A private, for-profit company has recently opened a pair of plasma donation centres in Canada, at which donors can be compensated up to $50 for their plasma. This has sparked a nation-wide debate around the ethics of paying plasma donors. Our aim in this paper is to shift the terms of the current debate away from the question of whether plasma donors should be paid and toward the question of who should be paying them. We consider arguments against paying plasma (...) donors grounded in concerns about exploitation, commodification, and the introduction of a profit motive. We find them all to be normatively inconclusive, but also overbroad in light of Canada’s persistent reliance on plasma from paid donors in the United States. While we believe that there are good reasons to oppose allowing a private company to profit from Canada’s blood supply, these concerns can be addressed if payment is dispensed instead by a public, not-for-profit agency. In short, we reject profiting from plasma while we endorse paying for plasma; we therefore conclude in favour of a new Canadian regime of public sector plasma collection and compensation. (shrink)

One of the central considerations to be taken into account in evaluating the ethics of compensation for donated plasma is respect for donor autonomy. And one of the main arguments against compensated donation systems is that many donors do or would come from circumstances of poverty that restrict their alternatives in a way that compromises those donors’ autonomy. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel version of this “compromised autonomy argument” which improves upon extant versions by employing a (...) more nuanced account of the relationship between alternatives and autonomy. According to the version of that argument I offer, donors lack autonomy with respect to the sale of their plasma if their economic circumstances leave them with no choice but to sell their plasma on the basis of a desire they have had no choice but to hold. After explicating the key terms of this argument, I examine its policy implications. I argue that, given several reasonable empirical assumptions, my argument implies that a majority of individuals whose income falls below a specified threshold would indeed lack autonomy with respect to the sale of their plasma. Most individuals whose income falls above that threshold, on the other hand, would be able to autonomously sell their plasma. I argue that respect for donor autonomy therefore speaks in favor of an income-restricted system of compensated donation which permits collection centers to purchase plasma from those whose income falls above the relevant threshold, but not those below it. (shrink)

Although transplantation surgeries are relatively successful and save the lives of many, only few are willing to donate organs. In order to better understand the reasons for donation or refusing donation and their implications on and influence by public policy, we conducted a survey examining public views on this issue in Israel. Between January and June 2010, an anonymous questionnaire based on published literature was distributed among random and selected parts of Israeli society and included organ recipients, organ donors, soldiers, (...) university and high school students, and the general population. The analysis of 799 questionnaires revealed that, although 74.7 percent have not signed a donor card, 60.8 percent of participants consider doing so. Additionally, 54.3 percent of respondents objected to giving or receiving compensation for donation, and, if at all, priority in transplantation care is the most desired form of such compensation. The health status of the donor and knowing that donation saves lives or that there exists a shortage of organs for transplantation are the two factors most affecting motivation to donate. Lack of information, relatives’ views on donation, and type of organ involved in donation are factors most inhibiting donation. Willingness to donate is significantly affected by the proximity of the recipient to the donor. With regard to most organs, their contribution to one’s sense of “self” and its symbolic role strongly affects motivation to donate, except for donation to relatives. Compensation for organ donation has little effect on motivation to donate during life and after death. Our findings suggest new ways to construct a more effective public policy on this issue. (shrink)

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one ‘buyer’—in (...) this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the ‘crowding out’ of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England. (shrink)

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller’s dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller’s dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of (...) dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney. (shrink)

In The Gift Relationship, Richard Titmuss argued that the practice of altruistic blood donation fosters social solidarity while markets in blood erode it. This paper considers the implications of this line of argument for the organ market debate. I defend Titmuss’ arguments against a number of criticisms and respond to claims that Titmuss’ work is not relevant to the context of live donor organ transplantation. I conclude that Titmuss’ arguments are more resilient than many advocates of organ markets suggest, and (...) more relevant to the debate than is commonly appreciated. (shrink)

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective—and morally justified—means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions (...) that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where “market-place morality” is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves. (shrink)

The essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore an innovative voucher program for encouraging kidney donation. Discussions cluster around a number of central moral and political/theoretical themes: What are the direct and indirect health care costs and benefits of such a voucher system in human organs? Do vouchers lead to more effective and efficient organ procurement and allocation or contribute to greater inequalities and inefficiencies in the transplantation system? Do vouchers contribute to the inappropriate commodification (...) of human body parts? Is there a significant moral difference between such a voucher system and a market in human organs for transplantation? This paper argues that while kidney vouchers constitute a step in the right direction, fuller utilization of market-based incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges, would save more lives and further reduce human suffering. (shrink)

Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and a market-based procurement system introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment-for-consent futures market, and the family-reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, (...) that consent to sell organs is invalid, that sellers will be harmed, and that commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family-reward futures market fares best in this comparison but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models and the increase in available organs they can be expected to provide. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial to state that meeting the vital medical needs of the vulnerable is agoal of great moral importance. Those in need of an organ transplant are among the mostvulnerable and yet society has to a large extent failed them. Many would-be organ recipientshave to wait for long periods of time before they get the organ that they need and some haveto wait until it is too late. Something has to change. One of the most widely discussedsolutions is to (...) create a regulated market in organs. The financial incentives are believed toencourage more people to give someone else their organs, thus significantly increasingsupply. Regardless of the potential effectiveness of such a solution, there are many who takea principled stand against organ markets. These objections generally stem from a concern forthe insidious potential for coercion and the hazard of exploitation. I will argue that thearguments against organ markets fail due to the flawed conceptualization of coercion, fairnessand the expressive meaning of markets that these arguments are premised on. Furthermore,even though there is some truth to the exploitation objection, it does not have sufficient moralrelevance to justify a prohibition on a regulated market in organs. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence in medicine, economics, law, and anthropology, I argue that a market is uniquely capable of meeting the demand for transplantable kidneys, and that it may be arranged so as to operate safely. The welfare gains, expected to accrue to both vendors and recipients, are sufficient to justify sales. Having spelled out the considerations recommending a kidney market, I address the most forceful objections facing the proposal. Despite its currency, the claim that incentives will crowd out altruistic (...) donors and result in a decrease in supply is empirically unsupported and predicated on an implausible view of donorsâ motives. A host of objections claim vendorsâ will not give informed consent. Many such objections identify easily remediable problems, or impose unreasonable standards â standards that would rule out morally permissible kidney donation. And all presuppose a model of morally transformative consent that, I argue, is deficient. Two further challenges point to harms inflicted on those who do not participate in the market. Some claim that those in poverty will be subject to harmful social and legal pressure to vend. This objection fails to distinguish between being pressured to perform a specific act, and being under general economic pressure and having the option to perform an act. It, moreover, presupposes vending more common than is possible. Others worry that the market will give rise to unfair pecuniary externalities. This objection also presupposes that kidney sales will occur more often than is possible. But more importantly, the normative consideration that is supposed to make such externalities especially objectionable, in fact, recommends allowing sales. I also make a political case for kidney sales. I offer an account of the stateâs proper role in the market. I begin with a conception of democratic equality according to which the state is responsible to secure for its citizens the preconditions for democratic participation. I then show that this end would be promoted were the state to end the current prohibition on sales. (shrink)