in terms of a failure on the part of patients to appropriately monitor their own inner speech. These self-monitoring accounts have recently been challenged by some who argue that AVHs are better explained in terms of the spontaneous activation of auditory-verbal representations. This paper defends two kinds of self-monitoring approach against the spontaneous activation account. The defense requires first making some important clarifications (...)
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  • Modeling psychopathology: 4D multiplexes to the rescue.Lena Kästner - 2022 - Synthese 201 (1):1-30.
    Accounts of mental disorders focusing either on the brain as neurophysiological substrate or on systematic connections between symptoms are insufficient to account for the multifactorial nature of mental illnesses. Recently, multiplexes have been suggested to provide a holistic view of psychopathology that integrates data from different factors, at different scales, or across time. Intuitively, these multi-layered network structures present quite appealing models of mental disorders that can be constructed by powerful computational machinery based on increasing amounts of real-world data. In (...)
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  • The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality.Anastasia Kozyreva & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1517-1547.
    Despite the ubiquity of uncertainty, scientific attention has focused primarily on probabilistic approaches, which predominantly rely on the assumption that uncertainty can be measured and expressed numerically. At the same time, the increasing amount of research from a range of areas including psychology, economics, and sociology testify that in the real world, people’s understanding of risky and uncertain situations cannot be satisfactorily explained in probabilistic and decision-theoretical terms. In this article, we offer a theoretical overview of an alternative approach to (...)
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  • Towards the Epistemology of the Non-trivial: Research Characteristics Connecting Quantum Mechanics and First-Person Inquiry.Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar - 2019 - Foundations of Science 26 (1):187-216.
    The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial (...)
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  • Computational enactivism under the free energy principle.Tomasz Korbak - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2743-2763.
    In this paper, I argue that enactivism and computationalism—two seemingly incompatible research traditions in modern cognitive science—can be fruitfully reconciled under the framework of the free energy principle. FEP holds that cognitive systems encode generative models of their niches and cognition can be understood in terms of minimizing the free energy of these models. There are two philosophical interpretations of this picture. A computationalist will argue that as FEP claims that Bayesian inference underpins both perception and action, it entails a (...)
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  • On the possible phenomenological autonomy of virtual realities.Mathias Kofoed-Ottesen - 2020 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 20 (1):e1857945.
    ABSTRACT In the following article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of dwelling with a view to its importance for the concept of ‘place’. It is my interest to show how a phenomenological concept of place can elucidate the phenomenology of virtual reality. I begin by contextualising the investigation through a presentation of Jeff Malpas’ concept of the non-autonomy of the virtual, and argue for a clearer understanding of the notion of causal non-autonomy. Furthermore, I argue that the autonomy or lack (...)
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  • Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.
    On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...)
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  • Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2113-2140.
    On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...)
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  • What do predictive coders want?Colin Klein - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2541-2557.
    The so-called “dark room problem” makes vivd the challenges that purely predictive models face in accounting for motivation. I argue that the problem is a serious one. Proposals for solving the dark room problem via predictive coding architectures are either empirically inadequate or computationally intractable. The Free Energy principle might avoid the problem, but only at the cost of setting itself up as a highly idealized model, which is then literally false to the world. I draw at least one optimistic (...)
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  • Free Energy and the Self: An Ecological–Enactive Interpretation.Julian Kiverstein - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):559-574.
    According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by (...)
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  • Predictive brains and embodied, enactive cognition: an introduction to the special issue.Michael Kirchhoff - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2355-2366.
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  • How to determine the boundaries of the mind: a Markov blanket proposal.Michael D. Kirchhoff & Julian Kiverstein - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4791-4810.
    We develop a truism of commonsense psychology that perception and action constitute the boundaries of the mind. We do so however not on the basis of commonsense psychology, but by using the notion of a Markov blanket originally employed to describe the topological properties of causal networks. We employ the Markov blanket formalism to propose precise criteria for demarcating the boundaries of the mind that unlike other rival candidates for “marks of the cognitive” avoids begging the question in the extended (...)
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  • Enactivism and predictive processing: A non-representational view.Michael David Kirchhoff & Ian Robertson - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):264-281.
    This paper starts by considering an argument for thinking that predictive processing (PP) is representational. This argument suggests that the Kullback–Leibler (KL)-divergence provides an accessible measure of misrepresentation, and therefore, a measure of representational content in hierarchical Bayesian inference. The paper then argues that while the KL-divergence is a measure of information, it does not establish a sufficient measure of representational content. We argue that this follows from the fact that the KL-divergence is a measure of relative entropy, which can (...)
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  • Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative models.Alex Kiefer & Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2387-2415.
    In this paper, we consider how certain longstanding philosophical questions about mental representation may be answered on the assumption that cognitive and perceptual systems implement hierarchical generative models, such as those discussed within the prediction error minimization framework. We build on existing treatments of representation via structural resemblance, such as those in Gładziejewski :559–582, 2016) and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, to argue for a representationalist interpretation of the PEM framework. We further motivate the proposed approach to content by arguing that it (...)
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  • The predictive mind and the experience of visual art work.Ladislav Kesner - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • A New Mark of the Cognitive? Predictive Processing and Extended Cognition.Luke Kersten - 2022 - Synthese 200 (281):1-25.
    There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment and those who think it is located squarely within the individual. Recently, a new actor has emerged on the scene, one that looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing says that the mind/brain is fundamentally engaged in a process of minimising the difference between what is predicted about the world and how the world actually is, what is known as ‘prediction error minimisation’. The goal of (...)
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  • Re-conceptualizing the role of stimuli: an enactive, ecological explanation of spontaneous-response tasks.Alan Jurgens - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):915-934.
    This paper addresses a challenge proposed against non-mindreading explanations of infant spontaneous-response task data. The challenge is a foundational assumption of mindreading explanations best summed up by Carruthers : 141-172, 2013, Consciousness and Cognition, 36: 498-507, 2015) claim that only by appealing to a theory of mind is it possible to explain infant responses in spontaneous-response false-belief tasks when there are no one-to-one correspondences between observable behavior and mental states. Heyes, 131–143, 2014a, Developmental Science, 17, 647–659. b) responds to this (...)
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  • Can predictive processing explain self-deception?Marko Jurjako - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.
    The prediction error minimization framework denotes a family of views that aim at providing a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action. In this paper, I discuss some of the theoretical limitations of PEM. It appears that PEM cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of motivated reasoning, as instantiated in phenomena such as self-deception, because its cognitive ontology does not have a separate category for motivational states such as desires. However, it might be thought that this objection confuses levels of explanation. (...)
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  • The Wrong of Injustice, by Mari Mikkola. [REVIEW]Katharine Jenkins - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):618-627.
    The Wrong of Injustice, by MikkolaMari. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 285.
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  • Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics.Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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  • Temporal Binding in Multisensory and Motor-Sensory Contexts: Toward a Unified Model.Kishore Kumar Jagini - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15:629437.
    Our senses receive a manifold of sensory signals at any given moment in our daily lives. For a coherent and unified representation of information and precise motor control, our brain needs to temporally bind the signals emanating from a common causal event and segregate others. Traditionally, different mechanisms were proposed for the temporal binding phenomenon in multisensory and motor-sensory contexts. This paper reviews the literature on the temporal binding phenomenon in both multisensory and motor-sensory contexts and suggests future research directions (...)
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  • REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification.Daniel D. Hutto - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):377-391.
    This paper shows how a radical approach to enactivism provides a way of clarifying and unifying different varieties of enactivism and enactivist-friendly approaches so as to provide a genuine alternative to classical cognitivism. Section 1 reminds readers of the broad church character of the enactivism framework. Section 2 explicates how radical enactivism is best understood not as a kind of enactivism per se but as a programme for radicalizing and consolidating the many different enactivist offerings. The main work of radical (...)
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  • Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell?Daniel D. Hutto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2445-2458.
    Predictive Processing accounts of Cognition, PPC, promise to forge productive alliances that will unite approaches that are otherwise at odds. Can it? This paper argues that it can’t—or at least not so long as it sticks with the cognitivist rendering that Clark and others favor. In making this case the argument of this paper unfolds as follows: Sect. 1 describes the basics of PPC—its attachment to the idea that we perceive the world by guessing the world. It then details the (...)
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  • Does the Attentional Boost Effect Depend on the Intentionality of Encoding? Investigating the Mechanisms Underlying Memory for Visual Objects Presented at Behaviorally Relevant Moments in Time.Fabian Hutmacher & Christof Kuhbandner - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • On the person-based predictive policing of AI.Tzu-Wei Hung & Chun-Ping Yen - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):165-176.
    Should you be targeted by police for a crime that AI predicts you will commit? In this paper, we analyse when, and to what extent, the person-based predictive policing (PP) — using AI technology to identify and handle individuals who are likely to breach the law — could be justifiably employed. We first examine PP’s epistemological limits, and then argue that these defects by no means refrain from its usage; they are worse in humans. Next, based on major AI ethics (...)
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  • Maxime Doyon and Thiemo Breyer: Normativity in Perception. [REVIEW]Zack Hugo - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (3):275-285.
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  • The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.
    An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain (...)
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  • Reflections on predictive processing and the mind. An Interview.Jakob Hohwy - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):145-152.
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  • Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness.Jakob Hohwy & Anil Seth - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (II).
    The search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of a systematic, principled foundation that can endow putative neural correlates with greater predictive and explanatory value. Here, we propose the predictive processing framework for brain function as a promising candidate for providing this systematic foundation. The proposal is motivated by that framework’s ability to address three general challenges to identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and to satisfy two constraints common to many theories of consciousness. Implementing the search (...)
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  • Self-supervision, normativity and the free energy principle.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):29-53.
    The free energy principle says that any self-organising system that is at nonequilibrium steady-state with its environment must minimize its free energy. It is proposed as a grand unifying principle for cognitive science and biology. The principle can appear cryptic, esoteric, too ambitious, and unfalsifiable—suggesting it would be best to suspend any belief in the principle, and instead focus on individual, more concrete and falsifiable ‘process theories’ for particular biological processes and phenomena like perception, decision and action. Here, I explain (...)
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  • Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Don’t Fear the Reductionist Bogey-man.Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):138-144.
    Shaun Gallagher calls for a radical rethinking of the concept of nature and he resists reduction of phenomenology to computational-neural science. However, classic, reductionist science, at least in contemporary computational guise, has the resources to accommodate insights from transcendental phenomenology. Reductionism should be embraced, not feared.
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  • Distrusting the present.Jakob Hohwy, Bryan Paton & Colin Palmer - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):315-335.
    We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed (...)
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  • Multiversionality: Considering multiple possibilities in the processing of narratives.Ben Hiskes, Milo Hicks, Samuel Evola, Cameron Kincaid & Fritz Breithaupt - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1099-1124.
    This paper proposes a conceptual framework of multiversional narrative processing, or multiversionality. Multiversionality is the consideration of multiple possible event sequences for an incomplete narrative during reception, from reading a novel to listening to the story of a friend’s day. It occurs naturally and is experienced in a wide range of cases, such as suspense, surprise, counterfactuals, and detective stories. Receiving a narrative, we propose, is characterized by the spontaneous creation of competing interpretive models of the narrative that are then (...)
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  • Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System.Inês Hipólito - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience must literally exist the system being modelled. Computational models are important tools to test a theory about how the collected data has been generated. While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally entail the properties construed in (...)
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  • Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference.Inês Hipólito & Thomas van Es - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind. Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, (...)
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  • Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential.Inês Hipólito - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):184-188.
    This paper argues that it is possible to embrace the predictive processing framework (PP) without reducing affordances to inferential perception. The cognitivist account of PP contends that it can capture relational perception, such as affordances. The rationale for this claim is that over time, sensory data becomes highly-weighted. This paper, however, will show the inconsistency of this claim in the face of the cognitivist premise that ‘encapsulated’ models can throw away ‘the body, the world, or other people’ [Hohwy 2016: 265]. (...)
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  • Can Emotional Feelings Represent Significant Relations?Larry A. Herzberg - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):215-234.
    Jesse Prinz (2004) argues that emotional feelings (“state emotions”) can by themselves perceptually represent significant organism-environment relations. I object to this view mainly on the grounds that (1) it does not rule out the at least equally plausible view that emotional feelings are non-representational sensory registrations rather than perceptions, as Tyler Burge (2010) draws the distinction, and (2) perception of a relation requires perception of at least one of the relation’s relata, but an emotional feeling by itself perceives neither the (...)
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  • Neuroethics, Cognitive Technologies and the Extended Mind Perspective.Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs - 2018 - Neuroethics 14 (1):59-72.
    Current debates in neuroethics engage with extremely diverse technologies, for some of which it is a point of contention whether they should be a topic for neuroethics at all. In this article, I will evaluate extended mind theory’s claim of being able to define the scope of neuroethics’ domain as well as determining the extension of an individual’s mind via its so-called trust and glue criteria. I argue that a) extending the domain of neuroethics by this manoeuvre endangers the theoretical (...)
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  • Why and How. The Future of the Central Questions of Consciousness.Marek Havlík, Eva Kozáková & Jiří Horáček - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:279552.
    In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the “hard problem” of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem (...)
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