This is an encyclopedia entry on consequentializing. It explains what consequentializing is, what makes it possible, why someone might be motivated to consequentialize, and how to consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory.

I propose and defend a novel view called “de se consequentialism,” which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates—contra Doug Portmore, Mark Schroeder, Campbell Brown, and Michael Smith, among others—that agent-neutral consequentialism is consistent with agent-centered constraints. Second, it clarifies the nature of agent-centered constraints, thereby meriting attention from even dedicated nonconsequentialists. Scrutiny reveals that moral theories in general, whether consequentialist or not, incorporate constraints by assessing states in a first-personal guise. Consequently, de se consequentialism enacts constraints through the (...) very same feature that nonconsequentialist theories do. (shrink)

There is, on a given moral view, an agent-centered restriction against performing acts of a certain type if that view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act-type even to prevent two or more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act-type. The fact that commonsense morality includes many such agent-centered restrictions has been seen by several philosophers as a decisive objection against consequentialism. Despite this, I argue that agent-centered restrictions are more plausibly accommodated within a (...) consequentialist framework than within the more standard side-constraint framework. For I argue that when we combine agent-relative consequentialism with a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a version of consequentialism, which I call 'Kantsequentialism', that has several advantages over the standard side-constraint approach to accommodating constraints. What’s more, I argue that Kantsequentialism doesn’t have any of the disadvantages that critics of consequentializing have presumed that such a theory must have. (shrink)

Derek Parfit argued that “Kantians, Contractualists, and Consequentialists … are climbing the same mountain on different sides.” By that he meant that when their views are properly developed, they will converge. One reason to reject his substantive view, however, is that he could not see how to account for the deontological intuition that it is very hard to justify using people as a means. Matthew Oliver offers a clever way for evaluator-neutral consequentialists like Parfit to account for that intuition. But (...) Oliver’s account runs into two problems: the axiology itself is problematic, and it seems inconsistent with other deep deontological intuitions. I offer a different development of contractualism that accounts for the relevant deontological intuitions, but it’s a fundamentally different “mountain.” Convergence is not in sight, but one can still hope that all climbers will eventually migrate to the better mountain. (shrink)