Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is ‘spacetime unitism’, according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A second is the B-theory of time, according to which the (...) past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to unitism and to the B-theory. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism. (shrink)

The branching time analysis grounds the possibilities entailed by temporal indeterminism in a branching temporal structure. I construct a spatial analog of the branching time analysis – the branching space analysis – according to which the possibilities entailed by spatial indeterminism are grounded in branching spatial structure. The construction proceeds in such a way as to show the analogies between the branching space and branching time analyses. I argue that the two views are a package. In particular: the theoretical virtues (...) of the one are theoretical virtues of the other and so if one ought to be accepted, then the other should also be accepted. And: if one ought to be denied, then the other ought to be denied as well. Thus, the branching space analysis functions either as a counterexample to the reductive strategy embodied in the branching time analysis or as a reasonable extension of it – as a lesson learned from it. (shrink)

Accounts of modal knowledge are many and varied. How should we choose between them? I propose that we employ inference to the best explanation, and I suggest that there are three desiderata that we should use to rank hypotheses: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle disagreement. After examining these desiderata, I contend that they can’t be used to justify belief in the modal epistemology that fares best, but that they can justify our accepting it in an epistemically significant sense. (...) Finally, I outline a modal epistemology that seems to do well by the standards I’ve recommended. (shrink)

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (...) of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage. (shrink)

Is philosophy useful for physics? Many physicists and philosophers believe that it is; but there are those who challenge the usefulness of philosophy for science. Three major objections can be identified in their reasoning: 1. Philosophy’s death diagnosis, which states that philosophy is dead and has nothing new to teach us. 2. Historic-agnostic argument/challenge, which states that there is no historical evidence for the claim that philosophy is useful for science, or if it is, it is unknown to us. 3. (...) The division of property argument, which states that philosophy and science are two distinct fields. The purpose of this article is to respond to these three objections by examining the case study of the relationship between general relativity and philosophy. By looking at the history of the formation and development of general relativity, we will argue that: 1. Philosophy has led to a refinement and deep understanding of the important concepts of covariance and invariance. 2. There is clear historical evidence for the positive influence of philosophy on the development of the core concepts of general relativity, as one of the most important physical theories, as well as the undeniable evidence for the key role of some philosophers in the development of the theory. 3. Physics and philosophy, in seeking answers to fundamental questions, are two highly intertwined fields. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the (...) Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise. (shrink)

What is it that determines the identity of an entity? Processualism is a theoretical perspective that offers a startling answer to this question. The identity of an entity—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate—depends on the set of relations in which this entity is located. And as the sets of relations are several, so are the identities that an entity can take. This article discusses this conclusion by integrating processual accounts from different fields of inquiry, such as relativistic physics and (...) actor-network theory. According to a processual interpretation of relativistic physics, speaking of states of things is but an abstraction. For states come from the introduction of arbitrary breakups of the spacetime continuum. Therefore, processes precede states, a process being a set of relations that confers identity on a physical state. According to a processual interpretation of actor-network theory, the same holds true for actors. Again, speaking of states of actors is but an abstraction. For what really acts is heterogeneous networks. When one describes actors in isolation, one is neglecting a whole array of relations with other actors whereby that actor can act or is made to act in such and such a way. These strands of processualism come to the same conclusion as to the identity of entities. These are not characterized by individuality but by individuality: they can be differently individuated according to the set of relations one is able to take into account. The main methodological consequence is that, if one intends to describe what an entity is, knowledge of this entity—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate—should be based on progressively less narrow localizations and mappings of the relations it has to other entities. (shrink)

In the last two centuries, a better understanding of nature and significant advances in science and technology have led to the emergence of new and exciting ideas and approaches. Almost all of them are known as the product of contemporary science. Ideas such as evolution in biology, the ideas about the beginning of the universe (models based on the existence of a starting point for the universe or otherwise), and the idea of parallel worlds in physics. Although these ideas have (...) flourished in the context of modern science, they contain important philosophical backgrounds and as a result, have some important philosophical consequences. In this article, a historical review of the writings and works of Ibn Sina shows that each of these ideas has been presented similarly since ancient times in natural philosophy. Therefore, their position is more philosophical than scientific. Using these theories without considering their metaphysical and non-experimental assumptions will lead to misconceptions. Many of the challenges between science and religion stem from not considering the limits of empirical science and a lack of attention to the metaphysical assumptions of scientific theories. In this article, we will explain Ibn Sina's reasons for or against these theories as one of the first people to explicitly examine the scientific and philosophical aspects of these theories. Ibn Sina's scientific accuracy and admirable scientific spirit can be enlightening for contemporary scholars. (shrink)